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Abstract
China‘s curriculum system has been undergoing substantial transformations
since 1986. In response to public criticism of the highly prescribed national
curriculum, the central state of China is attempting to build a more inclusive system
which is composed of national curriculum, province curriculum and school-based
curriculum. The new curriculum system accommodates more flexibility in carrying
out national curriculum policies and even encourages local input in curriculum
development and management. Apparently, the current curriculum reform in China is
moving toward decentralization.
The purpose of this work is to demonstrate the complexity of decentralization
reform in China‘s curriculum system and examine the dynamics of policy formulation
and outcomes of reform efforts in great depth. The main argument made in this sociophilosophical work is that the on-going Chinese curriculum reform is a process of
centralized decentralization, which merely transfers work to the local level but not
real authority. With an inquiry into the impetus of current Chinese curriculum reform,
this theoretical research illustrates that centralized decentralization is taken as a
strategic imperative by the state to avoid loss of control over school curriculum that
carries particular social and political significance for China in a transitional period.
Another major task for this cultural studies research is to problematize the strategy of
centralized decentralization, investigating the consequences of the superficial
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decentralization in reality and analyzing the bottlenecks in promoting current Chinese
curriculum reform.
In this research, Mark Hanson‘s conceptual framework of education
decentralization is used to clarify ambiguity in defining decentralization reform in the
education sector in China. Meanwhile, Foucault‘s theory about power/knowledge and
governmentality and Williams‘ theory about hegemony are used to deepen the
understanding of the state-education relationship in contemporary China. Besides a
descriptive analysis of phenomena in current Chinese curriculum reform, the
discussion is deployed through pragmatic approach and logic-based reasoning. Most
data are obtained from literature review, including previous studies on Chinese
education reform, government documents, laws and regulations related to current
Chinese curriculum reform.
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Preface
I was educated in China‘s public schools. Sitting in the classrooms, I was being
given knowledge, but also being socialized to be part of Chinese society. Gradually, I
have acknowledged a plurality of shared norms and social customs and learned to
make myself acceptable to my own groups and the larger society. Situated in this
specific socio-cultural context, I simply used my own experience to understand the
nuances in my daily life and looked at issues in Chinese education through an
insider‘s perspective. Four years ago, I came to study at an American university.
Immediately upon arrival, I was surrounded by an alien language and beings whose
social codes are unlike my own. After experiencing excitement with irritability, I have
learned to enjoy my sojourning in the cultural borderland between the two countries
and think reflectively on my knowledge about China. At the same time, despite being
physically distanced from my homeland, I felt much stronger sentimental attachment
to China and become more concerned about Chinese education reform. Writing this
dissertation is a chance for me to rethink the issues newly emerging in Chinese
education, especially in current curriculum reform.
Since 1949, the curriculum system in China has experienced substantial change.
The focus and content of these changes have varied over time and among different
parts of the system. Yet there has been a discernible trend of decentralization in
Chinese education reform since 1985. The purpose of this study is to reexamine this
trend in the changing socio-political context of China in this reform era and draw
vi

attention to the complexity of the tension between centralization and decentralization
in the curriculum reform. By doing so, I intend to question some assumptions that
people have taken for granted and open a new discussion on the on-going curriculum
reform in China.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Overview and Research Objectives
Historically, the central-local relations are the core issue in China due to its
vast territory and huge population. The economic reform initiated in the late
1970s has redefined the central-local relations in China. In the three decades of
economic reform, the central command economy has been gradually replaced by
the market mechanism. This structural transformation ―fundamentally shakes
China‘s centrally planned system which over decades constituted the very basis of
the nation‘s state socialist polity‖ (Jia & Wang, 1994, p. 35). In top-down
economic reform, step by step, the central authority allows more discretion to
local governments and encourages innovations in local affairs. Meanwhile, driven
by the force of market, local entities are becoming more sensitive to their own
economic performance. Consequently, local autonomy grows rapidly in the
economic reform. The impact of the changing central-local relations in Chinese
economy is far-reaching.
In the education sector, immediately after the founding of the People‘s
Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the new regime began to restore a public school
system under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). By transforming
public schools inherited from the previous regime and nationalizing private
schools, charity schools and missionary schools, all non-state schools were
excluded from China until the 1980s. In 1950s, a highly centralized public school
1

system was established in China. Meanwhile, insisting on the centrally-planned
funding, hierarchized administrative management and unified national curriculum,
schools across the state were put into a fixed model. The goal of the school system
was to educate as many people as possible under equal conditions. This egalitarian
strategy was to reduce the differences between city and countryside; workers and
peasants and mental and manual labors (Pepper, 1980a; Rosen, 1982). In the early
years of the PRC, to provide education for all children, especially for children from
previously under-privileged social groups, the state favored the centralized model of
mass education. The idea of egalitarian education led to a rapid quantitative expansion
in school education until the outbreak of the Great Cultural Revolution (1966-1976)
when regular schooling in primary and secondary schools were suspended, and later
urban youth were sent to the countryside to accept manual labor education from the
peasants1.
To restore Chinese education from the chaos in the Great Cultural Revolution
(1966-1976), a top-down education reform was initiated in 1985. First, as part of
the broad fiscal reform in the state, the central government began to reduce
subsidies for schools; consequently, education officials at local levels started to
pursue alternative sources to fund local schools (Hawkins, 2006; Wong, 2006).
1

In 1968, a nationally organized movement of ―sending-youth-to-countryside‖ was officially initiated

with the encouragement and support directly from Mao Zedong. Millions of urban youth were sent to
countryside in order to be reeducated by the peasants. Mao (1968) asserts the down to countryside
movement was a necessary approach to remove the differences between workers and peasants, between
city and countryside and between mental and manual labors.
2

By 1997, an estimated 45 percent of funding for precollegiate education in China
was from nongovernmental sources (Li & Wang, 2001).
Accompanying the emergence of the diversified financial provision system for
school education in China, a variety of social forces have stepped into local
educational affairs and participated in the operation of schools. As a result, almost
all aspects of Chinese education, from provision and administration to curriculum
development have been re-shaped (Tsang, 1996; Mok, 1998; Chan & Wang, 2006;
Zhong, 2006; Shi & Englert, 2008). Some studies have illustrated that the central
authority intends to retreat from its previous role as the sole provider of education
services. Meanwhile, local entities are playing more important roles in the Chinese
education system. In the trend of privatizing and marketizing Chinese schools, an
internal market or quasi-market for education is slowly emerging in China (Mok,
1997; Mok & Chan, 1998&2001; Mok, Wong& Zhang, 2009; Ngok, 2007). These
changes create an appearance that this wave of education reform is framed within a
larger decentralization strategy.
Yet, the decentralization reform in Chinese education is not an isolated
phenomenon. Transferring the governance of a nation state‘s education system to
lower levels, both at fiscal and administrative levels, has become a global trend
(Currie & Newson, 1998; Spring, 1998; Taylor, Rizvi, Lingard & Henry, 1997). In
recent years, international funding organizations, such as the World Bank, UNESCO,
and Asia Development Bank (ADB), have devoted their resources to advancing
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education reforms across the world, often making decentralization a precondition for
financial assistance (Conyers, 1984; Hanson, 2000; Rhoten, 2000). According to
Hong Kong scholar Mok Ka-Ho (2005), decentralization has become a popular public
policy strategy widely adopted by many nations, being offered as a solution for
improving the organization and management of the public sector. American
comparative education scholar Christopher Bjork (2006) notes that in the context of
decentralization, nations that choose not to follow this trend risk being marginalized
in international policy circles.
In the midst of the worldwide trend of decentralizing a nation state‘s education
system, the shared assumption is that transferring education governance to local levels
would contribute to promoting resource allocation, fostering innovations and
encouraging diversities in education. Ultimately, localizing education governance will
contribute to promoting education equality and quality. However, this is only a
theoretical assumption. Education policy scholar, Diana Rhoten (1999) observes that
due to the dearth of studies on education decentralization, ―little is known about the
nation course and local outcomes of decentralization within developing countries, nor
know they differ‖ (p.9). Cathy Gaynor (1998), a consultant of the World Bank‘s
Human Development Department agrees with Rhoten that ―while the view of
decentralization of education continues to attract considerable interest and support,
there is an increasing demand to extract lessons from experience and to critically
challenge assumptions about decentralization‖ (p.4). More importantly, under the
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name of decentralization, the actual reform initiative and process could vary widely
from state to state. Thus, a growing need is to provide a better contextualized analysis
on education decentralization reform.
The current wave of education reform in China is broad in scope and in scale,
including almost all aspects of the state‘s education sector and affecting everyone
involved in the system. To establish my own niche in the dissertation, I concentrate on
the current curriculum reform initiated in 1986, when the Compulsory Education Law
of People’s Republic of China was promulgated. Curriculum reform is a crucial step
in the chain of education reform. Curriculum reform is also the battleground where
diverse social forces take positions and all conflicts play out. Comparative education
scholar John Hawkins (2006) observes, ―[C]ontrol over the content of schooling is
usually one of the last areas that central authorities are willing to decentralize‖ (p.35).
This observation is also true in the case of China. In the current wave of Chinese
education reform, the central authority is very cautious of any reform effort in the
curriculum field. However, some fundamental adjustments in the curriculum field
have been evidenced. The supportive example is the emergence of a three-level
curriculum system of state, province and school within which the MOE maintains
control over 80 percent of school curriculum, but allows local education departments
and schools to innovate on 20 percent of courses (MOE, 2001a).
Undoubtedly, the new Chinese curriculum system constructed in the reform has
begun to tolerate more local inputs and diversities. How do we understand this change
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in the unique socio-political context of Chinese education? Does this change mean
China‘s curriculum system is moving toward decentralization? In a nation state with a
long history of centralized controlling over its school curriculum, such a conclusion
could be rash. In fact, in transitional China, central-local relations in education sector
is very complicated, especially considering that the reform policies are always in
change and the real efforts could differentiate in regions. After 15 years of efforts, the
curriculum reform in China is now at a crucial moment, waiting for a major
breakthrough. On the one hand, from the policy-makers at the center to school
administrators on the ground, from educational scholars to school teachers, everyone
is seeking the right path for improving China‘s curriculum system in the changing
national and international contexts. On the other hand, until now the reform has
seemed to lead only to mediocre result, even with the boost for innovations and
incentives in curriculum management and development. Thus, it is imperative to
reexamine the current curriculum reform in China both at the policy-making and
implementation levels.
Comparative education scholar Christopher Bjork (2006) finds that the few
studies of decentralization policies enacted in Asia primarily concentrate on decisionmaking at upper levels of government bureaucracies, but the implementation of those
decisions for local education stakeholders is not explored in great depth. Literature on
decentralization reform in Chinese education at the precollegiate level is in a similar
situation. The few studies focus on the reform policy input, describing the shifting of
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national policy toward devolving education governance over fiscal, administrative and
academic management to the local level (Hawkins, 2000; Ngok, 2007; Chan & Wang,
2009). The case studies on education decentralization analyze the reform process in
some specific settings (Mok, 1997, Lun & Chan, 2003, Wong, 2006). What is missing
from the literature is a deepened examination of the contextual factors that shape the
so-called decentralization reform in Chinese education. More noticeably, the previous
studies incline to put attention purely on decentralization, ignoring the tension
between centralization and decentralization in the unique socio-political context of
China. This dissertation intends to provide a relatively comprehensive picture of the
current curriculum reform in China with focus on the tension between centralization
and decentralization.
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate the complexity of
central-local relations in Chinese curriculum reform, to identify contextual factors that
shape current curriculum policies in China, and to investigate authority-sharing issues
in the reform process. Concretely, in contextualizing the curriculum reform into its
specific historical and contemporary background, the dissertation seeks answers to
why curriculum reform is occurring at this particular moment and in this particular
form. This study illustrates the complexity of the decentralization trend in the unique
socio-political context of China through investigating the motivation, objectives and
practices of the reform. To draw attention to the tension between centralization and
decentralization in curriculum reform, this study explores the particularity of school
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curriculum in terms of its social and political functions and reexamines the state‘s role
in current curriculum reform. At the end, the focus is placed on the outcome of reform.
In analyzing the bottlenecks in promoting the curriculum reform, this study
investigates policy dilemmas in this top-down curriculum reform and deep causes of
these dilemmas.
1.2 Philosophical and Mythological Positioning
At the outset, I should position myself in the research and describe my research
method. As a Chinese studying in an US university, I am a cultural sojourner
traversing boundaries of countries, races and languages. After experiencing a strong
sense of displacement regarding environment and culture, I am dedicated to building
an ongoing dialogic relationship between my Chinese cultural roots and the US social
context. In this project, I reexamine Chinese curriculum reform from a cross-cultural
perspective. As a cultural studies practitioner, I would follow the lead of Raymond
Williams, one of the pioneers in the field, who describes that culture is ―the ordinary
processes of human societies and human minds‖ that make up the lived experience of
culture as ―a whole way of life‖ (Williams, 1989, p.4). I insist studies should make
meaning of ordinary people‘s everyday life and dethrone the hierarchized dichotomy
inherent to our social, cultural, and historical discourses. The ongoing curriculum
reform is significantly changing Chinese society and individuals‘ life in the country.
This project is to straighten out some twists in the current wave of curriculum reform
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in China and open more reflective thinking about the effects of reform as well as the
future direction of reform.
Epistemologically, I am a social-constructivist, embracing the view that
knowledge is socially constructed (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Ernest, 1998) and that
human beings are social beings-in-relations (Dewey, 1931/2008; James, 1907/1975;
Noddings, 1984; Thayer-Bacon, 2003). As Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann
(1966) insist, all knowledge, including the most basic, taken-for-granted common
sense knowledge of everyday life, is derived from social interactions between
individuals and their environments. In fact, each individual is positioned in a given
historical, social, and cultural context; and each individual is positioned in a net of
relationships. Thus, individuals experience and perceive their own life in certain
ways, but individuals never live alone. They influence others and are influenced by
others. When people interact with each other, they do so with their respective
perceptions of the world surrounding them and act on their own understanding. The
most important point is that people negotiate with diverse standpoints in social
interactions and then construct an ultimate criterion to judge knowledge. In this sense,
knowledge is socially constructed and human beings are ―social beings-in-relation‖
(Thayer-Bacon, 2003). Consistent with my social constructive paradigm, it is
necessary to develop an inclusive mode to understand the realities and connect
superficially separate phenomena or objects with their particular contexts.
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I am unable to bracket out all the bias and taken-for-grantedness in my studies,
because my own experience and knowledge are inevitably embedded in certain
contexts. However, as Thayer-Bacon (2003) says, ―we are greatly determined by our
social settings as social being, but we are also able to become aware of our
embeddedness, because we are social beings. Others shape our views, but also help us
become aware of how views differ‖ (p.32). In this dissertation, taking a cross-national
perspective, I intend to problematize the current reform strategy in the on-going
curriculum restructuring process in China and open up new possibility for others to
rethink of China‘s curriculum system.
In this dissertation, my major approach to reexamine Chinese curriculum reform
is a socio-philosophical one. To put it concretely, besides a descriptive analysis, I
deploy the discussion through pragmatic analysis and logic-based reasoning.
Meanwhile ordinary language analysis is used to explain and clarify key concepts in
the project. Here, I explain how the methodology works in my dissertation. According
to Bertrand Russell (1910), description is an approach to knowledge:
Our knowledge of physical objects and of other minds is only
knowledge by description, the descriptions involved being usually
such as involve sense-data. All propositions intelligible to us,
whether or not they primarily concern things only known to us by
description, are composed wholly of constituents with which we are
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acquainted, for a constituent with which we are not acquainted is
unintelligible to us. (p.128)
Here, Russell not only shows how knowledge by description differs from
knowledge by acquaintance, but also points out how knowledge by description is
related to knowledge by acquaintance. The crucial point made in his statement is that
we can acknowledge the objects through description, though we can‘t be acquainted
with all objects, we still could acknowledge the objects through description.
The purpose of the factually-grounded description is to draw attention to core
issues covered in the dissertation and build a solid factual basis for further discussion.
In this dissertation, descriptive analysis is used to contextualize the Chinese
curriculum reform in its social, political, historical and contemporary background.
Meanwhile, the description of what is actually taking place under the name of
decentralization reform and how its effects on Chinese education are also provided.
Pragmatic philosophy 2 also inspires me with its particular emphasis on
experience and fallibilism. William James, Charles Peirce and John Dewey, three core
figures in classic pragmatism, share the opinion that experience contributes to
knowing. James‘s radical empiricism (1912/1976) claims that ―there is a function in

2

Barbara Thayer-Bacon puts particular focus on epistemology issues in her book Transforming

Critical Thinking and Relational “(e)pistemologies‖. She has developed insightful discussion about
how pragmatism, feminism and post-modernism address the epistemology issues and present an
analytic critique on the epistemology issues form her pragmatist social feminist view. The two books
are the source for me to construct my own epistemological position as well as the pragmatist approach
in the dissertation.
11

experience which thoughts perform, and for the performance of which this quality of
being is invoked. That function is knowing‖ (p.4). Peirce (1878/2000) argues that
―[C]onsider what effects that might conceivable have practical bearings, we conceive
the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole
of our conception of the object‖ (p.31). Dewey (1916/1966) asserts experience is not
primarily cognitive, but ―the measure of the value of an experience lies in the
perception of relationships or continuities to which it leads up. It includes cognition in
the degree in which it is cumulative or amounts to something, or has meaning‖
(p.139). These pragmatists treat experience as an approach to knowing. Drawing
attention to the value of experience, pragmatism connects the knower with the
knowing, thinking with doing.
Fallibilism is a widely-held belief of pragmatists. Peirce (1905/1998) asserts that
Truth is in the material world, but human beings are fallible, limited, contextual
beings who cannot trust their ideas or their experience to lead them to Truth. Thus,
Peirce suggests that we need work as a community of rational inquirers to further our
knowledge and understanding. Insisting on the notion that truth is related to an
individual‘s situation, James‘ epistemology ―aims to dissolve the absolute/relative
distinction‖ (Thayer-Bacon, 2003). James (1907/1975) claims that ―[T]rue ideas are
those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify. False ideas are those
that we cannot‖ (p. 97). Dewey uses ―warranted assertion‖ to replace the terms belief
and knowledge: ―[W]hen knowledge is taken as a general abstract term related to
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inquiry in the abstract, it means ‗warranted assertiblility‘‖ (1938/2008, p.16). Merging
truth and inquiry together, Dewey‘s ―warranted assertibility‖ problematizes the
existence of universal truth and unchangeable knowledge, but emphasizes that the
construction of knowledge/truth is an ever-ongoing, social, communal process. From
the standpoint of fallibilism, it is more understandable why classical pragmatists
continually

question

the

dualism

in

body/mind,

objective/subjective

and

absolute/relative and knower/known in traditional Western philosophy.
Using a pragmatic approach, I focus on concrete educational issues related to
people‘s everyday life rather than on abstract, obscure, broad inquiry about education
and reform. Thus, this project is not satisfied at conceptualizing education
decentralization or theorizing curriculum policies in China. Much more attention is
put on what is actually taking place in China‘s curriculum system under the name of
decentralization reform, why the reform occurs at this particular moment and in this
particular form and how the strategy taken in the reform affects reconstructing the
central-location relations in China‘s curriculum system. In addition, the discussion
extends to analyze the bottlenecks in promoting the reform toward desired goals and
to relate institutional impediments in the curriculum reform with the value dilemmas
in China‘s education philosophy. It is insisted that to provide a contextualized picture
of the current curriculum reform, all discussion and analysis are situated in the
changing socio-political realities of China since the 1980s.

13

Following pragmatists‘ lead in rejecting dualism, this dissertation not only
integrates policy-making in education bureaucracy with policy implementation in
local realities, but also emphasizes the tension between centralization and
decentralization in curriculum reform. This dissertation insists that neither
centralization nor decentralization should be examined separately. Both are effective
governing technologies with particular limitations and practicality, but the key is
always about how to balance between the center and localities. Therefore, this
dissertation draws attention to the complexity of central-local relations in China‘s
curriculum governance and issues in authority/responsibility sharing in reforming
China‘s curriculum system. Meanwhile, consistent with pragmatists‘ emphasis on
connecting knowledge with social communities of inquirers, this dissertation cites
scholars‘ works on educational decentralization and Chinese education reform. The
purpose is to represent a variety of opinions on the decentralization trend in Chinese
curriculum reform and ultimately illustrate how I have built my own arguments in this
project.
Ordinary language analysis is another approach used in this dissertation. This
approach seeks to understand philosophic ideas through a close and careful semantic
examination of ordinary language, aiming to clarify ambiguity and possible
misunderstandings of everyday language. Ordinary language analysis may appear
empty and trivial. Ernest Gellner (1959) even claims this method can never provide
insight into social reality, because ―concepts are as liable to mask reality as to reveal
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it, and masking some of it may be a part of their function‖ (p.148). However, I agree
with political philosopher Wertheimer‘s argument that socially accepted language
could not be simply treated as language itself. As Wertherimer (1976) states, ―our
language contains concepts that function as ideas or standards by which prevailing
values, institutions and patterns can be evaluated‖ (p.411). In other words, the value
of ordinary language lies in the connection between everyday language and its social
context. The analysis of ordinary language could provide insight into realities where
those terms are rooted. Power, governmentality, knowledge, centralization and
decentralization are key concepts in this dissertation. Those are also some of the
most-frequently-seen terms in the ordinary discourse about education reform. Before I
move to further discussion, I will clarify the meanings and implications of these
concepts in my dissertation.
The logic analysis used in this dissertation follows the traditional methodology
used in Western philosophy. According to Patrick Hurley, logic is ―the science that
evaluates arguments‖. The purpose of logic is to ―develop methods and techniques
that allow us to distinguish good argument from bad‖ (Hurley, 2006, p.1). Like most
scholars do in logic analysis, I look for validity and soundness in evaluating
arguments. The argument‘s validity means that the system‘s rules of proof will never
allow a false inference from true premises; soundness means that the system‘s rules of
proof will never allow a false inference from true premises and the premises prove
true (Bergmann, Moor & Nelson, 2009). In this dissertation, to make sound deductive
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arguments, in which the premises purport to fully support the conclusion, I examine
the validity of the logical form and make sure that the premises are true. To make
strong inductive arguments, in which the premises purport to partially support the
conclusion, I examine the reasonableness of the partial support offered by premises.
Meanwhile, I reevaluate the findings and previous studies cited in the dissertation
based on the evidence provided in their own analyses and highlight the assumptions
within their arguments. I am always aware of the importance of precision, clarity and
consistency in the logic analysis.
Most data shown in the study are obtained through literature review. I reread
education-related government documents, provisions, regulations and laws to map the
state‘s attitude and policies toward curriculum reform. Information obtained from
newspapers and periodicals are used as necessary supplements to picture the context
of Chinese education and issues in Chinese curriculum reform. Studies on Chinese
curriculum reform by scholars from both inside and outside of China and relevant
studies of education reform from international perspectives are also reviewed in this
dissertation.
1.3 Theoretical and Conceptual Frameworks
This section offers some insight into the key concepts used in the following
exploration. I start with the notion of power. In ordinary discourse, the term power
usually makes people think of control and oppression between the dominated and the
dominant. However, in the book History of Sexuality, Foucault (1978/1990) defines
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power as ―the multiplicity of force relations‖ (p.92). Foucault makes it very clear: 1)
there is no binary or opposition between the dominant and the dominated in the
manifold force relations; 2) power is immanent in all social relations. Foucault
reminds us that ―[W]here there is power, there is resistance‖ and that the resistance is
always inside power: ―there is no ‗escaping‘ it‖ (p.95). Foucault further emphasizes
that the existence of power relationships depends on a multiplicity of points of
resistance: ―these play the role of adversary, target, support or handle in power
relations. These points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network‖
(p.95). Thus, Foucault suggests that attention should not be placed on domination, but
rather on governmentality, where the technologies of power, the exercise of power
and project of power are happening. Foucault (1982) explains how power functions in
the form of governmentality: ―‗Government‘ did not refer only to political structures
or to the management of states; rather it designated the way in which the conduct of
individuals or of groups might be directed‖ (p.221).
Based on Foucault‘s theory about power and governmentality, this dissertation
refers centralization to a tactic of governmentality which operates on something
called the state, and decentralization to an opposite to centralization. Both
centralization and decentralization work at the point where power is produced.
However,

centralization

functions

toward

concentration,

convergence

and

homogenization; in contrast, decentralization functions toward dispersity, divergence
and heterogenization. Concretely, centralization is used to reformulate diverse social
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forces into a coactive force through a set of means. Within the processes of
centralization, there are struggles, confrontations and transformations among diverse
forces and the terminal form of this force relations take could be domination.
Decentralization is embedded in centralization, in the same way that resistances are
inherent in the power network. The coactive force formed in centralization is always
challenged by various social forces in different ways. In this sense, decentralization
promises an effort to destabilize and deconstruct a consolidated arrangement of force
relations, producing cleavages in a society and leading to a regrouping of those social
forces.
Through Foucault‘s theoretical lens, centralization and decentralization
mentioned in this dissertation are conceptualized in terms of the mobilization of
multiple power forces. How are the two concepts applied in educational sittings? In
the discourse of education reform, sometimes, the definitions of centralization and
decentralization are ambiguous. As they appear in previous literature, there is little
specified clarification about what is shifting in the process of centralization or
decentralization. Is it authority, responsibility, personnel or resources? Meanwhile,
such definitions also attempt to analyze the quantitative aspects of the shifting, i.e.:
the comparison of the size of the public sectors versus the private sectors in education
system; or the ratio of central government to local government expenditures on
education. Definitely, all of those perspectives could be useful approaches to examine
current trends in education reforms, but at the risk of oversimplification. In fact,
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decentralization or centralization in particular national contexts could take different
forms, have distinct content and move toward diverse ends. The focus in defining
centralization and decentralization needs clarification.
This project attempts to build a conceptual framework to define centralization
and decentralization with the focus on authority sharing in the process of decisionmaking. In this dissertation, educational centralization refers to the concentration of
authority over all kinds of resource flows across decision-making points in an
education system; and educational decentralization refers to the distribution of
authority over all kinds of resource flows across decision-making points in an
education system. Quantitative aspects of the reform, including finance, personnel,
information, etc, are important indicators to the degree of centralization or
decentralization in a system; but a deep examination of both centralization and
decentralization reforms must involve the structural dimension of decision-making,
i.e. what proportion of decision-makers control what proportion of decisions.
Discussion on the current trends in China‘s curriculum reform in this dissertation
centers on the latter.
Knowledge is another key concept in this dissertation. An unbroken line leads
from the Ancient Greek, to the European Renaissance, to the Age of Enlightenment,
and then to the modern Western philosophy that describes knowledge as innate and
unchangeable and the absolute truth as a necessary condition for what can be defined
as knowledge. Plato (Trans. 1892) believes that knowledge is in the certainty, because
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knowledge derives from the Forms, which is the universal answer to the question
―What is that?‖. Aristotle (Trans. 1986) asserts that actual knowledge is identical with
its object, but knowledge in its highest phase is associated with the essential nature of
reality. Descartes (1641/1984), the founding father of modern philosophy, defines
knowledge as justified, true belief, and thus, knowledge is ―incapable of being
destroyed‖ (p.103). Siegel (1997), a present-day modernist, insists that it is dangerous
to slide into the trap of relativism, where there is not a right/wrong answer to any
question, because ―absolutism is a necessary precondition of epistemological inquiry‖
(p.165). Obviously, with the emphasis on the transcendence of knowledge, traditional
epistemology identifies knowledge with unshakable, universal truth. However,
pragmatists, feminists and postmodernists bring in their concerns on the
absolutism/relativism dualism in defining knowledge.
As mentioned before, classical pragmatists contribute significantly to
problematizing the absolute/relative dichotomy through their emphasis on the
association between experience and knowledge (Peirce 1878/2000, James, 1912/1976,
Dewey, 1925/1981). Feminist epistemologists pay attention to the association
between the knower and the known. Feminist scholar Seyla Benhabib (1992) brings in
the concept of ―embedded and embodied self‖ and stresses that one‘s self ―can only
develop within the human community into which it is born‖ (p.5). Lorraine Code
(1996) argues the ―S-knows-that-p‖ statement in Western philosophy devalues the
importance of S, the subject, the knower and leads to an androcentric epistemological

20

conclusion that knowledge is transcendental. Donna Haraway (1988) asserts that most
knowledge is always situated and produced by positioned actors working in/between
all kinds of locations, working up/on/through all kinds of research relation(ships) and
thus what is known and the ways in which this knowledge can be known is subject to
the particular situation in which the knower is positioned. In short, feminist
epistemology emphasizes the situatedness of the knower as well as the known.
Postmodern philosophy is characterized by its skepticism to fundamental values
and assumptions in modern philosophy, especially concerning objectivity, certainty
and norms. Jean Lyotard (1984), a French postmodernist who first brought the term
―postmodernism‖ into philosophical discussion, examines how knowledge gets
legitimated and the nature of legitimation itself. He points out that ―knowledge and
power are simply two sides of the same questions: who decides what knowledge is
and who knows what needs to be decided‖ (1984, p.8). Richard Rorty (1979), the
most prominent American neo-pragmatist often classified by others as a
postmodernist, criticizes ―the notion of knowledge as accurate representation, made
possible by special mental processes and intelligible through a general theory of
representation‖ (p.6). Instead, Rorty suggests we should ―see knowledge as a matter
of conversation and of social practice, rather than as an attempt to mirror nature‖
(p.171). In the postmodern epistemological system, knowledge is not out there, but is
produced through the interaction between the knower and his/her social surroundings
and changed in different historical periods. More importantly, postmodern
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philosophers don‘t treat epistemology as an abstract issue, exclusively for
philosophical discussion. In varying degree, postmodernists go further than only
focusing on epistemology, but extend epistemology to sociology of knowledge.
Following the lead of pragmatism, feminism and postmodernism, in this
dissertation, knowledge is not defined as transcendental, objective, absolute truth. I
embrace the notion that knowledge cannot be out there, but is associated with the
knower, a subject who is situated in a particular context and perceives the world from
a particular perspective. Of course, claims always need to be justified based on certain
agreed-on criteria. Barbara Thayer-Bacon (2003) proposes ―qualified relativism‖ as a
solution to dissolve the absolute/relative distinction. Thayer-Bacon suggests that the
authority of knowledge ultimately derives from a community of people who agree
about the truth. The quest for knowledge is not the process of discovering the
universal truth, but the process of co-constructing meanings. Embracing the view that
knowledge is socially constructed, this dissertation intends to examine power relations
in the politics of knowledge and explore the social practice within the production of
official knowledge legitimated in school curricula.
This dissertation consists of six chapters3. Chapter 1 is an introduction of the
project, including the purpose of the study, the approach to deploy the examination,
3

I would specify that the dissertation focuses on general education at elementary and secondary levels

in China. The term ―Chinese education‖ in this dissertation refers to education services provided in
authorized educational institutions. In addition, the curriculum system examined in this dissertation is
not limited to a range of courses taught in schools, but also includes curriculum goals, pedagogic
methods, evaluation approaches and curriculum management and development.
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the core issues addressed in the dissertation and the key concepts. Besides, crucial
aspects of the tension between centralization and decentralization are highlighted in
each chapter respectively, and ultimately, constitute a comprehensive, but deepened
picture of policy shifts and changes in the current Chinese curriculum system.
Chapter 2 situates the on-going Chinese curriculum reform in its historical and
contemporary contexts. The impact of the changed central-local relations in China‘s
economic reform and the global trend of decentralizing education systems across the
world are discussed to answer why the decentralization trend in Chinese curriculum is
emerging at this particular moment and in this particular form.
Chapter 3 further examines the complexity of decentralization process in
China‘s current curriculum reform. In analyzing the motive, objectives and actual
efforts in the reform, this dissertation demonstrates the current curriculum reform is
moving toward centralized decentralization. In addition, Foucault‘s theory about
power, discipline and governmentality is used to understand the co-existence of
centralization and decentralization in governing China‘s curriculum system.
Chapter 4 explores the social and political functions of school curriculum and
seeks answers to why school curriculum is the last area the central state is willing to
decentralize. Through a sociological inquiry into the legitimation of knowledge in
the curriculum system, the chapter demonstrates how a national-wide consensus
on knowledge is created in the curriculum system and how power manipulates the
consensus knowledge. The argument made here is that curriculum knowledge
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could be easily coded by dominant social categories and gradually used to build a
homogenous social practice underlying people‘s daily lives.
Chapter 5 problematizes the centralized decentralization strategy applied to
China‘s curriculum reform. The discussion starts by analyzing the split of authority
and responsibility within the centralized decentralization strategy; and then extends to
examining the dilemmas in implementing this centrally formulated strategy in realistic
education settings at the local level. At the end, the chapter summarizes the arguments
made in the previous sections and concludes the dissertation by seeking a possible
solution.
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Chapter 2 Chinese Curriculum Reform on the Way
The purpose of the chapter is to provide a relatively comprehensive picture of
the socio-economic context of China in which the current curriculum reform is
embedded. To contextualize the on-going Chinese curriculum reform in its historical
background, the chapter begins with a schematic description of Chinese education
after 1949 with the focus on the centralized controlling exerted by the top. The
following discussion situates the current curriculum reform into a more contemporary
context, nationally and globally, seeking answers to 1) how the changed central-local
relations in China‘s economic reform impacts on Chinese education; 2) how the trend
of decentralization in global public sector reforms affects Chinese education
governance. Meanwhile, the reform efforts in Chinese education since the 1980s are
investigated to gain a better understanding of what is occurring in China‘s curriculum
system. This chapter serves as a substantial foundation for the further examination of
the current wave of Chinese curriculum reform found in the following chapters.
2.1 Contemporary Chinese Education after 1949
Curriculum reform is a search for innovative solutions to problems in schooling.
In this sense, the school system is the actual site where the curriculum reform is
eventually applied. The examination of any reform effort in the present school system
must begin with seeing the school system as the outgrowth of a specific historical
context. To better understand changes in Chinese education and school curriculum, it
is necessary to trace back to the early years of the People‘s Republic of China (PRC,
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中 华 人 民 共 和 国 ) when the Chinese school system was established and the
mechanism of the system took its primary shape.
The past, usually, is the key to understanding the present. The founding of the
PRC in 1949 did not solve a series of daunting problems in China. Inside the
country, society and the polity were fragmented, public order and morale decayed,
and the war-torn economy suffered from severe inflation and unemployment
(Teiwes, 1987). Outside the country, the new regime had to deal with the hostility
against the communist China during the Cold War, then the conflicts in Korea in
the 1950s, followed by the political rivalry with the Soviet Union in the 1960s.
All of these provided a continuous pretext for appeals to the strong antiimperialist sentiments throughout the country (Lewis & Teets, 2008). Pressure
both from the inside and outside urged the new communist regime to take radical
actions to build a powerful, centralized state system under the leadership of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP, 中国共产党). The education sector was also
reshaped in the state formation process.
Before 1949, the school system in China was dysfunctional in providing basic
education for all children. According to a report by the Ministry of Education (MOE,
教育部) (2004), prior to 1949 the access to education was extremely limited in China.
More than 80% of the population in cities was illiterate. The rate in the countryside
was 95% or higher. In 1946, the peak year of educational development, the country
had only 1,300 kindergartens, 289,000 primary schools, and 4,266 secondary schools.
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In a county where 80% to 90% of the population was uneducated, it was imperative
for the new regime to establish a new school system which could provide educational
services for all children, especially for those of the poor workers and peasants who
constituted the population with the highest illiteracy rate. At the end of 1949, the
MOE was established as a central government agency, taking full responsibility
for national education affairs. With strong support from the central government, the
MOE was dedicated to building a public school system under the leadership of the
Chinese Communist Party. Through transforming public schools inherited from the
previous regime and nationalizing private schools, including charity schools and
missionary schools, an extremely centralized public school system was established in
the early 1950s. Private education disappeared throughout the state until 1978.
In Maoist China (1949-1976), the state-run school system was completely
under the control of the authorities at the top of the state system, financially,
institutionally, and academically. Financially, Chinese economy during the Maoist
period was defined by its central planning mechanism. In 1949, immediately after
the victory of the communists in the Chinese Mainland, the Central Financial and
Economic Commission (CFEC, 中央财政经济委员会) was established to take
charge

of

nationwide

economic

activities.

In

1950,

the

Government

Administrative Council (GAC, 政务院) issued the Decision on Unifying State
Financial and Economic Work (《关于统一国家财政经济工作的决定》). The
1950 Decision claimed that all financial revenues and expenditures, material
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distribution and cash management should be under the unified control of the
central state. In 1952, the State Planning Commission (SPC, 中央计划委员会)
was established. In 1953, the First Five-year Plan was launched for rapidly
building up a state-controlled heavy industry from 1953 to 1957. By the late
1950s, a centrally planned economic mechanism was formed in the state of China.
Public finance was also highly centralized, practicing the financial policy of
unified revenue and allocation (统收统支). Education finance scholar Mun Tsang
(1996) summarizes the policy as:
a lower-level government would turn in all its tax revenues to a
higher-level government and would receive all its expenditures
from the higher-level government. All tax revenues would
ultimately be controlled by the central government, and all
expenditures would also come from the central government… The
amount of total government expenditure at a given level was based
on the corresponding amount in the previous year with a marginal
adjustment; and the initial expenditure level was determined in the
1950s. (p. 424)
There were several adjustments in implementing this fiscal policy from 1951 to
1976. However, the central authority took full control over the state‘s financial
revenues and resource allocation. The education sector was no exception.
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The state funded its public school system through its bureaucratic chain
from the central government to the provincial government, and then to the
prefectural government, to the county government, and finally down to the town
or township government. Public expenditures on general secondary schools came
from the budgetary allocation of the central government through the provincial to
prefectural and then to the county governments (Tsang, 1996). In the primary
education, as Chinese studies scholar Suzanne Pepper (1990) observes, the funds
were through the same budgetary allocations, but differentiated between urban
schools and rural schools:
The all-important budgetary allocation came down the bureaucratic
chain through the provinces and counties, which apportioned funds
for their commune elementary schools. Only city schools were fully
state-funded, however. In the countryside, throughout the 1960s and
1970s, the crucial intervening variable was the commune (公社) or
more specifically its constituent parts, the village-level production
brigades (生产队)... Allocations were made in such a way that the
communes and brigades had to rely on their own local resources to
make up the difference between their small share of state funds and
the total cost of maintaining their village elementary schools. (p. 76)
Basically, urban public schools in Maoist China were funded by the state and thus
were administrated by the central state.
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Institutionally, the bureaucratic structure of Chinese education in Maoist
China was highly hierarchized, concentrating authority at the top of the
organizational pyramid. The basic five-level bureaucratic system in Chinese
education hasn‘t changed a lot since it was first established (see Figure 2.1).
1) Ministry of Education (MOE, 教育部) at the national level;
2) Department of Education (教育厅) at the provincial level 4;
3) Bureau of Education (教育局) at the prefectural level;
4) Branch Bureau of Education (教育(分)局) at the county level;
5) Group of Education (教育组) at the township/town level in rural areas or
Street Neighborhood Education Commission ( 街 道 教 育 委 员 会 ) at the
community level in urban areas.
The mission of the MOE is ―to take charge of the overall planning, coordination
and management of all forms of education at various levels; to formulate, in
collaboration with relevant departments, the standards for the setting-up of
schools of all types at various levels‖ (MOE, 2010). The bureaucratic
organization of Chinese education at the local level is administrated dually: the
local education bureaucratic organization not only reports to its direct supervisor

4

There are four municipalities directly under the Central Government in the Chinese Mainland,

including Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing. These four municipalities are at the same
administrative level as provinces. The Municipal Commission of Education is in charge of education in
its own administrative region.
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in educational bureaucracy, but also to the local government at the corresponding
level.
In the expanded hierarchical structure, the MOE directly reports to the State
Council (国务院), previously known as the Government Administrative Council
(GAC, 政务院), the chief administrative authority of the state. Above the State
Council is the National People‘s Congress (NPC, 全国人民代表大会), the highest
state body and the only legislative house in China. The NPC has a nationwide
network at different levels. The MOE and its branches at various levels consult
and collaborate with the NPC and its branches at corresponding levels. The
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CCPCC, 中国共产党中央委员会),
as the highest authority within the Chinese Communist Party, also plays a crucial
role in making educational policy and jointly announces education policies with
the State Council of China. Meanwhile, the State Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC, 国 家 发 展 改 革 委 员 会 ), previously known as the State
Planning Commission (SPC, 国 家 计 划 委 员 会 ) 5 and the Ministry of Finance
(MOF, 财 政 部 ) impact on Chinese education through budgetary control. In
Maoist China, all elementary and secondary schools were organized, operated and
monitored by this highly structured bureaucracy.

5

The National Development and Reform Commission (previously known as St ate Planning

Commission) is a macroeconomic management agency under the Chinese State Council which
exerts broad planning control and policy monitoring over the entire Chinese economy.
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Academically, the implementation of a national curriculum unified the
content of schooling in Maoist China was unified across the country. In 1951, the
Decision on Reforming Chinese School Structure (《关于改革学制的决定》)
was promulgated to regulate Chinese education by standardizing the structure of
the Chinese school system. The 1951 Decision fixed the levels of school
education, the admission ages of students, and the length of schooling at different
levels. The requisite examination became the criteria considered in selecting
students at each step of the educational ladder. Meanwhile, the 1951 Decision laid
down the principles for developing teacher education, higher education, technical
education, special education, distance education, etc. In the next year, the
Temporary Provision of Elementary and Secondary Schools (《中、小学暂行规
程》) was issued to detail how to put the 1951 Decision into effect.
At this time, the MOE began creating the first set of national curriculum to
guide education at the elementary and secondary levels. In 1950, the Curriculum
Standards of All Subjects for Secondary Schools (Draft) (《普通中学各科课程标
准(草案)》) was issued. In 1952, the Elementary School Teaching Plan (《小学
教 学 计 划 》 ) was launched. Meanwhile, The MOE established the People‘s
Education Press (PEP) to compile and publish school textbooks for nationwide
use. Under the direct leadership of the MOE, the PEP was the sole legal textbook
publisher in China from 1950 to 1986. In 1951, the first set of national textbooks
for elementary and secondary education was published. This set of national
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curriculum laid down a unified model of schooling in China, regulating teaching
content, targeted attainment, and detailed course arrangement for all schools
across the state, irrespective of local conditions and individual differences in
ability, personality, and interest. Local education departments/bureaus, schools
and teachers were not allowed to make any changes. Through the implementation
of this national curriculum, Chinese schooling was integrated into a standardized
system. From 1952 to 1964, the central state adjusted the national curriculum to
reflect the changes in Chinese economy and society. In 1957, in response to the
national policy of combining learning with laboring, the national curriculum
downsized school courses offered at the secondary level to make more time for
students to gain experience in workplaces. In 1960, under the same policy, the
length of schooling from the elementary to secondary levels was cut down from
12 years to 10 years. However, the highly prescribed national curriculum was
well maintained until all schools were shut down in the Great Cultural Revolution
(文化大革命)6.
School education in Maoist China demonstrated strong ideological color.
The central state consistently strengthened the association between education and
ideological indoctrination. As early as 1949, at the opening ceremony of the First
6

The Great Cultural Revolution or simply the Cultural Revolution was a mass movement in the PRC

from 1966 to 1976. The Cultural Revolution was launched by Mao with the calling to remove all
liberal bourgeoise elements which were permeating the Party and society. The movement subsequently
spread into all aspects of Chinese society and caused nationwide social, political and economic
upheaval in the PRC until the death of Mao in 1976.
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National Conference of Educational Work in Beijing, Ma Xulun, Minister of
Education explained the guiding principle of Chinese education in the PRC:
―[E]ducation is expected to be a new one, reflecting the new China‘s politics and
economy, as a class struggle tool to consolidate and develop the people‘s
democratic dictatorship‖ (p. 6). In 1957, Mao gave a speech entitled ―On
Correctly Handling Contradictions among the People‖ (《关于正确处理人民内
部 矛 盾 的 问 题 》 ) at the Eleventh Session (Enlarged) of the Supreme State
Council Conference. Mao (1957) asserted that ―[O]ur educational principle must
enable educatees to develop morally, intellectually and physically and become
workers with both socialist consciousness and culture‖ (p. A1). At another
meeting in the spring of 1958, Mao claimed that ―Education must serve the
proletarian politics and be combined with productive labor. Laboring people
should receive education, while the intellectuals should participate in labor work‖
(p.11). In accordance with Mao‘s two speeches, the CCPCC and the State Council
announced an official governmental document, Directive on Educational Work
(《关于教育工作的指示》) in 1958. The general principle of Chinese education
was stated: ―[E]ducation must serve the proletarian politics and be combined with
productive laboring. To implement the principle, education affairs must be under
the Party‘s leadership. Without the Party‘s leading, socialist education is
impossible‖(p.5).
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At the broader social level, from 1962 to 1965, the CCP initiated a series of
nationwide socialist education movements to restore socialist ideological purity
and intensify class struggle 7. Chinese schools also plunged into these nationwide
political movements. The emphasis on this ideological approach to Chinese
education reached its culmination in the Great Cultural Revolution initiated in
1966. The atmosphere of anti-intellectualism was pervasive throughout the school
system. Schooling was oriented toward the needs of class struggle. Millions of
teenagers organized into brigades of Red Guards with the revolutionary ideal of
sweeping away the old to bring forth the new (Major, 1989). Under the slogan of
destroying Four Olds (四旧): old culture, old ideology, old customs and old habits,
Red Guards across the country destroyed their classrooms, burned books, and even
harshly criticized their teachers for not emphasizing proletarian politics in teaching. In
the ten-year turmoil, almost all elementary and secondary schools in China were
disrupted for at least six years. Even when schools were reopened in the early 1970s,
students‘ performance was mainly measured based on their political loyalty to the
Party.

7

After the socialist transformation of all private entities in the economic sector was completed in 1950s,

bourgeois as a social class were eradicated from Maoist China. However, in the 1960s, Mao advanced
the slogan ―Never forget class struggle‖, thereby initiating a series of social movements to intensify a
unified socialist class consciousness and to liquidate the remains of so-called bourgeois ideology. Class
struggle in the Great Cultural Revolution particularly refers to an ideological struggle against bourgeois
ideas, customs, and traditions.
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In Maoist China, the ultimate purpose of education was to serve a unitary and
cohesive state under the leadership of the CCP. The motivating force behind
centralizing Chinese education was more than educating Chinese children equally.
Jonathan Unger (1982), a journalist and an expert on China, asserts that ―school
systems obviously provide more than just book knowledge. They provide also the
means by which any modern society‘s official values are transmitted to its
younger generations‖ (p.11). In centralizing school education, the socialist regime
intentionally instilled

communist ideology into younger generations and

highlighted political commitment to the Party. Political science scholars Orion
Lewis and Jessica Teets (2008) observes that by maintaining a unified model of
schooling, the communist regime ensured that ―generations of youth were
indoctrinated regarding the superiority of the communist system and the
importance of political loyalty‖ (p. 678). In this sense, the ideological function of
education rationalized the choice of consistently centralized Chinese education in
all aspects from 1949 to 1976.
In Maoist China, the centrally planned fiscal system, highly structured
bureaucratic management, and unified national curriculum were used to exert a
rigid control over the state‘s school system. However, this highly centralized
school system failed to improve education nationwide, though there was a rapid
quantitative expansion. Suzanne Pepper (1996) observes that the unified model of
schooling ―would not safeguard China against the most basic dysfunctions of

36

development, because the model‘s urban-based, heavy-industry focus didn‘t
contribute to closing the gap between urban-rural education at elementary and
secondary levels‖ (p. 211). In the Great Cultural Revolution, the top-down overemphasis on class struggle and consciousness in schooling completely stagnated
Chinese education. To restore Chinese education, both the center and localities
were urged to reconsider the role of education in China and ways to improve
Chinese education.
After the Cultural Revolution ended in 1976, it was imperative for China to
reconstruct all sectors of the state. In 1979, a top-down economic reform was initiated
to restore the state‘s economy. During the economic reform, the central planning
mechanism in the economy has been gradually replaced by a market-driven model.
The impact of the economic reform has moved far beyond the economic field. Both
the rhetoric and practice of that economic reform are dramatically changing all
aspects of the Chinese society, including the central-location relation in Chinese
education. The current curriculum reform was initiated during the era of broad
reform in China. Understanding changes in China‘s central-location relation is
crucial to mapping out the socioeconomic environment of the current curriculum
reform.
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2.2 Changed Central-local Relations in Economic Reform
Political economy professor Huang Yasheng (1996) points out that ―[T]he
central-local relations are a core but problematic issue in China‘s reform process‖
(p. 655). In pre-reform China (1949-1979), the center was the only source of power
and the so-called local authority was only a responsive agent of the center
(Schurmann, 1968). To put it concretely, the central authority formulated decisions
on all major sectors of the state, whereas the local authority merely carried out
central policies to the letter. The rhetoric of centralism, strongly colored by
collectivism, was always highlighted in pre-reform China. There always existed a
particular emphasis on taking the long-term needs of the state as a whole into
account. To fulfill national goals, it was more likely that local needs and interests
were ignored or suppressed. Localities and individuals in pre-reform China were
often required to sacrifice for the good of the state (RACER, 1984).
The central authority would occasionally consult with localities in
formulating national policies and even tolerated some flexibility when national
policies applied to local situations. In late 1957, decentralization policy in the
Chinese economic system was even taken into consideration by the center
(Schurmann, 1968; Lardy, 1975). However, as Doak Barnett (1967) summarizes,
even though decentralization did happen, it took place only when the center wanted
it to. Power, thus, could easily be recentralized if the need arose. Within this
framework, the central-local relation in pre-reform China was merely the one
between the superordinate and subordinate.
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The highly centralized state system could not guarantee the consistency
between decision-making at the center and policy implementation at the localities.
In other words, the central authority was not always effective in exercising its
authority.

Political

scholar

James

Scott

(1998)

has

already

theorized

centralization as statecraft and problematized the effectiveness of centralized
control. Scott stresses that no state system is capable of representing any existing
social community, because ―a human community is surely far too complicated and
variable to easily yield its secrets to bureaucratic formulae‖ (p. 22). Thus, the state has
to rely on a greatly schematized process of abstraction and simplification ―which is
always far more static and schematic than actual human societies‖ (p. 46).
Pre-reform China followed Scott‘s model. Being removed from the actual sites,
usually, the central officials in Capital Beijing approached Chinese society through
the schematic information abstracted from statistics or other documents rather
than from full realities. Inevitably, the center lacked sufficient, timely and precise
information to appropriately fulfill its governance function for localities, while the
localities knew their situations from inside, but were powerless to make any decision
based on their own knowledge. As a result, national policies lagged behind the
constantly changing social reality. Sometimes, even though the center had made
appropriate policy adjustments, it was difficult for the localities at a distance from
the power center to follow those adjustments. Due to the lack of plasticity and
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adaptability,

the

rigid

centralized

system

resulted

in

inefficiency and

ineffectiveness in exercising governance.
In the early years of the PRC, the central authority might easily exert its
coercive force over the state under the name of constructing a unitary China with
strength and glory. However, when Chinese economy increased in size and
Chinese society expanded in complexity, some inherent deficiencies of the highly
centralized state system became apparent. Chinese studies scholars Jia Hao and
Lin Zhimin (1994) note that the centralized system ―caused low efficiency or
sheer waster in resource allocation, not to mention the heavy burden of
administration it imposed on a giant country‖ (p. 3). Meanwhile, after the 10-year
economic disarray and stagnation in the Cultural Revolution, the cost of
maintaining such a high level of centralization became an unbearable fiscal
burden on the central government (Li, 1998; Shirk, 1993). In response, a topdown economic reform was initiated in 1979. In the following three decades of
Chinese economic reform, the central command economy has been gradually
replaced by the market mechanism. This transformation ―fundamentally shakes
China‘s centrally planned system which over decades constituted the very basis of
the nation‘s state socialist polity‖ (Jia & Wang, 1994, p. 35).
During the fiscal reform, the center began allowing more and more local
discretion in resource allocation, revenue assignment, government expenditures,
credit allocation, investment project proposal, price and wage control, foreign
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trade management and local agricultural and industrial policy formation (Li, 1998;
Huang, 1996; Wang, 1994; Zhang & Zou, 1994). Meanwhile, the economic
reform has also granted great autonomy to urban enterprises and rural households
across the entire state. Transferring fiscal responsibility to localities is an obvious
trend in Chinese economic reform. Accompanying with this shift, local autonomy
has grown and the market mechanism has gone into full gear. As Karl Polanyi
(1944) notes, the most important effect of the market mechanism lies in the fact
that it provides an environment for domestic competition. In the economic reform,
as local governments have gained greater fiscal autonomy to allocate resources
and more policy flexibility regarding local innovation, they are more sensitive to
local interests and their own performance. Meanwhile, driven by market forces,
local economic entities have become independent profit units and expected to
maximize what they could gain from the market. The impact of economic reform
is far-reaching. Certainly, it has not only relaxed the unaffordable fiscal burden on
the shoulder of the central government, but also further redefined the central-local
relation in Chinese education.
In the education sector, the reform began with the transformation of the
centralized funding for Chinese schools. The economic reform has created a huge
demand for professionals and educated workers. Considering the insufficient
resources and the cost of maintaining a centralized education provision system,
the central government in Beijing had to realize that the state alone would be
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unable to provide adequate education services to meet the increasing education
demands in China. The fiscal burden was the initial motive for diversifying
funding system for Chinese education (Bray, 2003; Mok, 1997; Hawkins, 2006).
Of course, the shifting of fiscal responsibility for education provision to a lower
level was also a part of the broader fiscal reform aimed at disengaging the central
state from the heavy fiscal burden. Following the national policy of self-financing,
local authorities turned to alternative sources for funding schools, while the
central authority began to retreat from its previous role as the sole provider of
education services.
Fortunately, in the economic reform, local enterprises, institutions,
organizations, and individuals have grown to be vigorous economic entities
capable of providing reliable fiscal resources for funding local schools.
Meanwhile, both the local governments and economic units have acknowledged
the close connection between education and economy. The most direct economic
benefit of education is more productive labor forces that create economic growth.
Educational institutions are the best sites for fostering the professionals, experts,
technical staff, and skilled workers needed in local economic development. Thus,
wherever local funds are involved, local interests and local needs become
prominent in the school system. Accordingly, the economic reform has
significantly changed the broad socioeconomic environment of Chinese education
reform. Local sectors has been gradually empowered to be relatively autonomous
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economic entities and involved in funding local schools. Also, they expect to
speak to local education affairs. Later, this situation leads to a new wave of
curriculum reform aimed at addressing a series of issues concerning how to
reflect local needs in schooling based on local realities.
2.3 Changed Social Policy Model in Accelerated Globalization
2.3.1 Conceptualize Globalization
Chinese scholar Jiang Xiaoxing (1992) notes a major shift in social policy in
transitional China. The new value system stresses market-driven economic
efficiency and competition. Efficiency has replaced the traditional goal of
egalitarianism and uniformity in social policy practice. In the education sector,
there remained an assumption that a school system run by local forces could more
nimbly respond to local needs. The central state began to retreat from its previous
role as the sole provider of education services in the state. This shifting is not an
isolated phenomenon, taking place only in China and only because of the on going economic reform in China.
Public service reforms in different countries may take different forms.
However, a common mode has been emerging in the past thirty years. The state is
deliberately retreating from its role as the sole provider of public services and
gradually leaving those services to the non-state sectors. In other words, the stateguaranteed public service provision and delivery mode is giving way to a new
mode. Alberta Sbragia (2000) finds that the state‘s role is fundamentally changed
from ―provider of benefits‖ to ―builder of market‖, whereby the state actively
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builds markets, shapes them, and regulates them in different ways (p. 196). Jan
Aart Scholte (2005) also observes that ―the responsibilities for the provision of
education, health care, housing, pensions and the like have tended to shift from
the state to non-state actors‖ (p. 196). A report by the United Nations in 2001 also
reveals that there is a global trend of public service reforms initiated in the mid 1980s, which ―sought to reduce the role of the state in production, as well as in
service delivery and to encourage the deregulation of public enterprises‖ (p. 32).
These fundamental changes in the philosophy of governance and methods of
running the public sector are closely related to the process of globalization (Flynn,
1997; Hood, 1991).
Especially since the early 1990s, globalization has become increasingly
prominent and its impacts have already swept across economic, social, political
and cultural fronts (Giddens, 1990; Held, 1991; Robertson, 1992; Sklair, 1991).
Even though globalization has quickly become a term that people are living with,
there is no agreed-on definition of the term in its popular usages. The definitions
provided by some sociologists might be helpful for clarifying the ambiguousness,
inconsistency and confusion in the concept of globalization. Roland Robertson
(1992) explains that ―[G]lobalization as a concept refers both to the compression
of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole‖ (p.
8). Anthony Giddens (1990) writes that globalization is ―the intensification of
worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local
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happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa‖ (p.
64). David Held (1999) conceptualizes globalization as
a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in
the spatial organization of social relations and transactions—
assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and
impact—generating transcontinental or interregional flows and
networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power. (p. 16)
A consensus on some basic elements in conceptualizing globalization
appears in

the

definitions above. Two

of these

elements

are

about

deterritorialization and reterritorialization. French philosophers Gilles Deleuze
and Felix Guatari (1972/2004) create the concept of deterritorialization in their
book Anti-Oedipus and refer to deterritorialization as a disjunction between the
boundaries of a location and the established traditions tied to the location.
Deleuze and Guattari (1972/2004) reiterate that deterritorialization is always
followed

by

reterritorialization,

the

reconstructing

of

a

transformed

interconnection between territory and its socio-culture. When referring to
globalization, the term deterritorialization indicates a weakening of the ties
between a particular location and social activities taking place at the location. As
Jan Aart Scholte (1996) observes, ―global events can—via telecommunication,
digital computers, audiovisual media, rocketry and the like—occur almost
simultaneously anywhere and everywhere in the world‖ (p. 45). It is in this way
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that a territory loses its natural relation with localized cultural and social
activities. However, Deleuze and Guattari (1972/2004) further point out that it is
important not to stereotype deterritorialization as merely a deconstructive force in
delocalizing human activities which were initially bonded with a particular,
geographical location. Deterritorialization is a constructive force in opening
increased possibilities for reterritorialization which aims to build a transformed
interconnection produced by the growing interactions between people in
situations where locations seem immaterial to human activities. In this sense,
deterritorialization and reterritorialization constitute both sides of the same
coin—globalization. The notion of the dynamics between deterritorialization and
reterritorialization is found in one form or another in most contemporary accounts
of globalization.
John Tomlinson (1999) uses complex connectivity to describe the dynamics
between the apparently paradoxical processes of deterritorialization and
reterritorialization in globalization. Tomlinson writes that ―[By] this I mean that
globalization refers to the rapidly developing and ever-densening network of
interconnections and interdependences that characterize modern social life‖ (p. 2).
Anthony Giddens (1990) speaks of globalization as ―a dialectical process‖. He
writes,
The undue reliance which sociologists have placed upon the idea
of ―society‖ where this means a bounded system, should be
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replaced by a starting point that concentrates upon analysing how
social life is ordered across time and space—the problematic of
time-space distanciation. The conceptual framework of time-space
distanciation directs our attention to the complex relations
between local involvements (circumstances of co-presence) and
interaction across distance (the connections of presence and
absence). In the modern era, the level of time-space distanciation
is much higher than in any previous period, and the relations
between local and distant social forms and events become
correspondingly ‗stretched‘. Globalization refers essentially to that
stretching process, in so far as the modes of connection between
different social contexts or regions become networked across the
earth‘s surface as a whole. (p. 64)
Viewing the dynamics between deterritorialization and reterritorialization as
the essentials in understanding globalization, a theoretical framework for
analyzing the impact of globalization on nation states is generated. Held et al
(1999) summarize that the impact of globalization is characterized by four types
of changes:
 A stretching of social, political and economic activities across
political frontiers, regions and continents.
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 Intensification, or the growing magnitude, of interconnectionness
and flows of trade, investment, finance, migration, culture, etc.
 Growing extensity and intensity of global interconnectedness can
be linked to a speeding up of global interactions and processes, as
the

evolution

of

worldwide

systems

of

transport

and

communication increases the velocity of the diffusion of ideas,
goods, information, capital and people.
 A blurring of the boundaries between domestic matters and global
affairs in which global interactions can obtain local significance
and even the most local developments may come to have global
consequence.
Held has made his point clear that the rise of globalization is breaking the clearcut boundaries of nation states, which were historically associated with particular
geographical locations and a bounded social system, by encouraging world-wide
interconnectedness. The transformation described by theorists has been illustrated
by the proliferation and strengthening of international organizations or
intergovernmental cooperative communities. The number of international
organizations rose from 61 in 1940 to 260 by 1996 (Barnett, 2002). In addition,
the existing international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund,
the Word Bank and the World Trade Organization, have transformed their roles
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substantively, gaining further involvement in formulating and implementing
international policies (Camillery and Falk, 1992; O‘Brien et al, 2000).
2.3.2 Decentralization as Global Tendency in Public Sector Reforms
With the increase in cross-national connections, globalization has become a
transforming power in changing governance models worldwide. Jan Aart Scholt e
(2005) notes that the transformation is a shift from a statist mode of governance
to a polycentric one: ―a move away from territorialism in geography has, not
surprisingly, unfolded together with a move away from statism in governance. As
a result, society in today‘s globalized world is regulated in what can be termed a
polycentric manner‖ (p. 186). Scholte points out that the state does not share
governance over its realm with any other party in statist circumstances. The
formulation, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of societal rules occur
through the state and inter-state relations. The state, with its agencies, exercises
supreme, comprehensive, unqualified and exclusive rule over its territory and all
social activities in the territory. Local authorities have few chances to engage
directly with the wider world outside their state. Scholte (2005) further argues
that governance in the more global world has become distinctly multi-layered and
policies could be formulated at municipal, provincial, national, macro-regional
and global levels. A polycentric mode of governance is emerging in the
accelerated globalization: ―governance tends to be diffuse, emanating from
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multiple locales at once, with points and lines of authority that are not always
clear‖ (p. 186).
Scholte‘s argument about the changed model of governance is somewhat
shared by other scholars. Jong Jun & Deil Wright (1996) point out that the
linkages between global and local socioeconomic, political, and administrative
organizations constitute a widely spread network of transnational cooperation and
human interactions in an era of large-scale globalization. Local and global events
become more directly intertwined. It becomes more possible for local institutions
and organizations to develop direct connections with the outside world. As a
result, localities at different levels are becoming more conscious of global events
and getting further involved in global influence. Meanwhile, many localities
acquire relative autonomy to take their own initiatives in global affairs. In this
sense, polycentric governance demonstrates more tolerance to trans-national
cooperation and more flexibility to local incentives. It is in this policy climate
that the strategy of decentralization is introduced to countries across the world.
The idea of decentralizing public sectors spread along with economic
integration and institutional isomorphism. Economic integration is not only a
prominent phenomenon in the globalization process, but also an extensive force
in introducing the idea of decentralizing public sectors in countries across the
world. Centuries ago, commerce and trade between distant areas took place.
Today, improvement in the technology of transportation and communication
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dramatically exaggerates economic globalization at an unprecedented scale and
intensity. As Geoffrey Garrett and Jonathan Rodden (2000) observe, during the
last three decades, governments have reduced legal barriers to the movements
across national borders of capital, goods and services. Nations across the world
are integrated differently into the global economy. A world market is emerging
with the flows of trade, capital and labor organized across a set of trans -state
networks. In global economic integration, the force of market is reaching most
places and providing the foundation on which institutions rely and individual life
is organized and reorganized (Cox, 2000; Gill, 2000; Story, 2000). In pursuing
maximized efficiency and cost/benefit ratio in a market economy, the
responsibilities of the state in running its public sectors are increasingly shared
by other actors, including individuals, families, and the third sector (Peters, 2000;
Pierre, 2000; Rhodes, 1997; Salamon, 2002). The emergence of global market
fundamentally redefines the state and non-state sector relations in a nation state‘s
public sectors and rationalizes decentralization as a strategy in reforming a nation
state‘s public sectors.
Meanwhile, economic integration is also a powerful force in nurturing
interconnections between states which are not limited to economic fields. Transstate connections provide much more opportunities for joint work between the
local and global spheres, including sharing information and other cooperative
activities. Not surprisingly, a cross-national convergence could easily occur at the
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institutional level. Studies on organizational institutions have illustrated the idea
that the multilateral, trans-state relations stemming from globalization are
directly affecting on the process of homogenization in institutional structure. Paul
DiMaggio and Walter Powell (1983) propose the concept of institutional
isomorphism to best capture the process. In DiMaggio and Powell‘s description,
institutional isomorphism is a transformative process through which institutions
worldwide are modified in the direction of increasing compatibility in
organizational structure, government mandate, legitimacy, operating procedures,
etc. Fernanda Astiz, Alexander Wiseman and David Baker (2002) further explain
the process of institutional isomorphism in national education systems:
At the heart of this transformation is the convergence of formal
institutions within and across nations toward similar goals and
operating structures. Cross-national descriptions of schools, health
care, social welfare, and justice systems reveal significant trends
in this convergence. Institutional convergence tends to create
isomorphic

polities,

reinforcing

uniform

patterns

among

organization structure in these sectors. (p. 67)
In short, accelerated globalization has been widening and intensifying a trend
toward institutional convergence worldwide. Under the impact of globalization,
the model of polycentric governance is spreading all around the world. The
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strategy of decentralization is adopted in the public sector reforms in nation states
across the world, following the spread of the dispersal of governance worldwide.
In addition, the growing number and influence of inter-governmental
organizations (e.g. the UNESCO, the OECD, the World Bank, etc.) constitute a
participative force in spreading the notion of decentralization in the global
education reform movement. In recent years, international funding organizations,
such as the World Bank and the Asia Development Bank (ADB) have also
devoted themselves to advancing decentralization reform in education systems
across the world, often making decentralization a precondition for financial
assistance (Conyers, 1984; Hanson, 2000; Rhoten, 2000). From 1998 to 2008, the
World Bank funded education projects in around 50 nations and areas that were
attempting to decentralize their education systems (World Bank, 2009). The
UNESCO also advocates decentralized governance in education as a way to improve
access to educational services. At the World Education Forum (2000) in Dakar, the
international community pledged to ―develop a responsive, participatory and
accountable system of educational governance and management‖ (p. iii). In line with
the Dakar Framework for Action, the UNESCO Program on Educational Governance
at Local Levels was initiated to build national capacities to formulate and implement
decentralization policies in the world (UNESCO, 2007). Mok Ka-Ho (2005) indicates
that decentralization has become a popular public policy strategy widely adopted by
many nations, and being offered as a solution for improving the organization and
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management of the public sector. American comparative education scholar
Christopher Bjork (2006) notes that in the context of globalization, nations that
choose not to follow this decentralization trend risk being marginalized in
international policy circles. As the force of globalization is sweeping across the
world, transitional China could not be an exception.
2.4 Chinese Education Reform in Action
2.4.1 Fiscal and Administrative Reforms in Chinese Education
The changed central-local relations in China‘s economic reform and the
global trend of decentralizing public sectors have led to a series of substantial
adjustments in the education sector in China. A comprehensive reform was
initiated in 1985 with the release of the Decision on Reforming Chinese
Educational System (CCPCC & State Council). According to the 1985 Decision,
the core principle of Chinese education reform is ―streamlining administration,
enhancing local school autonomy, while strengthening macro-management‖. The
reform began with the transformation of the highly centralized financial support
for the Chinese school system. To reduce the financial burden on the central
government, local authorities are required to bear more of the financial costs of
education than before and multiple channels of finance are encouraged.
Consequently, local governments are expected to find alternative fundings to
support schools. A variety of local sectors are involved in financially supporting
Chinese education. The five main methods for funding precollegiate education in
China are: 1) government expenditure from both the central and local; 2) funds
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from industry or other social organizations; 3) donations from communities or
individuals; 4) tuition fees from students‘ families; 5) income from school-run
enterprises. By 1997, it was estimated that roughly 45 percent of fundings for
precollegiate education in China was from nongovernmental sources (Li & Wang,
2001).
The fiscal reform in Chinese education is actually a part of the broad
economic reform in China which is guided by the ideology of market. Thus, it is
not surprising that the logic of market would be applied to the operation of China‘s
education system. In the later 1990s, a policy orientation of enterpreneurializing
education ( 教 育 产 业 化 ) took shape. Literally, enterpreneurializing education
refers to the transformation of the education sector to an enterprise for
moneymaking, just like other business sectors (Ngok, 2007). With the
acquiescence of the central authority, in the late 1990s, enterpreneurializing
education was expected to play an active role in stimulating consumption and
investment, driving economic growth and relieving employment pressure (Ning,
2005). However, the commodification of education, while contributing funds to
the deficit, was not a solution for the promotion of education equality and quality
in China. In carrying out the policy, ―education becomes a commodity provided
by competitive suppliers; educational services are priced, and access to them
depends on consumer calculations and ability to pay‖ (Yin & White, 1994, p. 217).
In response to criticism of the negative effects of over-enterpreneurializing
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education, the central state had to clarify that education in China was still
regarded as a public good, not as a commodity, no matter who runs the schools
(Li, 2004). However, it was through the process of enterpreneurializing education
that the market mechanism was introduced to the Chinese education s ystem.
The educational market emerging in the current reform offers an alternative
to the state-run school system. In 1993, the Outline of Chinese Education Reform
and Development (《中国教育改革和发展纲要》) was issued. The 1993 Outline
clarified the state‘s attitude toward non-state-run schools: ―active encouragement,
strong support, proper guidance, and sound management‖. As a result, minban
education 8 was introduced to China in 1987, but it has flourished since the 1990s.
In this non-state-run sector, a variety of social forces, including enterprises,
organizations, and individuals, are allowed and encouraged to run minban schools
to meet the increasing demand for education for Chinese people. According to the
MOE (2007), by 2007, there were 4488 minban middle schools and 5798 minban
primary schools across the country. By running minban schools, these local

8

Literally, minban education refers to people-run education. In 2002, China issued Minban Education

Promotion Law and defined minban education as educational services provided in educational
institutions that are run by corporations, public enterprises, social organizations, social groups, or
individuals through non-governmental expenditure. The central and local governments regulate minban
education through policy control and quality inspection. Because education privatization is a very
sensitive issue in China, the ownership of Chinese minban schools remains ambiguous.
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sectors are now seeking to take their own interests and needs into account. As
Mok Ka-Ho (1997) notes, ―[R]evitalizing local initiatives and utilizing individual
efforts and overseas support promote a more direct relationship between those
who provide educational services and those who pay for them‖ (p.265). As a
result, more local interests and individual needs are now taken into account in
running Chinese schools.
Coupled with the diversification of funding for Chinese schools is a reform
in education administration. Scholars have noted that education administration is
not a matter solely for the central authority (Ngok, 2007; Mok, 2001; Bray, 2003;
Hawkins, 2006). The central government and the MOE began allowing their
administrative subdivisions to participate in administering the Chinese education
system. According to the Education Law of People’s Republic of China (《中华人民
共和国教育法》) issued in 1995, the MOE operates centrally in administrating
and monitoring Chinese education in a general way, while local government and
education departments/bureaus function at the local level. Specifically, the MOE
coordinates the management and development of Chinese education and
formulates broad frameworks and overall plans for curriculum development
personnel management, resource coordination, etc. The local governments and
departments/bureaus of education administer regional school systems and carry
out national policies in local conditions. Meanwhile, the principal-accountability
system has been legitimatized by the 1995 Education Law. School principals gain
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more autonomy in school matters, such as teacher recruitment and training,
school resource coordination, staff performance evaluation, school -community
relation maintenance, etc. The adjustment in education administration grants local
units somewhat more flexibility in running schools according to local conditions.
2.4.2 Current Curriculum Reform in Broader Chinese Education Reform
The curriculum reform is the most crucial step in the chain of the current
Chinese education reform begun in 1985. In fact, the content of schooling is always of
great importance for education. In the case of Chinese education, the central
authority is particularly cautious of any changes in the curriculum field. The
fiscal and administrative reforms in Chinese education have brought about a series
of structural adjustments in Chinese education. Curriculum reform has also become
imperative. The current curriculum reform, initiated in 1986, is unprecedented in
intensity and in scope in the history of socialist China (Zhong, Cui & Zhang 2001).
In Maoist China, the central state and MOE were dedicated to maintaining a
unified national curriculum with a strong ideological color. However, at the
National Conference of Educational Work in 1978, Deng Xiaoping (1978/1983),
the core figure of the power bloc in post-Mao China, asserts that ―educational
undertakings must be geared towards the needs of national economic
development‖ (p.123). Deng made it clear that class struggle would no longer be
put at the pivotal position in the school curriculum. Instead, under the policy of
linking education with economy, science and technology have become the most
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prestigious subjects in schools. Deng‘s concept of Chinese education was cited
repeatedly as the support for a series of reforms in the curriculum field after 1976.
The first wave of curriculum reforms in post-Mao China focused on fixing
the chaos caused by the Great Cultural Revolution in school. To restore orders,
the MOE launched a new set of unified national curriculum in 1981 which placed
the emphasis on academic education. The national curriculum reregulated the
length of schooling for full-time primary and secondary education was 11 years (5
years for primary education plus 6 years for secondary education). Meanwhile,
the national curriculum specified the common objectives of school education at
different levels, school course structure and instruction plans for core subjects.
The People‘s Education Press published a new set of textbooks for nationwide use
in accordance with the 1981 national curriculum. In the 1980s, the national
curriculum in China basically maintained its uniformity in content and conformity
in enforcement. In this sense, the intention of the 1981 national curriculum was to
regulate all irregulations in China‘s curriculum sector.
The promulgation of the Compulsory Education Law of People’s Republic of
China (《中华人民共和国义务教育法》) is a milestone in the history of Chinese
curriculum reform. Closely related to the changed state-education relationship in
the broad education reform, a new round of curriculum reform was initiated, after
the law was enacted. Compulsory education in China covers a period of nine
years and is mandatory for all children who have reached the age of six,
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regardless of sex, ethnicity, socio-economic status or religion. The Compulsory
Education Law also specifies that the state policy on compulsory education is to
improve the quality of Chinese education and to enable school-age children to
achieve all-round development, morally, intellectually and physically. Under the
unified leadership of the central state, local authorities assume responsibil ity for
putting compulsory education into effect nationwide, including raising funds to
cover the insufficiency of the state appropriations for compulsory education,
laying down concrete course structures and teaching plans, etc.
In accordance with the 1986 Compulsory Education Law, the MOE issued
Teaching Scheme for Compulsory Education Full-time Primary and Middle
Schools (Pilot) (《义务教育全日制小学、初级中学教学计划(试行)》) in 1988
and amended it to Curriculum Scheme for Compulsory Education Full-time
Primary and Middle Schools (《义务教育全日制小学、初级中学课程计划》) in
1992. The 1992 Curriculum Scheme resembled the previous national curriculum,
specifying teaching content, course work, the emphases and weighting of subjects
and the pedagogical approaches and expected achievement goals of instruction. It
is noteworthy that the 1992 Curriculum Scheme was innovative, providing more
flexibility for local education departments and schools. The 1992 Curriculum
Scheme divided school courses into two categories: subject courses and activity
courses. The former covered all academic instruction for students at school and
the latter included after-class activities and community service organized by
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schools. At the same time, for middle schools, optional courses and optional
teaching content were encouraged for those with need. To carry out the 1992
Curriculum Scheme, the MOE issued the new national Teaching Syllabuses (《教
学 大 纲》 ), covering all 24 obligatory subjects taught in primary and middle
schools. This time, the MOE closely worked with local schools in creating the
new Teaching Syllabuses, drawing lessons from the pilot implementation in some
selected local schools.
In addition, immediately following the implementation of the 1986
Compulsory Education Law, the MOE began reforming the textbook selection and
publication process. This was the first time that the MOE adopted a policy of
diversifying the compilation and publication of textbooks across the country and
with the condition that unified national requirements of teaching must be
complied with. In 1986, the State Textbook Examination and Approval
Committee was established to supervise school textbook publication. In the next
few years, the People‘s Education Press and the Beijing Normal University
published three sets of textbooks for nationwide use. Education departments in
Shanghai, Guangdong, Zhejiang and Sichuan organized educational experts,
scholars and teachers to compile another four sets of textbooks for regional use.
The publication of these regional textbooks was a radical change from the
previous practice, in which only one set of national textbooks was used
throughout the state. Meanwhile, reference books, manuals, booklets, wall charts,
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slides and visual materials for classroom instruction were published as
supplements for the textbooks (MOE, 2004). Among the supplementary teaching
materials, many were designed to meet the needs of local schools.
Following the lead of the 1986 Compulsory Education Law, the central state
has taken regional disparities in economic, social and cultural development into
account. Taking into account that local schools varied a great deal regarding
available resources and needs, the new national curriculum for basic education
set general references for schools, but it allowed local schools to expand upon the
implementation of the national curriculum by designing activity courses, optional
courses and by allowing selection from to multiple sets of textbooks and other
supplementary teaching materials. The innovations in the 1992 Curriculum
Scheme became the prelude to further curriculum reform centered on diversifying
school curriculum to accommodate various local conditions and needs.
In 1995, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee launched the
national strategies of rejuvenating China through science and reinvigorating
China through human resource development. Through the implementation of
these national strategies, education has become the top priority for China. With
the purpose of accelerating Chinese education development in a comprehensive
way for the coming 21st century, the central state adjusted its policy in the current
curriculum reform. In 1999, the CCPCC and State Council jointly promulgated
the Decision on Deepening Educational Reform and Fully Promoting Essential-
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Qualities-Oriented Education （《关于深化教育改革全面推进素质教育的决定》
and the Action Scheme for Invigorating Education toward the 21st Century (《面
向 21 世纪教育振兴行动计划》). Drawing the blueprint for the development of
Chinese education in the 21st Century, the two directives claim that the major
theme of this deepened curriculum reform is a shifting from test-centered
education to essential-qualities-oriented (EQO) education.
The EQO education is defined as a model of student-oriented education
which centers on moral education and highlights all-round development for the
student at all aspects, including knowledge, creativity and practical capability as
well as mental and physical well-being (MOE, 1997). When focusing on students‘
all-around development, the narrowness of the prescribed national curriculum was
seen as disadvantageous for meeting local students‘ needs and local schools‘
conditions. To ensure the EQO education from the top down, in 2001, the MOE
issued the Outline of Basic Education Curriculum Reform (Pilot) (《基础教育课
程改革纲要》 (试行)), providing guidance for the nationwide curriculum reform
at primary and junior-secondary levels. The 2001 Outline reconfirms the stateeducation relations in this wave of curriculum reform. The MOE, as the central
authority for education, provides an overall curriculum framework, national
requirements

and

guiding principles,

but

doesn‘t

specify the

detailed

implementation of the national curriculum; the provincial education departments
assume responsibility for laying down localized plans to put the national
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curriculum into effect and for formulating provincial curriculum and curriculum
standards with the approval of the MOE. Local schools are allowed to develop
their own school-based curriculum with the focus on their specific characteristics
and local needs, but under the supervision of the educational bureaucracy at all
levels. The MOE (2001) makes it clear that the center maintains control over 80%
to 84% of the total school hours, while allowing local governments and schools to
innovate the rest. Insisting on diversified school textbooks, the 2001 Outline
reconfirms that all qualified publishers are encouraged to compile and publish
textbooks for nationwide use, but all school textbooks must be in conformity with
the national requirements and approved by the State Textbook Examination and
Approval Committee. Textbooks for regional use must be examined and approved
by the Provincial Textbook Examination and Approval Committee. Local
education departments/bureaus are allowed to make selections from the pool of
approved textbooks.
To replace the national Teaching Syllabuses, a set of National Curriculum
Standards for Compulsory Education was drafted in 2000 and officially launched in
2001, after a comprehensive public consultation process to include feedback and
comments from all involved and affected parties, such as teachers, principals, experts,
scholars, etc. Taking the policy of experimentalizing before popularizing, the National
Curriculum Standards was first launched in 38 national level curriculum reform
experimental areas in 29 provinces, involving 470,000 primary and middle school
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students since September, 2001. The scope of the curriculum reform experiment has
expanded each year. The number of counties and districts involved in the experiment
was 330 in 2002, then increased to 1, 642 by 2003, accounting for 57% of the total
number of the counties and districts in China. By the end of 2002, the framework of
the new curriculum system for basic education had taken preliminary shape regarding
content and methods of teaching, education assessment, teacher education, etc. By
2007, the new curriculum system has been introduced to all first-year students China at
all levels.
The curriculum reform initiated in 1986 is not a simple readjustment in the
content of schooling or replacement of textbooks, but a fundamental reconstruction of
China‘s curriculum system. Different from previous practices in which the national
curriculum was designed by the central state alone and carried out by the localities.
The new curriculum system is a product of the joint work between the center and the
localities. The tolerance to local curriculum and school-based curriculum has opened
possibility of diversifying school curriculum to accommodate local varieties. The focus
on the EQO education has led to a major change in curriculum philosophy, which took
students‘ all-around development into account.
In building this more inclusive curriculum system, the central authority of
education has left some discretion to local sectors. It is unprecedented that the central
state allows important input from schools, scholars, teachers and other social sectors,
and even leaves some curriculum development work to local education bureaucracy
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and institutions. Viewed in this way, the current wave of curriculum reform creates the
appearance that the role of the localities in Chinese education is changed from
passively carrying out the instruction formulated at the top to actively working with the
central state in reforming China‘s curriculum system. However, it is still too early to
make the conclusion that the current curriculum reform in China is moving toward
decentralization.
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Chapter 3 Gear toward Centralized Decentralization
This chapter further examines the complexity of the decentralization trend in the
current curriculum reform in China. To better understand education decentralization,
Mark Hanson‘s (1989a, 1989b, 2000&2006) theory is cited to provide a conceptual
framework for examining the current curriculum reform in China. In investigating the
motive behind the current Chinese education reform, the paper demonstrates that the
central state has no attempt to transfer its authority to the local level. The following
discussion focuses on the tension between the center and the locality in the current
curriculum reform and demonstrates that the reform is actually moving toward a
centralized decentralization. Foucault‘s theory about power, governmentality and
discipline is cited to build a theoretical lens to explore the seemingly paradoxical
mixture of centralization and decentralization in education governance.
3.1 Complexities of Education Decentralization
The reform of financial provision for Chinese schools was deepened by a
comprehensive reconstruction in all aspects of the Chinese education system. The
initiation of curriculum reform also followed this trend. In response to criticism
of the rigidity and narrowness of the highly prescribed national curriculum, the
process of reconstructing the curriculum system features its unprecedented
flexibilities and openness to local inputs. In the current wave of curriculum
reform, local autonomy is accelerating in the curriculum design, implementation
and development, while the central authority of education is deliberately
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retreating from its previous role as the sole source of regulation and management.
It is assumed that the ongoing curriculum reform is moving toward decentralizing
its curriculum system. However, it is hasty to use the term decentralization to
generalize the substantial reform efforts currently taking place in Chinese
curriculum reform.
Decentralization is not a well-defined concept. Education policy scholar R.
Govinda (1997) points out that ―the concept has remained vague and highly
ambiguous, even though used extensively by policy-makers as well as
intellectuals‖ (p.3). The general use of the term focuses on the shift of governing
from one level to another level within a system or from one organization to
another. However, few of the studies specify the nature of the mobilization or
clarify the complexities of the shifting. In fact, there is considerable variation in
the actual practices of decentralization. Because of this, it is best to build a
conceptual framework of decentralization before an examination of the reform
trend in Chinese curriculum reform.
Aaron Schneider (2003) notes that ―researchers have multiplied the
conceptualization of decentralization; associated the various concepts with
different meanings; imbued it with positive normative value; conflated it with
other concepts; and ignore its multi-dimensionality‖ (p. 34). Schneider‘s
argument regarding basic standard for measuring the conceptualization of
decentralization is:
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if there are multiple dimensions, then decentralization along one
dimension could be related to one set of causes and effects, and
decentralization along another dimension could relate to a different
or opposite set of causes and effects. Alternatively, decentralization
along

one

dimension

could

interact

or

combine

with

decentralization along another dimension (to produce outcomes).
Researchers who do not explicitly look at each dimension or
haphazardly aggregate dimensions will mismeasure the type and
degree of decentralization and draw incorrect inferences about the
relationship between decentralization and other phenomena. (p. 35)
Conforming to the conceptual mode suggested by Schneider (2003),
comparative education scholar Mark Hanson (1989a&b) offers a clear and
coherent definition of education decentralization, along the dimension of resource
transferring

in

the

decision-making

process.

According

to

Hanson,

decentralization refers to the transfer of authority, responsibility and tasks from
higher to lower levels or between organizations. Thus, Hanson (2006) identifies
three major forms of decentralization in terms of the degree to which the central
state disperses its governing authority.
1. Deconcentration transfer typically involves the transfer of tasks and work,
but not authority to other units in the organization.
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2. Delegation involves the transfer of decision-making authority from higher
to lower hierarchical units, but that authority can be withdrawn at the
discretion of the delegating unit.
3. Devolution refers to the transfer of authority to an autonomous unit that
can act independently, or a unit that can act without first asking
permission. (p. 10)
To be more specific, deconcentration is a spatial transfer of the
implementation of authority, but not the authority itself. In other words,
deconcentration refers to a geographical relocation of where the task or work
should be done and by whom, but not a shifting of authority to a lower level. In
the process of deconcentration, the central state retains the integrity of its
authority over state affairs and exercises that authority through the hierarchical
channels of the bureaucracy, while the localities carry out the tasks previously
done by the central state with very limited autonomy in implementation. By
contrast, delegation is a transfer of responsibility to lower levels under state
supervision. In this process, the center designs the broad management framework
and overall policy objectives at the national level, but also appoints local
delegates and encourages their participation in making policies for local affairs.
Thus, the localities could gain certain degrees of autonomy in deciding what work
should be done and how it should be done at the local level. However, in the
process of delegation, all work must be completed within the framework set up by
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the central authority and all decisions must be subject to the national guidelines
laid down by the central authority. In this way, the central authority could easily
take away local autonomy when there is need. Devolution is a maximum transfer
of authority from the center to the periphery, as compared to the other two forms
of decentralization. Through devolution, the center grants local units genuine
authority over their own affairs, and thus, local units gain a great degree of
autonomy to perform their own governance.
Hanson‘s (1989a, 1989b, 2000&2006) definition differentiates the three
forms of decentralization in terms of the degree to which the central authority is
transferred. Deconcentration is the most superficial decentralization, deepened by
delegation, a moderately higher level of decentralization, and then by devolution,
the highest level of decentralization. Hanson (1989a) argues that in the long run,
devolution guarantees the continuity of the shared authority between the center
and the localities, but delegation is often accompanied by the potentials of the
frequently changed center-periphery authority-sharing arrangement, and that even
the retraction of the local autonomy depends on the motivations of the moment.
Hanson‘s interpretation of decentralization clarifies the ambiguousness in
conceptualizing decentralization and explains the variety of labels applied to
decentralization. In reality, actions taken in the name of decentralization vary in
their motivations, objectives, and strength of implementation, and thus yield
different results under different circumstances.
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The current wave of education reform in China has been in the making for over
two decades. The reform efforts in education finance, administrative management and
curriculum development are moving toward disengaging the central state from the
heavy burden of maintaining highly centralized education provision and delivery. In
the process, a lot of work which was previously performed by the MOE at the central
level has been transferred to the local level, such as funding schools, administering
local school systems, developing local-based teaching content, etc. However, in
Hanson‘s conceptual framework of education decentralization, it is important to
investigate whether these changes have been accompanied by a shift of authority in
the decision-making process.
3.2 Deconcentration in Chinese Curriculum Reform
Viewed through the conceptual framework offered by Hanson (1989a, 1989b,
2000&2006), the complexity of education decentralization should not be ignored
or underestimated. The core issue is to what degree the central authority is
transferring its authority in this wave of curriculum reform. The current
curriculum reform in China appears to tolerate more local innovation and to
accommodate flexibility in carrying out national curriculum policies. To inquire
into the nature of the current trend of relaxing centralized controlling over school
curriculum, the motivation and process of the reform must be examined in the
context of China‘s unique socio-political context.
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Schooling is inextricably linked to the larger society, and changes in the
curriculum field are inevitably related to the broad socio-economic context in which it
is embedded. In the late 1970s, when the central authority in Beijing initiated the
economic reform, modernization was highlighted as the national goal for all
Chinese people. Deng Xiaoping (1979/1983), as the core of the political power
bloc in China after 1979, officially announced that socialist modernization was of
supreme political importance for China. In the Chinese context, moder nization is
not a broad, abstract concept, but a set of specific development tasks in four fields:
agriculture, industry, science and technology and national defense. Putting
particular emphasis on economic modernization, Deng Xiaoping (1978/1983)
introduced a new notion that science and technology constituted a primary
productive force; education was the foundation for scientific and technological
development and training for those field required personnel with professional
knowledge and skills. Thus, Deng repeatedly emphasizes that education must be
placed on the nation‘s development agenda as a strategic priority.
Following the lead of Deng‘s idea of linking education with socialist
modernization, the 1985 Decision on Reforming Chinese Education System
further confirms the relationship between socialist modernization and education.
The Decision makes it clear that socialist modernization is built on the
improvement of the quality of the entire population and the best use of
intellectual resources. To meet the needs of economic and social development,
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Chinese education must center its efforts on cultivating qualified personnel at all
levels and in different fields. Thus, as summarized at the beginning of the 1985
Decision, education must serve socialist construction and socialist construction
relies on education development. In the 1993 Outline of Chinese Education
Reform and Development, the CCPCC and State Council claimed that
―[E]ducation must serve the socialist modernization and must be combined with
productive labor in order to foster builders and successors with all-round
development—morally, intellectually, physically and aesthetically—for the
socialist cause.‖ In the Educational Law promulgated in 1995, this policy was put
into the legislative form. As a result, the emphasis on the direct and functional
relationship between education and socialist modernization has become the main
theme in reconstructing Chinese education in the reform era.
The structural adjustment in the curriculum field is oriented by this reform
theme. In the policy climate of linking education with modernization, the 1986
Compulsory Education Law announces that compulsory education must carry out
national education policies, improve education quality, and cultivate children‘s allaround development in morality, intelligence, and physical well-being. The goal is to
foster well-educated builders and successors for the socialist modernization. The 2001
Outline of Basic Education Curriculum Reform emphasizes that the curriculum
reform of basic education must follow Deng‘s idea of education. That is, education
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should be oriented toward meeting the needs of socialist modernization, globalization
and challenges in the future.
As indicated by the educational laws and overall guidelines for education
reform, schooling in China is not seen as a relatively autonomous social institution
with its own independent purpose and scope, but is more regarded as a state apparatus
serving the national goal of socialist modernization, especially economic
modernization. The school system is viewed as the foremost vehicle for sending
trained human resources with skills and knowledge to meet the needs of economic
growth. Thus, following the structural transition from centrally planned economy to
market-driven economy, reforms in Chinese education become imperative to a vibrant
economic future for China. In this sense, the reforms in the Chinese education system
are not primarily motivated by the needs of improving education itself, but by the
needs of economic transition.
In the very beginning, the reform in diversifying fiscal provision for schools
was based purely on financial considerations. While disengaging from the
unaffordable fiscal burden of paying all costs of education, the central state is
encouraging local bureaucracies and education institutions to look for alternative
fundings for schools. The diversified financial provision has substantially
changed the operation of the school system. Local actors not only invest in
schools, but also seek to participate in running schools due to the increased
sensitivity to their own education needs. In that same vein, there has developed a
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need for a new curriculum system which could provide more freedom for
localities to select and arrange the most appropriate curricula based on diverse
local conditions. Responding to demands from below, the central state initiated
this top-down curriculum reform in 1986. To strengthen direct management, the
central state has to allow local education bureaucracies to take part in
administering curriculum matters and coordinate between national policies and
local realities. Through these effects, the emergence of the diversified funding
system for schools is the immediate cause of the initiation of the current
curriculum reform.
Being motivated by the national goal of socialist modernization, the major
objective of the curriculum reform has been defined as the construction of a new
curriculum system capable of equipping students with competencies and skills
that will allow them to enter into the contemporary workforce and ultimately
contribute to economic development of China. The motive and objectives of the
current curriculum reform have already demonstrated that the central authority
has no real desire to transfer decision-making authority to the local level, even
though the reform is a response to the critique on the narrowness and rigidity of
the national curriculum. As a result, despite the discernible trend of including
relatively more local input in curriculum design and management, the central
state‘s authority over school curriculum is always substantial and the governance
structure is still hierarchical.
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School curriculum in China was previously marked by its uniformity in
curriculum philosophy and conformity in practice. In the current curriculum
reform, initiated in 1986, there are obvious signs of accommodating more local
flexibilities in curriculum design and implementation. The central authority of
education works jointly with local authorities, social entities, scholars, schools
and teachers to build a more inclusive curriculum system for China. However, the
authority of the central state still prevails across the entire education system. The
strength of the central authority in the current curriculum reform is expressed
mainly through education legislation and pervasive supervision.
After the initiation of Chinese education reform in 1985, China launched a
whole series of education-related laws designed to regulate all aspects of Chinese
education, including teacher qualification, compulsory education, and non-staterun education. The central authority repeatedly emphasizes that all reform efforts
at local levels must take shape within the legislative framework set up by the
state. As a part of the top-down education reform, the current curriculum reform
also takes shape within the legislative framework set up by the state. The MOE is
dedicated in formulating concrete regulations, guidelines and overall plans for
putting these education laws into effect. In the early stages of the current wave of
curriculum reform (1986 to 1996), the MOE regulated the content of schooling
through implementing a unified national curriculum composed of National
Curriculum Scheme and National Syllabuses. The national curriculum prescribed
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13 compulsory subject courses while allowing a small number of optional courses
to be designed at the local level. In 2001, the MOE issued the Outline of Basic
Education Curriculum Reform (Pilot). This directive outlines the objectives,
scope and content of curriculum reform. The MOE issued the 2003-2007 Action
Scheme for Invigorating Education in 2004, followed by the Outline of China’s
National Plan for Medium and Long-term Education Reform and Development
(2010-2020) in 2010. The two plans set up a concrete timetable and define the
content of the reform process. In this sense, the reform actually has been
formulated in a uniform manner determined by the center. To ensure that the
national curriculum policies are carried out correctly and that the national goals
of education are achieved effectively, supervision pervades the entire education
system in China.
Being empowered by the central authority of education, education
supervision in China‘s education system is composed of a nationwide network of
education inspection, a set of centrally imposed curriculum requirements and a
standardized testing system. In 1986, the Office of National Education
Inspectorate (OONEI) was established. The Inspectorate is in charge of
monitoring, inspecting, evaluating and reporting the standards and quality of
education in primary and secondary schools across the state. To normalize the
work of the National Education Inspectorate, the Provisional Regulation of
Education Inspection (《教育督导暂行规定》) was issued in 1991. According to the
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Provisional Regulation, besides the Office of National Education Inspectorate
operating centrally, local education inspection organs are required at lower levels
from the province down to the county. The central office in Beijing frames the
principles that guide the work at the local level, while the local offices undertake
the work of inspection within the framework.
The mission of this hierarchical inspection system is ―to inspect, evaluate
and guide how work is done at local governments, local education departments
and schools‖ (MOE, 1991). In the curriculum reform, this hierarchal inspection
system has been strengthened to ensure the implementation of national education
policies, adherence to various laws and regulations and the achievement of the
targeted goals. On one hand, the organs of education inspection at all level
regularly report their findings and provide their feedback to governments and
departments/bureaus of education at corresponding levels and to education
inspection organs at upper levels. On the other hand, when problems in local
teaching or administrative institutions present themselves, and especially when
those institutions do not follow the national policies, laws and regulations set up
by the central state, the inspection organs take direct steps in an attempt to put
them back onto the right pathway through proper administrative procedures.
Direct interference in classroom practice is through an imposed national
curriculum requirement. In the new curriculum system, ultimate decision-making
authority is not granted to local education bureaucracies and institutions. The
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number of school hours allocated to the national curriculum is suggested to be 80
to 84 percent of the total school hours (MOE, 2001a). Within the national
curriculum, a homogenous pattern of schooling is strengthened by a set of
national curriculum standards. Curriculum Standards for Compulsory Education
(《义务教育国家课程标准》) was drafted in 2000 and was launched in 2001 as
an authoritative directive in schooling, coupled with the release of the Outline of
Basic Education Curriculum Reform in 2001. The Curriculum Standards covers
all major subjects taught in Chinese schools and regulates the content of teaching,
plans of instruction, targeted attainment, performance evaluation criteria and
textbook development principles. Thus, tolerance to curriculum diversities and
flexibility is very limited, confined to the remaining percentage of total
instruction hours. Meanwhile, innovations in the province-based curriculum and
school-based curriculum must be examined and approved by the hierarchical
education bureaucracy.
A major reform in textbook policy is an inseparable part of the current
curriculum reform. Since the initiation of the curriculum reform, the monopolistic
state textbook adoption process has been replaced by a diversified textbook
supply system which has competing alternative textbooks. The central state
allows local publishers to organize the preparation and production of textbooks
and encourages them to compete in the textbook market. The textbook adoption
decision is also left up to local education departments/bureaus and schools. While
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building a more diversified textbook supply, the central state applies a rigid
approval process to ensure the textbooks used in Chinese schools are properly
qualified. The State Textbook Examination and Approval Committee (全国教材
审定委员会) was established to supervise school textbook publication in 1986.
The Provisional Procedures for Primary and Secondary School Textbook
Compilation and Approval (《中小学教材编写审定管理暂行办法》) was issued
in 2001. According to the Provisional Procedures, all textbooks and very basic
supporting materials for required subjects taught in primary and secondary
schools must be examined and approved by the State Textbooks Examination and
Approval Committee before publication to verify ideological content, academic
quality and adaptability to classroom instruction. Supplementary teaching
materials with local figures are to be examined and approved at the provincial
level. To a great degree, the autonomy in designing local teaching materials is
limited by this strict approval and examination procedure.
To ensure what is taught in schools strictly adheres to the standards and
requirements set by the central state, standardized testing is used in all levels of
the Chinese education system. The subject-based standardized testing has become
in some ways routine for Chinese students. School teachers test students to assess
their learning progress. Local education departments/bureaus give tests not only
for research purposes but also for evaluating school performance. Students take
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tests under formal test conditions on a given date and the papers are collected,
marked and sorted based on scores, then for use in the classroom.
Passing the entrance examinations is the channel to higher education in
China which is extremely structured with competitive entry to the top institutions
and most popular majors. The large-scale entrance examinations are given in the
last year of each school level from primary through junior high to high school.
The outcome of this set of standardized testing is used as the determining factor
for making admission decisions. The most important one is the college entrance
examination. To strengthen supervision, the MOE set up the National Center of
Testing as the central agency to administer the nationwide college entrance
examinations, including formulating testing schemes for all subjects annually,
formulating testing policies, collecting testing results and evaluating the
performance of test takers. The local organs of the National Center of Testing at
the provincial level assume the responsibilities for putting the national guidance
into effect. Recently, innovations in the college entrance examinations started
allowing provincial departments of education to choose the additional testing
subjects outside of the three required ones: Chinese, English and Math. Since
2000, the MOE has credited 16 provinces and municipalities with designing their
own testing content as alternatives to the national ones, with the consideration
that the provincial/municipal-based propositions must conform to the national
testing scheme formulated by the MOE. In addition, the college entrance
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examinations must be given at the same time and in the same conditions across
the country. The score obtained in the examinations is the only criterion for
tertiary education admissions.
The local units carry more of the organization and management work
previously done by the MOE, but have gained no real autonomy in challenging
the unified national model of testing determined by the central authority of
education. More importantly, the high-stakes testing becomes the key means to
ensure that teaching and learning in schools across China are on the right track.
Under the heavy pressure of high-stakes testing, teachers and principals are left
with no choice other than teaching to the test. Thus, teaching relies mainly on the
pedagogy of rote memorization and learning is a passive process of acquiring
textbook knowledge. Not surprisingly, the majority of the curriculum resources are
concentrated on the subjects examined in the entrance examinations, but not on
curriculum innovations. In this sense, standardized testing system is becoming a
powerful tool for the imposition of national standards and requirements on
Chinese schooling.
The multi-level inspection of the day-to-day schooling, the single Beijingbased agency of approving textbooks production, the centrally imposed national
requirements and the high-stakes testing system constitute an extensive network
of education supervision over Chinese curriculum reform. The rigorous
supervision functions effectively to maintain the absolute authority of the central
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state in curriculum governance. No matter how much local innovation is
tolerated, local education departments/bureaus as well as local schools must work
within the policy framework set up by the central authority. Thus, the current
curriculum system in China is particularly characterized by its conformity and
uniformity.
In the on-going curriculum reform in China, there has been a discernible
trend of transferring more work to the local level. However, this process has
barely involved authority sharing in regard to curriculum governance in a
significant way. Considering the motivation and objectives of the reform, the
current curriculum reform is not to enhance the curriculum system, but to fix
newly-emerging problems accompanying with the changed socio-economic
context of China in a transitional period. The central state does not intend to
change the existing authority-sharing arrangement between the center and the
periphery which highlights the absolute authority of the central state in
curriculum governance. In practice, the central state determines what should be
done by whom and keeps a close watch on how the work is completed in
localities. Local education bureaucracies and institutions have to take much more
responsibility and caution to ensure that their work performance meets the central
state‘s expectations. Thereby, all major policy decisions are continued to be made
centrally, but educational services are delivered locally but based on centrally
controlled agencies. This arrangement merely implies a shifting of workload from
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the central officials to bureaucratic officials and educators outside the national
capital without granting local agents the authority to decide what to do and how
to do. In this sense, decentralization in Chinese curriculum reform remains
superficial. Measured within Mark Hanson‘s (2006) conceptual framework,
decentralization in Chinese curriculum reform only takes the shape of
deconcentration that does not involve a real transfer of authority to intermediate
or basic levels.
Deconcentration in Chinese curriculum reform may promote the efficiency
and effectiveness of curriculum system and even create an illusion of increased
local participation in curriculum governance, but it does not provide realistic
opportunities to exercise substantial local discretion at the decision-making level.
Distributing work and task to dependent local agencies, the central state has been
disengaged from its heavy burden of carrying out all of the work in providing and
distributing education services nationwide. As a result, the central state is able to
concentrate on constructing a legislative framework to regulate all practices in the
process and building a pervasive supervision system to ensure the conformity in
policy implementation.
To some degree, deconcentration has become a device to strengthen the
unshakable authority of the central state over school education in China. With
greater interference over curriculum matters through policy control, the central
state maintains its determinative role in regulating and orienting the
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deconcentration process. Thus, even though the deconcentration process has gone
quite far in many aspects of the curriculum system in China, the reform has never
substantively

challenged

the

centrally

controlled

model

of

curriculum

governance. In other words, with the deconcentration process, strong centralized
tendencies coexist with particular forms of decentralization in Chinese curriculum
reform. Centralization indicates congregating at the center, but decentralization
implies moving away from the center. The two move in opposite directions and
even against each other. The problem is how to explain the apparently paradoxical
mixture of centralization and decentralization in the current Chinese curriculum
reform.
3.3 Paradoxical Mixture of Centralization and Decentralization
3.3.1 Conceptualize Centralization and Decentralization
The key to the seemingly paradoxical mixture of centralization and
decentralization is the role of state in the education system. According to Max
Weber‘s (1919/1994) influential definition of state in Politics as a Vocation, the
modern state monopolizes the means of legitimate physical violence over a welldefined territory. Moreover, the legitimacy of this monopoly is of a very special kind,
―rational-legal‖ legitimacy, which is based on impersonal rules that constrain the
power of state elites. Here, Weber makes it very clear that an entity is a state, if it has
a relatively settled population, a well-defined territory, and legitimated monopolies
over the population and the territory. Meanwhile, Weber‘s definition also indicates
that the state is not simply there; the rise of state, typically, involves legitimated
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monopolies and imposed rules. It‘s not difficult to find supportive voices for Weber‘s
definition in recent years. Political scholar Nancy Fraser (1989) argues that the state is
an arena in which different groups struggle to legitimate and institute their own sense
of needs and needed discourses. Reverberating Weber's echo, education scholar Andy
Green (1994) refers to the state formation as a historical process through which ruling
elites struggle to build a national unity at economic, cultural and territorial levels and
consolidate political and ideological consensus. Bruce Curtis (1992) emphasizes that
―the state may best be studied as a process of rule‖ (p. 9). These scholars have already
reached an agreement that at all levels the state is constantly being formed by diverse
social forces. Thus, it is necessary to look at the interplay between these social forces.
Foucault (1978/1991) offers us a deepened theoretical framework for the
analysis of interactions between those social forces and how the examination of the
formation of state in terms of power relations. Foucault rejects the attempts to theorize
state. For Foucault, the state has no universal essence based on unexamined
presumption about its essential unity, its given functions or its inherent tendency
toward domination. Foucault claims that
the state, no more probably today than at any other time in its history,
does not have this unity, this individuality, this rigorous functionality,
nor, to speak frankly, this importance; maybe, after all ,the state is no
more than a composite reality and a mythicized abstraction, whose
importance is a lot more limited than many of us think. (p. 103)
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Breaking the fascination of the state, Foucault (1978/1991) argues that what is really
important for the society is the governmentalization of the state. Foucault defines
governmentalization as the tactics of government, which are internal and external to
the state and which ensure the state‘s survival. Thus, Foucault argues that ―state can
only be understood in its survival and its limits on the basis of the general tactics of
governmentality‖ (p.103). Foucault‘s emphasis on the art of government is closely
connected with his concerns on the emergence of population, which is defined as ―the
end of government, the subjects of needs and aspirations, but also the object in the
hands of the government‖ (p.100). In this sense, Foucault further points out that the
state of government has to deal with the interest of individuals who make up the
population, and the interest of the population as a whole regardless of any individual‘s
interest. Individual‘s interest in Foucault‘s words should not be understood in a
narrow sense. Individual could be extended from a person to any specific object in a
collection, such as human society.
Interests might diverge or even conflict with each other, and thus diverse social
forces might be produced. In his book, History of Sexuality Foucault (1978/1990)
defines ―the multiplicity of force relations‖ as power (p. 92). Foucault makes it very
clear that power in his term ―is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a
certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex
strategically situation in a particular society‖ (p. 93). Foucault (1990) suggests that
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power is immanent in all social relations and the understanding of power should begin
from below, in the heterogeneous social forces.
At the same time, Foucault (1990) believes that there is no binary and allencompassing opposition between the dominant and the dominated. The manifold
relationships between forces are the basis for ―wide-ranging effects of cleavage that
run through the social body as a whole‖ (p. 94). These manifold relationships can also
form a general line of force and ―bring about redistributions, realignments,
homogenizations, serial arrangements and convergences of the false relations‖ (p. 94).
Foucault also asserts that ―[W]here there is power, there is resistance‖ and resistance
is always inside power, ―there is no ‗escaping‘ it‖ (p. 95). Foucault emphasizes that
the existence of power relationships depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance:
these play the role of adversary, target, support or handle in power relations. These
points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network.
With his emphasis on immanent power and resistance, it is more understandable
that Foucault would argue that there is no trans-historical, universal, unchanging
notion of state. In fact, Foucault regards the state as an ensemble of power relations,
which are in constantly changing. Thus, attention should be placed not on domination,
but rather on governmentality, where the technologies of power, the exercise of power
and projection of power are happening. Foucault (1982) explains how power
functions in the form of governmentality:
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Basically power is less a confrontation between two adversaries or the
linking of one to the other than a question of government…
―Government‖ did not refer only to political structures or to the
management of states; rather it designated the way in which the
conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed... To govern, in
this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of others. The
relationship proper to power would not therefore be sought on the side
of violence or of struggle, nor on that of voluntary linking (all of
which can, at best, only be the instruments of power), but rather in the
area of the singular mode of action, neither warlike nor juridical,
which is government. (p. 221)
Based on Foucault‘s theory about state, power and governmentality,
centralization may be viewed as a tactic of governmentality which operates on
something called the state, and decentralization as a resistance against centralization.
Centralization and decentralization work at the point where power is produced.
However,

centralization

functions

toward

concentration,

convergence

and

homogenization; whereas, as a resistance, decentralization functions toward disparity,
divergence and heterogenization. Centralization is used to reformulate diverse social
forces into a coactive force via a set of means. Within the processes of centralization,
there are struggles, confrontations and transformations among diverse forces and the
terminal form of these force relations take may be domination. Decentralization is
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inscribed in centralization, in the same way that resistance is inherent in the power
network. The coactive force formed in centralization is always challenged by various
social forces in different forms. Indeed, decentralization is an effort to destabilize and
deconstruct a consolidated arrangement of force relations, producing cleavages in a
society and leading to a regrouping of those social forces. In this sense, centralization
and decentralization, as the tactical strategies of governmentality, are always
entangled together.
In the education sector, both centralization and decentralization function as
effective means to realize governmentality over the system. Centralization involves
the concentration of authority over resource flows across decision-making points at
the upper level of a hierarchized system; decentralization involves the distribution of
authority over resource flows across decision-making points down to the lower levels
of the system or outside the system. Thus, quantitative aspects including finance,
personnel and information, are important indicators of the degrees of centralization
and decentralization. However, the most fundamental dimension of both centralization
and decentralization is authority, which is the manipulating force behind those
superficial phenomena. In terms of the shifting of authority, centralization and
decentralization functions toward opposite directions, but they are not necessarily
against each other.
In reality, there are no education systems which are completely centralized or
decentralized. Both centralization and decentralization can be used by the central

92

authority, but are motivated by different intentions and toward diverse objectives. In
Mark Hanson‘s (2006) words, ―[C]entralization or decentralization are not ends in
themselves, but only means to an end‖ (p. 9). Consequently, under given conditions
the rationale behind strengthening centrality or decentrality is persuasive. In this sense,
the tension between centralization and decentralization could be universal. The real
issue surrounding this tension is how the two forces balance each other out.
Both centralization and decentralization assume there is a center that plays a
vital role in the concentration or distribution of authority within or beyond a bounded
system regardless of whether the pressure comes from the upper or the lower levels or
from both. In the Chinese education system, the central state is playing this vital role.
In the latest curriculum reform, the central state finds itself in a very complex
situation that is common to quite a few countries in reconstructing their education
systems. Educational foundations scholar Joseph Zajda (2007) summarizes:
On one hand, the concept of nation-state necessitates the centralization
of certain functions, including the provisions for mass education.
Current educational policy reforms designed to achieve competitiveness
and diversity by means of standardized curricula, national standards and
standardized assessment also suggest an increasing centralization. On
the other hand, the state defined policies of educational restructuring in
response to demands for equality, participation and diversity, have the
effect of encouraging decentralization of schooling. (p.3)
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Different countries take different strategies to deal with this paradox. Current Chinese
curriculum reform is through a top-down approach, where the content, the process,
the goals and the strength of the reform are determined by the center and used as a
tactic to reach desired outcomes of the state. In this sense, deconcentration in Chinese
curriculum reform is a centralized decentralization.
3.3.2 Centralized Decentralization as Strategic Imperative
As the term centralized decentralization indicates, in the tension between
centralization and decentralization, the former is weighted heavily by the central state.
In other words, the authoritative position of the central state is intentionally reinforced
in the current curriculum reform. The particular emphasis on centralization at this
crucial moment is never an isolated phenomenon. In fact, it is related to the transitions
in China‘s education system. In fiscal reform, the state has retreated from the previous
role of the sole provider of education services in China. With the increasingly
diversified funding, schools have become the site where different social forces are
manifesting their own positions in Chinese education and seeking the maximized
interest in the school system. With the fiscal reform has come a diversified
administrative management in Chinese schools. The central government and the MOE
started to allow their administrative subdivisions to participate in building a multilayer management structure in Chinese education, where the central agencies function
at the level of macro-regulation, but the local agencies work at a more immediate
level in specific affairs (CCPCC, 1993). In the broad education reform, the
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paradoxical role of state in the tension between education centralization and
decentralization has become prominent. The central state is somewhat willing to
relieve itself of the heavy burden of maintaining a highly centralized education system
financially and administratively. However, the reduced role of central state in
education becomes a pressing concern of loss of control, when more work is
transferred to the local level. Compared to the fiscal and administrative reforms in
Chinese education, the curriculum system is the last area over which the central state
is willing to loosen its control.
Historically, the unification of school curriculum is seen as the core of Chinese
education. In imperial China (134 BC - AD 1912), the dynasties kept changing, but
the supreme position of Confucianism in state schools was never replaced. One of the
central beliefs in Confucianism is li (礼), which stresses the structured order for
society and proper behaviors for individual members. Thus, a hierarchized
governance model was justified by Confucianism. By legitimizing Confucianism as
the state ideology, the dynasties justified a highly structured governance model and
thus strengthened the centralized state power. The idea about unification and
centralization were continually reinterpreted by the followers of Confucianism, and
practiced by the regimes for thousands of years. Ultimately, the emphasis on China as
a unitary nation under centralized controlling has penetrated into the core of Chinese
culture, history, politics and society.
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After 1949, the political philosophy of Confucianism was rejected by the
socialist regime, but the tradition of espousing a sole dominant ideology in schools
has been continually used to maintain a centralized controlling over China‘s education
system. In 1949, as the Chinese Communist Party gained the full control of the
Chinese Mainland, the Party found it was far from fostering a strong identification
with the state, especially since the state had been disintegrated for such a long time
and had witnessed so many regime shifts. Furthermore, the socialist regime faced
daunting problems in economic and social stability inside the country and hostility
against communist China outside the country. To tie the country together under the
name of People‘s Republic of China, the Party was dedicated to building a cohesive
national identity for all Chinese people. Following the tradition of building a unitary
nation through indoctrinating a set of unified ideology, schools were seen as site for
the distribution of prescribed knowledge promoting the superiority of communism
and the importance of political loyalty. Thus, it became imperative to exert tight
control over the school curricula. Centralization was the most direct and effective
means to ensure the unification and conformity of school curricula taught in schools
across the state.
Since the initiation of Chinese economic reform in 1979, the national goal of
China has already shifted from building national cohesion and identification with the
socialist regime to developing socialist modernization. However, what has not
changed is that Chinese education is treated as a part of the state apparatus serving the
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unified national goal of a particular historical moment rather than an autonomous
social device with its own scope and purpose. With the resurgence of market ideology
and global discourse of decentralizing public services, various social sectors in China
are calling for a more inclusive curriculum system to address their diverse needs and
interests. The curriculum system built in the reform has become more open to local
innovations and incentives in province-based and school-based curricula.
In order to restrict the strength, direction and process of the current curriculum
reform in China, centralized decentralization is more like a strategic imperative in
reinforcing the monopolistic authority of the central state over Chinese education in
nature. In fact, as Mok Ka-Ho (2001) observes, ―[E]ssentially, the role of the state
changes from one carrying out most of the work of education itself, but it still
determines where the work will be done and by whom‖ (p. 127). The crucial point to
make is that, by tightly holding authority in hand, even though more work can be
done at the local level, the central state continues to steer the Chinese curriculum. In
fact, in Chinese schools, the content of schooling is accredited by the central state
system and under the hierarchical supervision, and the flexibility in designing localbased curricula is administrated by the central state. In this sense, the curriculum
system in China is still highly nationalized.
To a great degree, the decentralization reform in the form of deconcentration is
largely under the realistic pressure of fixing the narrowness of the unified national
curriculum. As a result, the decentralization process in the current Chinese curriculum
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reform remains at the superficial level. The central state does not intend to transfer
any real authority of curriculum governance to the periphery, but rather uses the
national curriculum as a powerful tool to boost a strategic control from the top over
China‘s curriculum system. The unification and conformity in the implementation of
the national curriculum fits P. Watkins‘s (1993) argument that the centralized
decentralization becomes the means to ―avoid the loss of control, authoritative
communication and managerial scrutiny‖ (p. 10).
In the early years of the People‘s Republic of China, the urgent need to form a
unified national identity explains why the central state could easily exert its
coercive force across the entire state. However, when the education system
expands in complexity and reform goes deep in all aspects, the centralized
decentralization reform in the curriculum system must be reexamined. Why is the
central state unwilling to transfer its authority over its curriculum system? What
factors distinguish curriculum reform from other reforms in Chinese education? How
is the central authority actualized through a unified curriculum system? The answers
rely on inquiries into the social and political nature of the nation curriculum.
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Chapter 4 National Curriculum as Monopolistic Authority
Centralized decentralization improves diversity and inclusion in China‘s
curriculum system. However, school curriculum is still the last area that the central
state is willing to decentralize (Hawkins, 2006; Bray, 1999). The current curriculum
reform is moving cautiously in line with the national education policy and dedicated
to the national goals of education. In transferring work to the local level, the central
state keeps a close watch on the work done at the local level and ensures that reform
follows the desired pathway. In the current curriculum system, the national
curriculum formulated at the state level dominates the classrooms and the
implementation of national curriculum policies is under the strict supervision of the
central state. The national curriculum becomes an effective means by which the
central state‘s authority is maintained. Why does the central authority move so
cautiously in any changes in the curriculum system? Why is a mandatory national
curriculum needed? To answer these questions, this chapter concentrates on the social
and political function of school curriculum. On the one hand, this chapter examines
the sociological nature of the Chinese national curriculum, demonstrating the
disciplinary mechanism functioning in regulating schooling. On the other hand, the
chapter analyzes the politics of the national curriculum by illustrating the hegemonic
mechanism operating in the Chinese curriculum system.

99

4.1 Sociological Nature of National Curriculum
4.1.1 Social Construction of Knowledge in Schooling
What counts as knowledge? This epistemological inquiry has been constantly
reinvigorated from generation to generation. Following the lead of ancient Greek
philosophy, traditional western epistemologists separate the mortal body from the
immortal soul. The knower‘s physical body is an object related to a particular time
and a particular place. However, the known is not limited to the body‘s sense
experience, but rather is abstracted from the material world (Plato, Trans. 1892;
Aristotle, Trans. 1924; Descartes, 1641/1984). The split between the knower and the
known leads to a sharp distinction between individual belief and universal truth. The
individual body is embedded in the material world, surrounded by the empirical
senses, and influenced by its physical needs. The individual‘s ideas strongly rest on
personal feelings, experiences and perceptions. Thus, individual belief is subjective
and relative. On the other hand, embracing the dualisms in body and mind, it is
assumed that knowledge is associated with the universal essence behind the
phenomenal world and exists on its own. In this sense, only that which is absolutely
true is Knowledge9.
However, the absolutism and universalism of Knowledge are challenged by
modern theorists in different ways. The critique on the transcendence of Knowledge

9

In this chapter, to differentiate, Knowledge with capital ―K‖ is a concept associated with the

assumption that knowledge is absolute truth and absolute truth is independent from the empirical world.
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begins with questioning the body and mind dualism that is the fundamental
assumption centered in western traditional epistemology. The key point is drawing
attention to the ignored role of the knower in the knowing process. In presenting her
(e)pistemology10, Barbara Thayer-Bacon (2003) begins with the assumption that ―all
people are social beings‖ (p. 7):
We develop a sense of self through our relationships with others, and
we need a sense of self in order to become potential knowers….Not
only are all people social beings, we are contextual social beings. All
of us have unique contexts that affect who we are and how we interpret
the world. We are situated people who are embedded in a particular
setting as well as embodied within a particular body. With our unique
bodies we experience the world around us certain ways and not others.
And, due to our embeddedness we inherit a past at birth, and are
affected by our environment, including our social environment. The
social practices that surround us promote us to believe certain beliefs
and not others. How people begin to make sense of the world is due to
their contextuality, including their own subjective experiences as well
as their social setting, and its past. (p. 7-8)

10

In order to break from the traditional definition of epistemology as transcendent, Barbara Thayer-

Bacon (2003) uses ―(e)epistemology‖ in her book Rational “(e)pistemologies”. By demonstrating the
association between the knower and the known, Barbara Thayer-Bacon argues that knowing is socially
constructed by embedded, embodied people who are relating to each other.
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Emphasizing the embeddedness and contextuality of the knower, Thayer-Bacon offers
a relational perspective in reconsidering the role of the knower in the knowing process.
Following the assumption that knowers are social beings in relations, the strong
association between the knower and the known becomes obvious.
Being situated in a certain social setting, the knower develops a particular
perspective and interprets reality from his or her own standpoint. The individual body
is embedded in the material world, surrounded by the empirical senses, and influenced
by its physical needs. The individual knower‘s ideas and thoughts deeply rest on his
or her personal feelings, experiences and perceptions. Thus, the knower‘s belief is
subjective and relative. More importantly, it is almost impossible to bracket out the
knower‘s own situatedness and embeddedness in their effort to know. In this sense,
the knower plays a central role in the knowing process. The known is in the empirical
world and not independent from the knower, but strongly associated with the
knower‘s subjective and relative beliefs. To know is not simply to discover
transcendent truth 11 . What counts as knowledge?

At this moment, the answer

becomes ambiguous.

11

Definitely, there is a need to justify truth claim. In fact, in Thayer-Bacon‘s book Relational

“(e)pistomology, she develops an in-deep discussion about Dewey‘s ―warranted assertion‖ and James‘
―satisfactory truths‖. Thayer-Bacon, herself, also proposes ―qualified relativism‖ as an approach to
build knowledge. However, this dissertation doesn‘t intend to answer what is true and how to justify
truth. The focus here is the sociological meaning of ―knowledge‖ as well as how it is related to reality.
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Closing the divide between the knower and the known, the knowing process
involves the communication and negotiation between the knowers who are situated
and embedded in diverse social settings. The knower perceives reality via his or her
experience in everyday life. Exchanging ideas and thoughts within the community of
knowers, individual knowers acknowledge that they are differentiated from each other
in terms of their unique subjectivities, but also recognize that they could hold shared
beliefs within the community. In practice, there is a need to determine whether their
beliefs are reliable and worthy of acting on. In John Dewey‘s (1938/1991) words, an
agreement between the knowers must be reached to establish an epistemic claim. In
constant communication and negotiation, the contextualized social beings build a
common sense of what is real and what is certain. By nature, the process to build this
common sense is an ever on-going inquiry of ―knowledge‖. In this sense,
―knowledge‖12 is socially-constructed. ―What counts as knowledge?‖ is not a purely
epistemological issue, exclusively for philosophical discussion, but also a complex
sociological question related to socially contextualized human beings and their
interpretations of realities.
The social constructive view of ―knowledge‖ makes room for various
possibilities in what to know and how to know. However, there is always a trend
12

The quotation mark around ―knowledge‖ is to distinguish it from the capitalized Knowledge with an

assumption of transcendence. The quotation mark indicates that the use of ―knowledge‖ is in a social
constructivist sense. ―knowledge‖ is not something settled and eternal, but something in a continual
process of social construction.
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toward building a relatively unified knowledge system. Historically, it is common that
some knowledge is well-preserved throughout time, but some disappears from public
memory. Also, it is not rare that some knowledge is valued as cultural wealth at a
particular time or in a particular place, but devalued in another condition. Even in a
given social environment, some knowledge is treated as much more important than
other knowledge and more deserving of investment and attention. That is to say, it is
typical that a single set of structured ―knowledge‖ is treated as the most powerful one,
monopolizing all discourses. This monopolistic ―knowledge‖ is best manifested in
school curriculum, which is designed for teaching younger generations across a nation
state.
In effect, transcendental epistemology has been firmly embedded in the norms
and routines of schooling for a long time. In schooling, Knowledge is reified as school
curriculum. Highlighting objectivism and absolutism as inherent features of
Knowledge, the academic culture in schools stresses the quest for universal truth that
is detached from the subjective individuals and contextual experience. Such a view
implicitly assumes that pupils and teachers are passive receivers and transmitters of
Knowledge, respectively. As a result, the intentionality and initiatives of the knower
in the learning process are ignored. Schooling is assumed to be the procedure by
which the settled, eternal truth about the world is indoctrinated to the knower. There is
little possibility of creating new ―knowledge‖. Consequently, the uniformity of school
curriculum is taken for granted. The myth of transcendent Knowledge may be a
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rationalistic excuse, but it is an insufficient explanation, failing to recognize the
association between the knower and the known.
Grounded on the constructivist paradigm, ―knowledge‖ is produced, maintained
and transmitted through negotiation within a supporting community of knowers. The
members are contextualized social beings who are actively interpreting their
perspective views. In other words, the knower is not passively accepting knowledge,
but also engaged in creating ―knowledge‖. By viewing the knower as a situated agent,
both the pupils and teachers in schools produce the content of ―knowledge‖ in their
joint work and intersubjective exchanges. Schooling becomes a process by which
pupils and teachers make meanings of realities together. Thus, instead of a onedimensional, uniform content of teaching, school curriculum becomes a composite of
diverse meanings, perspectives and ways of thinking that are socially correlated.
Undoubtedly, socially conceptualized ―knowledge‖ conflicts with the practice of
national

curriculum,

which

emphasizes

unified

content

and

conformed

implementation. This contradiction may not be as simple as it appears. Behind the
contradiction is a fact about the social function of a national curriculum.
4.1.2 Social Discipline Mechanism in Imposing National Curriculum
Taking the situatedness and contextuality of the knower into account, classroom
interaction may be a process to make meanings of reality and then construct
―knowledge‖. Epistemologically, the uniformity of school curriculum is untenable.
However, the advocacy for a national curriculum deliberately ignores the social

105

constructive nature of ―knowledge‖, highlighting instead the national curriculum as an
assembly of settled, organized Knowledge most appropriate for teaching in schools.
Moreover, the national curriculum is mandatory for all schools in the nation state.
That is to say, the implementation of the national curriculum implies constant
subjection and obedience to state power. By imposing conformity and uniformity to
schools in the state, the national curriculum becomes, in effect, ―a discipline‖ over
schooling.
Discipline, in Foucault‘s (1975/1995) definition, ―is a type of power, a modality
for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedure, levels
of apparatus; targets; it is a ‗physics‘ or an ‗anatomy‘ of power, a technology‖ (p.138).
Foucault writes,
the disciplines create complex spaces that are at once architectural,
functional and hierarchical. It is spaces that provide fixed positions and
permit circulation; they carve out individual segments and establish
operational links; they mark places and indicate values; they guarantee
the obedience of individuals, but also a better economy of time and
gesture. They are mixed spaces: real because they govern the
disposition of buildings, rooms, furniture, but also ideal, because they
are projected over this arrangement of characterizations, assessments,
hierarchies. (p. 148)
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That is to say, when being disciplined, the individual is regulated to a certain
position and thus defined by that position as well as by the meanings assigned to the
position. However, the procedure of discipline does not end at training docile bodies
which ―may be placed, moved and articulated on others‖ (p. 146). The manipulable
body makes meticulous control over the individual possible. Foucault (1975/1995)
argues that ―[D]iscipline is no longer simply an art of distributing bodies, of
extracting time from them and accumulating it, but of composing forces in order to
obtain an efficient machine‖ (p. 164). With this particular focus on details, the
discipline mechanism is not only processing docile bodies but also molding
submissive minds. Thus, Foucault further points out that disciplines become general
formulas of domination and that increased disciplinary coercion is linked with an
increased domination.
According to Foucault (1975/1995), the chief function of disciplinary power is
to train ―the moving, confused, useless multitudes of bodies and forces into a
multiplicity of individual elements—small, separate cells, organic autonomies,
genetic identities and continuities, combinatory segment‖ (p. 170). The success of
disciplinary power depends on three elements: hierarchical observation, normalized
judgment, and examination. Foucault describes that hierarchical observation as an
apparatus by which disciplinary power is exercised through the maximum
surveillance in well-organized sites, such as schools, hospitals and military camps,
because ―it is everywhere and always alert‖, ―leaving no zone of shade and constantly
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supervising the very individuals‖; and it is ―absolutely discreet‖, functioning
―permanently and largely in silence‖ (P. 176). For Foucault, normalization of
judgment aims at correcting the slightest departures from correct behavior through
punishment for infraction or reward for compliance. Examination is central to the
procedure of disciplining individuals into the object of power, since it is the
combination of the first two means. Examination introduces individuality into the
field of documentation, a mass of writing fixes the individual, and also makes the
individual a case that can be analyzed and described.
In Discipline and Punishment, Foucault (1975/1995) repeatedly cites schools as
examples of disciplinary institutions where the mechanism of control is expressed and
maintained. He focuses on how schools discipline pupils through analysis of the
spatial arrangements of schools, norms set through continuous rewards for behavior
and school examinations as the approach to rank and document the pupils. However,
Foucault‘s concept of discipline is not only appropriate for analyzing how to train
docile individuals in some well-organized institutions. Foucault himself doesn‘t
intend to use the concept in so narrow a sense. Like most of his studies, the
genealogical investigation of discipline is meant to represent the operation of power in
the mechanism of discipline which pervades everywhere, throughout history and in
any form.
Modern schools do not have the same appearance as those described in
Foucault‘s (1975/1995) study. However, they have inherited certain basic
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characteristics from the schools of the eighteenth century. The primary role and
function of schooling has not significantly changed. Modern schools are still places
specialized for a particular end—educating people. The mechanism of discipline still
works, but has become more subtle and ulterior. The implementation of a national
curriculum is illustrative of how the mechanism of discipline works in modern
schools by continually normalizing centrally imposed national standards and
examining the process and consequences to the letter in daily teaching and learning.
4.1.3 Discipline Mechanism in Chinese National Curriculum
In a large universe of potential knowledge, there must be a variety of ways of
interpreting the world and making meaning of realities. However, diversities in
―knowledge‖ are assumed to be a threat to a consensus culture and ultimately
destabilize a homogenous society. Therefore, there is a strong need for a social filter
to resolve diverse discourses into a set of unitary social meanings. Historically, school
curriculum is used as the most effective social apparatus by which a particular set of
basic norms is continually reinforced and deeply internalized into the individual‘s
thoughts and behaviors. In order to reach a consensus, not all perspectives and
meanings are allowed to be represented in classrooms. The policy of a national
curriculum is adopted to ensure that only a single set of knowledge is allowed to be
transmitted to the younger generations.
Since the establishment of the People‘s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the
policy of a unified national curriculum has been applied to Chinese schools. Several
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rounds of curriculum reform have not shaken the supreme position of the mandatory
national curriculum in Chinese education. Usually, it is assumed that the national
curriculum represents the knowledge that we must teach to the younger generations in
China. In other words, the selective knowledge in the national curriculum is treated as
the knowledge with the most worth in the context of China. In organizing knowledge
into a settled framework, national standards coupled with a rigid supervision
procedure are laid down to ensure the national curriculum is distributed to the pupils
in a uniform fashion. In this sense, the national curriculum is legislated and spread as
official knowledge13 in China.
Recently, proponents have claimed that a national curriculum is one way to
improve education quality and establish benchmarks to evaluate schools. Following
this trend, in China, the idea of a unified national curriculum has won wide
acceptance as a way to secure equal educational opportunity for all pupils and to
establish national standards for assessing education quality across classrooms. As
announced in the 2006 amended Compulsory Education Law as well as the 2001
Outline of Basic Education Curriculum Reform (Pilot), the purpose of national
curriculum is to equalize quality education provided in Chinese schools through
standardizing the content taught across schools. Michael Apple (1990) asks American

13

The concept of ―official knowledge‖ is borrowed from Michael Apple (1993). Apple‘s examination

of official knowledge is to analyze the politics of school curriculum in the United State. In this chapter,
the term ―official knowledge‖ is used in the similar way as Michael Apple, but the analysis focuses on
the policy and practice of national curriculum in China.
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educators, ―[A]re things as they seem?‖ (p. 129). This question should also be asked
in China at this transitional moment. Schooling is also a process to make meanings
and ―produce‖ people. The national curriculum is not simply about literacy or
numeracy skills taught in classrooms, but bears more socio-cultural meanings than
what is claimed in the governmental directives. Acknowledging the sociological
function of national curriculum, the central state has made no attempt to shake the
central role of national curriculum in China‘s curriculum system in the top-down
reform.
The current curriculum reform is a response to the critique of the narrowness of
the Chinese curriculum system. To accommodate more local input, a three-level
curriculum system has emerged. As clearly stated in the Outlines of Basic Education
Curriculum Reform (Pilot) issued by the MOE in 2001, the current curriculum system
includes:
1) National curriculum: The MOE is responsible for drawing up overall plans
of the basic education curriculum, laying down national policies on basic
education curriculum management, deciding state subjects and required
instructional hours for each subjects, setting national curriculum standards
and introducing the new curriculum evaluation system.
2) Provincial curriculum: The provincial education departments assume the
responsibility for setting out provincial plans to carry out the national
curriculum and laying out local curriculum development and implementation
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plans. With approval from the MOE, the provincial education departments
are allowed to formulate provincial curriculum plans and standards for
schools under their own jurisdictions.
3) School-based curriculum: while carrying out the national curriculum and
provincial curriculum, schools are allowed to develop school-based
curriculum based on school conditions as well as students‘ needs and
interests. However, the school-based curriculum must be under the guidance
and supervision of education bureaucracy at all levels.
Though the three-level curriculum system encourages innovations based on
local or school conditions, the national curriculum still constrains flexibility in
curriculum development and implementation in China. In fact, being mandated by the
central state, the national curriculum regulates all aspects of schooling in great detail,
including building course structure, setting up curriculum standards, imposing
Beijing-based textbook approval procedures, and implementing standardized testing
as the evaluation method. Meanwhile, the MOE clearly (2001a) states that the
instruction hours allocated to the national curriculum are suggested to be 80 to 84
percent of the total school hours. Provincial curriculum and school curriculum largely
cover elective subjects or activity-based practice courses which are seen as necessary
supplements for the national curriculum. In this sense, the national curriculum is still
central to the entire curriculum system, giving orientation to Chinese education in
accordance with the central state‘s policy preference (Table 4.1&4.2).
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Table 4.1 Subject structure of compulsory education in China (MOE, 2001a)

Grades

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Ideology
and
Morality

Ideology
and
Morality

Ideology
and
Morality

Morality and Society
History and Society ( or choice of
History and Geography)

Morality and Life

Science (or choice of biology,
physics and Chemistry)

Science

Subjects

Chinese

Chinese

Chinese

Chinese

Chinese

Chinese

Chinese

Chinese

Chinese

Math

Math

Math

Math

Math

Math

Math

Math

Math

Foreign
Language

Foreign
Language

Foreign
Language

Foreign
Language

Foreign
Language

Foreign
Language

Foreign
Language

P.E.

P.E.

P.E.

P.E.

P.E. and
Health

P.E. and
Health

P.E. and
Health

P.E.

P.E.

Art (or choice of Music, Fine Arts)

Comprehensive Activity and Practice

Local and school-based courses

113

Table 4.2 Proportions of subjects in total sessions of compulsory education (MOE,
2001a)
Grades

Properion in
Total
Sessions
in 9
year

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Morality
and Life

Morality
and Life

Morality
and
Society

Morality
and
Society

Morality
and
Society

Morality
and
Society

Ideology
and
Morality

Ideology
and
Morality

Ideology
and
Morality

7～9%

History and Society ( or choice of
History and Geography)

3～4%

Science (or choice of biology,
physics and Chemistry)

7～9%

Science

Science

Science

Science

Subjects

Chinese

Chinese

Chinese

Chinese

Chinese

Chinese

Chinese

Chinese

Chinese

20～
22%

Math

Math

Math

Math

Math

Math

Math

Math

Math

13～
15%

Foreign
Language

Foreign
Language

Foreign
Language

Foreign
Language

Foreign
Language

Foreign
Language

Foreign
Language

6～8%

P.E.

P.E.

P.E.

P.E.

P.E. and
Health

P.E. and
Health

P.E. and
Health

10～
11%

P.E.

P.E.

Art (or choice of Music, fine arts)

9～11%

Comprehensive Activity and Practice
16～
20%
Local and school-based courses
Weekly
Total
(Sessions)

26

26

30

30

30

30

34

34

34

274

Yearly
Total
(Sessions)

910

910

1050

1050

1050

1050

1190

1190

1122

9522

Note: 1. The total sessions in 9-year compulsory education is counted on 35 weeks a year.
2. The course of comprehensive activity and practice includes information technology education,
research-based learning, community service and social practice, labor and vocational skill
education
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The core of the national curriculum is the National Curriculum Standards for
Compulsory Education (《义务教育课程标准》), which was officially issued by the
MOE in 2001. To replace the over-prescribed National Teaching Syllabuses, which
regulated every detail in the process of learning and teaching, the 2001 Curriculum
Standards were created to provide national guidelines for core subjects in schools.
Basically, the National Curriculum Standard for each subject is formulated in a
standardized format, including the following sections:
1) Preface: Introduces the characteristics of a specific subject and the basic
ideas of curriculum design for that subject.
2) Objectives: Defines the general objectives and the specific objectives for
each stage, including Grade 1-2, Grade 3-4, Grade 5-6, and Grade 7-9.
3) Content Standards: Specifies the knowledge, concepts and skills that the
students should acquire at each grade level.
4) Suggestions for implementation: Provides guidance on classroom pedagogy,
textbook compilation, evaluation methods and educational resources
utilization.
5) Terminology: Explains and clarifies key terms in the National Curriculum
Standards.
Undeniably, the National Curriculum Standards accommodates more flexibility
for curriculum development. The National Curriculum Standards provides a general
framework of guidance and criteria for classroom teaching, performance evaluation
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and textbook development, but leaves room for local education bureaucracies and
schools to design their own plans to meet the expected national goals. However, the
appearance of a softened policy stance in curriculum control doesn‘t change the fact
that the Chinese national curriculum is still highly structured.
In the newly established three-level curriculum system in China, the national
curriculum is fundamental to schooling. With the particular emphasis on national
standards, the national curriculum itself becomes a powerful means to constrain
deviation and foster docility by regulating, evaluating, supervising and correcting
activities in schools. Meanwhile, with the mandatory implementation of national
curriculum, the central state firmly upholds uniformity in the content of schooling and
conformity in the practice of national curriculum policies. Based on this principle, a
strategic control over Chinese school education is realized. As a result, even though
the on-going reform allows diverse classroom pedagogies, multiple textbook adoption
and local-based curriculum, teaching and learning in any particular school is
rigorously conformed to the framework set by the central state. Local autonomy in
school curriculum is extremely limited.
To a great degree, the national curriculum has become a state apparatus to
maintain a strict disciplinary mechanism in China‘s school system. With little
provision for flexibility, the national curriculum sets up the fundamental framework to
regulate the behavior of individual schools at the state level. In carrying out the
mandatory national curriculum, the central state could easily impose a set of coercive
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disciplines in classrooms across the state by normalizing a strategic control from the
top and regularly examining the conformity in local practice.
The national curriculum itself is composed of a series of rules, specifying
teaching objectives, defining learning standards and providing suggested pedagogical
guidelines at the central level. In imposing the national curriculum, the central state
repeatedly indoctrinates school administrators, teachers and pupils with the idea that
uniform content of schooling must be achieved in their daily work. The National
Curriculum Standards becomes a clearly-explained instruction manual for these
educators. The Education Law (1995) and the amended Compulsory Education Law
(2006) put the mandatory implementation of national curriculum into a legal form.
This procedure intentionally identifies delimitations between the permitted and the
forbidden, unifies behaviors and excludes deviations. As a result, the national
curriculum is normalized as a sole set of standards for teaching and learning in every
classroom. A homogeneous pattern of schooling is generated.
The implementation of the National Curriculum Standards is coupled with
standardized achievement testing at different levels. Under the pressure of being
assessed by high-stakes testing14, students and teachers are encouraged to be strictly
observant of the national curriculum. Those who comply with the rules of the
standardized testing system may survive in the school system and those who are doing
better than others in the testing may be treated as prospective social elites. Those who
14

In China, the outcome of a standardized test is used as the sole determining factor for making a

decision on selecting students to higher level education.
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refuse to follow the rules or fail to prove their ability to live within the rules are
excluded by the school system. Besides using standardized testing as the ultimate
method to evaluate students and teachers, a nationwide network of education
inspection also exists to supervise behaviors of schools and teachers. After the
reestablishment of the Office of National Education Inspectorate under the direct
leadership of the MOE in 1986, its local agencies have rapidly spread across the state
and worked jointly with the local administrative bureaucracy at all levels. The role of
the hierarchized inspection system in Chinese education has been increasingly
strengthened through monitoring the implementation of the national curriculum at the
local level.
By normalizing the idea of national standards, the application of high-stakes
testing and the construction of a network of education inspection, the practice of
national curriculum in China becomes Foucault‘s (1975/1995) technique of
―examination‖. It makes every detail in schooling visible. Thus, it is possible to
evaluate, to judge, to classify and to document. Also, it is easy to integrate all data
into a cumulative system in such a way that everyone is trackable. Finally,
examination ensures ―the great disciplinary functions of distribution and classification,
maximum extraction of forces and time, continuous genetic accumulation, optimum
combination of aptitudes and, thereby, the fabrication of cellular, organic, genetic and
combinatory individuality‖ (Foucault, 1975/1995, p. 192).
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In sum, while retreating from direct interference in schooling, the central state of
China successfully maintains a rigorous strategic control over the operation of
schooling by normalizing a unified national curriculum as the most authoritative
directive for schooling in the state. In pursuing conformity of implementation, the
central state not only indoctrinates those involved in the system with an idea of
national standards, but also normalizes the imposition of the national curriculum.
Meanwhile, the examination system safeguards the homogeneity created through the
normalization. In this view, the national curriculum in China functions to maintain the
school system as a modern disciplinary space which intends not only to train docile
bodies but also to process submissive minds. However, the knower does not passively
accept knowledge, but also engages in creating knowledge. Students and educators
working in the disciplinary space are still active agents involved in the process of
constructing knowledge. Thus, there is always a possibility that the authority of the
national curriculum at the central level could be challenged from below. In that
situation, the state power is the mighty force which solidifies the disciplinary
mechanism operating through the national curriculum. The involvement of the state
power politicalizes national curriculum as a hegemonic mechanism.
4.2 Politics of Unified National Curriculum
4.2.1 Power Relations in Selective Knowledge
In 1861, English philosopher Herbert Spencer (1861/1890) stated that ―[B]efore
there can be a rational curriculum, we must settle which things it most concerns us to
know, …we must determine the relative values of knowledge‖ (p. 13-4). For Spencer,
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―What Knowledge Is of Most Worth?‖ is the question of questions in education. To
seek the answer to the question, Spencer made a list of human activities arranged by
descending value and concluded that science is of most worth, and even science
should be stratified according to how particular knowledge is related to one‘s life.
Spencer‘s naturalistic-evolutionary belief makes his answer controversial, but two
hundred years later his question is still powerful for all practitioners in education. The
crucial point made by Spencer is that out of the vast universe of what is known, only
some can be labeled as knowledge; within the body of knowledge, some should be
valued more. In this sense, knowledge is hierarchically structured.
In the contemporary education system, legitimated by state power, the national
curriculum represents an assembly of official knowledge that is considered to be the
most prestigious in a national context. With the involvement of the state, the
production of national curriculum becomes a complex process operating on all kinds
of bonded social actors. The state is the site where various social forces present
themselves and also struggle to legitimize their perceptions of the realities. The state
is also an arena of conflict and negotiation between diverse social discourses.
Consequently, the national curriculum becomes politically contestable terrain.
A national curriculum represents the knowledge of most worth in a particular
national context at a particular historical moment. The production of the national
curriculum is a process of selecting, organizing and representing ―knowledge‖ within
a structured framework. It is impossible and unnecessary to package all potential
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content into school courses. Only selected ones can be taught in schools and in an
organized form. Who selects what should be taught in schools and by what criteria?
These two crucial issues are intentionally overlooked. In effect, the selection tradition
must involve particular principles and reflect the most powerful values in the social
context. In this sense, what knowledge is eligible to be taught in schools is not a
simple academic query. In Michael Apple‘s (1996) words,
whether we like it or not, differential power intrudes into the very heart
of

curriculum, teaching and evaluation. What counts as knowledge,

the ways in which it is organized, who is empowered to teach it, what
counts as an appropriate display of having learned it, and—just as
critically—who is allowed to ask and answer all these questions, are
part and parcel of how dominance and subordination are reproduced
and altered in this society. There is, then, always a politics of official
knowledge, a politics that embodies conflict over what some regard as
simply neutral descriptions of the world and what others regard as elite
conceptions that empower some groups while disempowering others.
(p. 23)
A typical national curriculum consists of core subjects, instructional materials,
quality evaluation methods and achievement goals. Who selects and organizes the
knowledge in this particular form? In terms of national curriculum, the central state
makes the decision that only selective curriculum should be taught in schools and in a
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specified form. To carry out the policy, a series of administrative methods are taken to
guide and regulate local education departments/bureaus and schools in implementing
the national curriculum. Meanwhile, the systematic selection operated by stateaccredited experts and institutionalized distribution under the control from the center
compose the legitimation process to identify the national curriculum as the sole
assembly of official knowledge in the state. As a result, the national curriculum
becomes the most prestigious curriculum in a particular national context and the entire
curriculum system is hieratically structured. The mere act of asking who selects and
organizes the knowledge in the national curriculum is not sufficient. Further questions
should be asked: What knowledge is the most worth passing on to the young? Why is
a hierarchized structure needed?
The national curriculum is declared to be that knowledge which we must have
and the knowledge for all. The legitimation process also reinforces the supreme
position of the national curriculum in the knowledge system. However, the national
curriculum is only the result of the selection, but it does not answer questions related
to what knowledge deserves to be preserved and transmitted to the younger
generations. In reality, not all social sectors get the chance to make their discourse
public. Also, not all public discourses could be legitimated as official knowledge. The
crucial issue in the selection and legitimation is not what has been chosen, but what
values are used as the criteria for choosing. In other words, what really matters is the
selection criteria that determines what knowledge is of the most worth.
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Apple (1993) argues that ―knowledge is filtered through a complicated set of
political screens and decisions before it gets to be declared legitimate‖ (p. 68).
Legitimating certain knowledge as official knowledge is actually a process of
legitimating the selection criteria. With the deep involvement of the state power, it is
assumed that the legitimate knowledge is the knowledge of the dominant social group.
This is far too simplistic, ignoring the complex power relations behind the production
of legitimate knowledge. In fact, just as the formation of the state is continually in
process, the conflict and negotiation between different social forces are continually in
process. However, the primary purpose of the state is certain—to govern its members.
A series of institutional means may regulate people‘s behaviors, but may not work
well in building consensus in people‘s minds. An ideological apparatus is needed. For
the state, schools are the disciplinary space for instilling behaviors in the pupils as
well as shaping their minds. Consequently, school curriculum must be integrated into
the ideological apparatus.
There is no pure consensus in ―knowledge‖. Foucault (1978/1990) draws
attention to the heterogeneity of knowledge/discourse as well as to the dynamics in
power relations. Consistent with his view of the immanent power and the immanent
resistance against power, he further notes that ―we must not imagine a world of
discourse divided between accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or between the
dominant discourse and the dominated one; but as a multiplicity of discursive
elements that can come into play in various strategies‖ (p. 100). In this sense, the
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dominated groups‘ discourses could be the resistant force to deconstruct existing
power relations at any possible moment. Also, the dominant group could make
compromise with the dominated groups via conversation. Linking knowledge with
power, Foucault argues ―[D]iscourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it,
but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it‖
(p. 101). Foucault makes clear his view that power and discourse/knowledge cannot
be separated: in manipulating knowledge we exercise power and in exercising power
we manipulate knowledge.
With the Foucaudian view of knowledge and power, the political nature of the
national curriculum may be perceived. What knowledge is included or excluded in the
national curriculum is not simply the result of an act of domination, but a
consequence of the compromise between diverse social discourses. In the complex
and unstable network of power relations, knowledge can be manipulated as an
instrument for maintaining an existing structure or order. Meanwhile, power relations
are also inherent in the production and distribution of certain knowledge. At this point,
the principle of legitimating selective knowledge has been revealed. That is to what
extent this particular knowledge would contribute to create a common sense that
enables the existing framework of power relations to be maintained without the
necessity of resorting to overt domination. How to create this common sense through
manipulating knowledge must be related to the concept of hegemony.
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4.2.2 Political Hegemony Mechanism in Imposing National Curriculum
For Antonio Gramsci (1971), the supremacy of a social group substantiates itself
in two ways, as ―domination‖ and as ―intellectual and moral leadership‖. Domination
tends to ―liquidate‖ all antagonistic groups by armed force, while intellectual and
moral leadership is attained by consent rather than coercive force of one class or
group over others. The latter form of ―the supremacy of a social group‖ is hegemony.
To be more specific, Gramsci (1971) describes hegemony as:
The spontaneous consent given by the great masses of the population
to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant
fundamental group; this consent is ―historically caused‖ by the prestige
(and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because
of its position and function in the world of production. (p. 12)
Here, Gramsci refers to hegemony as an imposed social consent in which a dominant
social discourse is spoken and represented in the thoughts and behaviors of a
population.
It is Gramsci‘s great contribution that he recognizes the presence of hegemony
in the actions and thoughts of ordinary people. Though Gramsci avoids using Marxist
terms such as class, proletariat, and bourgeoisie in defining hegemony, as a Marxist
philosopher, Gramsci still views hegemony as an oppression exercised by the
dominant class in a Marxist sense. Raymond Williams (1977) further develops
Gramsci‘s idea, extending his insight into the ulterior distinction between hegemony,
culture and ideology. Williams refers to culture as ―a whole social process, in which
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men define and shape their whole lives‖ (p. 108); ideology is ―a system of meaning
and values, it is the expression or projection of a particular class interest‖ (p. 108).
Hegemony goes beyond culture in ―its insistence on relating the ‗whole‘ social
process to a specific distribution of power and influence‖ (p. 108); hegemony exceeds
ideology in ―its refusal to equate consciousness with the articulate formal system‖
which can be and ordinarily is abstracted as a worldview or a class outlook (p. 109).
That is to say, hegemony concentrates on the power relations between domination and
subordination that saturate the very heart of culture, but it doesn‘t reduce all
consciousness to an ideology which typically articulates the formal meanings, values
and beliefs of a dominant class.
Distinguishing the three concepts into fine nuances, Williams (1972) explicitly
defines hegemony as ―the strongest sense of a ‗culture‘, but a culture which has also
to be seen as the lived dominance and subordination of particular classes‖ (p. 110).
To be more detailed,
It is a whole body of practices and expectations; over the whole of
living: our senses, our assignments of energy, our shaping perceptions
of ourselves and our world. It is a lived system of meanings and
values—constitutive and constituting—which as they are experienced
as practices appear as reciprocally confirming. It thus constitutes a
sense of reality for most people in the society, a sense of the absolute
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because experienced reality beyond which it is very difficult for most
members of the society to move, in the areas of their lives. (p. 110)
Moreover, Williams (1977) notices that a lived hegemony is not a uniform,
static and abstract structure, but an active construction in process. It continually
saturates into the very heart of culture, and divides it into dominant culture,
alternative culture and oppositional culture. As he puts it,
In practice, that is, hegemony can never be singular. Its internal
structures are highly complex, as can readily be seen in any concrete
analysis. Moreover (and this is crucial, reminding us of the necessary
thrust of the concept), it does not just passively exist as a form of
dominance. It has continually to be renewed, recreated, defended, and
modified. It is also continually resisted, limited, altered, and
challenged by pressures not at all its own. We have then to add to the
concept of hegemony the concepts of counter-hegemony and
alternative hegemony, which are real and persistent elements of
practice. (p. 112-113)
Giving insight into the very nature of hegemony, Williams makes his crucial point
clearly, that hegemony deeply saturates the whole process of living, dynamically
interacting with the economic, political and social systems. He emphasizes the fact of
domination, but also views hegemony as a process. In that process, education plays a
fundamental role in preserving and transmitting the dominant culture.
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According to Williams (1973), education is involved in the continual making
and remaking of an effective dominant culture and educational institutions are
agencies in distributing that dominant culture. Williams particularly notices the
―selective tradition‖ in the process of education: ―that which, within the terms of an
effective dominant culture, is always passed off as ‗the tradition‘, ‗the significant
past‘‖ (p. 9). William further stresses that the selectivity is the point: among a whole
possible area of past and present, only certain meanings and practices are chosen,
while certain other meanings and practices are neglected and excluded. More crucially,
―some of these meanings are reinterpreted, diluted, or put into forms which support or
at least do not contradict other elements within the effective dominant culture‖ (p. 9).
The selective process in school education, by nature, is the hegemonic process in
school education, by which the meaning of reality and living is redefined based on
dominant culture, and the existing relation of domination-subordination is normalized
as every member‘s consciousness.
Highlighting the so-called neutrality of knowledge, school curriculum is
declared to go beyond the interest of any social groups. The national curriculum is
also legitimated in the name of the common interest or general will of the people.
However, Williams‘s point should not be ignored. Hegemony saturates the whole
process of living in an ulterior way. The national curriculum is not an exception. In
reality, the dominant group not only sets limits on the selection process for
formulating a system of school curriculum, but also exerts pressure on the
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organization and affects distribution of the content of the system. The political
purpose is to create a way for dominant culture to reinforce an already existing power
relation. It is obvious that the dominant group plays a central role in the complex
network of power relations and in creating a dominant culture by manipulating
discourses and making compromise with different social interests. Through
legitimating selective curriculum, the dominant culture could be easily ideologicalized
into a set of imposed ideas and notions. However, as Williams (1973) writes,
if what we learn were merely an imposed ideology, or if it were only
the isolable meanings and practices of the ruling class, or of a section
of the ruling class, which gets imposed on others, occupying merely
the top of our minds, it would be—and one would be glad—a very
much easier thing to overthrow. (p. 9)
In order to continually affirm the dominant culture as inevitable and commonsensical,
the process of hegemony occurs. In diverse national contexts, the hegemonic process
operating in formal education system varies in terms of intensity, scale and methods.
Nevertheless, to internalize the imposed ideology into a saturated consciousness in
everyday life, school curriculum, especially the national curriculum is considered the
most direct hegemonic apparatus.
4.2.3 Hegemony Process in Chinese National Curriculum
In People‘s Republic of China (PRC), the history of current national curriculum
can be traced back to the early 1950s. Chinese national curriculum is formulated
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under the direct leadership and supervision of the central state. In the early years of
the PRC, the emphasis on a unitary national curriculum had a strong ideological color.
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officially declared the establishment of
the PRC. However, for the socialist regime, it was just the beginning, not the end. The
most imperative issues were how to form a unitary state and how to forge a national
identity to tie the people to the state, especially when the people had witnessed so
many regime shifts and the country had been disintegrated for such a long time. To
create a cohesive identification with the socialist regime, the central state was
dedicated to creating and indoctrinating a unitary socialist ideology into the
population.
Following the establishment of the PRC, Chinese people were plunged into a
series of socialist movements in economic, cultural and political areas. The interest of
the Chinese proletarian class, the sole dominant group in new China, was repeatedly
highlighted. For a new regime, the motive was obvious— to consolidate the socialist
regime at all levels and in all aspects. From 1962 to 1965, the CCP initiated a
nationwide Socialist Education Movement to propagate the ideas of class
consciousness. As Orion Lewis and Jessica Teets (2008) describe,
By maintaining tight control over school curriculum, the CCP was able
to ensure that generations of youth were indoctrinated regarding the
superiority of the communist system and the importance of political
loyalty. This teaching was reinforced by the state-run media which
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served to disseminate CCP propaganda. In sum, the CCP designed a
complex set of institutions that pervaded every aspect of the citizen‘s
life and ensured that the CCP‘s messages of patriotism and antiimperialism were heard by all. (p. 678)
In the Great Cultural Revolution, ideologicalized education reached its peak. The
over-emphasis on class conflict and class consciousness caused nationwide chaos and
brought the Chinese education system to a virtual halt from 1966 to 1976. After
several waves of curriculum reforms, ideological indoctrination in the Chinese
curriculum system is not as visible as before, except the patriotic themes in moral
education classrooms. However, the strong need to maintain and transmit the
dominant culture is still there. In the current reform, the changed socio-economic
context of China makes this need much more imperative.
The transition from a command-based planned economy to a capital-oriented
market economy has not only dramatically changed the economic structure of China,
but also empowered local economic entities to be autonomous forces with
consideration for their own interests and demands. The principle of market economy
has encouraged these entities to compete with each other to gain maximized profit. As
the economy increases in size and the society expands in complexity, the local
autonomy grows and spreads. Thus, more and more conflicts of interest are
happening, not only between regions, but also between the center and the localities
(Zhao, 1994). To varying degrees, the rise of local autonomy has become the resistant
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force challenging the existing power relation from below. The impact of increased
local autonomy is not limited to the economic field. In the education sector, while the
central state is retreating from its previous role as the sole provider of Chinese
education, diverse social forces participate in operating schools. More crucially, they
intend to establish a more inclusive curriculum system to address diversified local
discourses.

This

diversification

inevitably threatens

the

hegemonic

social

consciousness.
Meanwhile, with the development of communication and transportation
technologies, the rapid traversing of flows of trade, migration and culture lead to an
increased interconnectedness between people living in diverse locations. The
exchange of ideas across national borders takes place instantaneously across the world.
In China, global communication has manifested its potential in expanding the existing
public sphere and provide easy access to dissident views. To a great degree,
communication entails pluralism, diversity and two-way interaction and thereby
reduces the potential for monolithic, centralized information control and direct or selfimposed censorship (Sussman, 1989). In other words, it cultivates heterogeneous
discourse. For the dominant culture, the heterogeneity of social discourse is a
provocative force with the ability to destabilize its authority and control.
To preserve the dominant culture, schooling is viewed as a social device for
exerting pressure and imposing limits over social consciousness and discourse.
National curriculum is the consequence of compromise and negation between diverse
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social discourses. However, as Basil Bernstein (1990) points out that by the time
selective knowledge gets into the national curriculum, it has been abstracted from its
original context and then reinterpreted for use in a particular pedagogic text. This
process enables the dominant group to constantly redefine and reshape the meanings
of lived experience and reality, and implant a whole set of coded ideas, values and
beliefs into the national curriculum. In other words, the central state, as the main
agency of the dominant group could successfully transform the national curriculum
into a hegemonic mechanism which justifies the interest of the dominant group and
consolidates its domination, without the necessity of resorting to overt repression over
the subordinated groups or formally articulating about their own ideology. Through
schooling, the dominant culture becomes a saturating social consciousness distributed
to whoever teaches and learns within the framework and then widely spread to the
larger society. The expectation of the state is to build a stable identification with the
dominant hegemony.
In the hierarchically structured curriculum system in China, the national
curriculum is legitimated as the most authoritative one on the subject of what should
be taught in which way. Meanwhile, national curriculum is put into effect through the
power from the top of the state apparatus. The prescribed content, settled structure
and mandatory implementation leave people with the impression that the national
curriculum represents itself as the voice of the general will of the people. Thus, the
Chinese national curriculum is declared to be the knowledge for all and the
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knowledge we must have. In the day-to-day teaching and learning, the national
curriculum regulates all aspects of schooling. Meanwhile, the imposition of this
mandatory national curriculum is normalized. Ultimately, the national curriculum is
used as an effective means to preserve and transmit the dominant culture, and
gradually strengthen it as a norm or a fact that deeply saturates the consciousness of
the society.
Apple (2003) argues that ―[W]hether we like it or not, curriculum talk is power
talk‖ (p. 7). The social construction of school knowledge and the politics of the
selection process result in the inevitable tension between centralization and
decentralization in the implementation of the national curriculum. The central state
utilizes the national curriculum as a social device to determinate the boundary
between what should be taught and what should not be taught in schools. Also, the
supreme position of the national curriculum in the entire system becomes a coactive
force to reinforce the values and beliefs of the dominant culture through schooling.
However, the power relation is never stable: wherever there is power, there is
resistance (Foucault, 1975/1995). The hegemonic process must be alert and
responsive to the alternatives and oppositions which question or threaten its
dominance (Williams, 1977). In this sense, reform must occur at some point in an
attempt to readjust the power relations between the diverse social forces in China‘s
curriculum system.
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Both the changed economic structure inside of China and the global trend of
decentralizing public sectors impact on the current Chinese curriculum reform and
even lead to a series of relatively radical reform policies, from diversifying the fiscal
system for Chinese education to transferring administrative management work to
lower levels, as well as being deepened into deconcentrating curriculum development
to the local level. However, the central state has never underestimated the sociological
and political meanings of the school curriculum. In current curriculum reform, there is
a much more intensive desire to preserve the existing structure of power relations and
maintain a sole set of meanings of reality and living. Thus, even though faced with the
critiques of narrowness and rigidity of the nationalized curriculum system, the central
state insists on maintaining a centralized curriculum system by strengthening the
absolute authority of the national curriculum.
With the evolution of the curriculum reform, the tension between centralization
and decentralization is escalating. In diversifying school curriculum development, the
innovations in implementing national curriculum in local conditions are
accommodated in the current curriculum system. To solve the narrowness of a unified
national curriculum, even local-based curriculum is allowed as a supplement to the
national curriculum.

However, considering the social and political functions of

school curriculum, the central state is unwilling to transfer real authority to the local
level. In fact, the state insists that all reform efforts must be framed within the process
and manners determined by the central state. The national curriculum is strengthened
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to retain the monopoly of the central authority in China‘s curriculum system. The
negotiation between diverse social forces is an on-going process. Does the strategy of
centralized decentralization really work in solving the confrontations and conflicts
emerging in the current curriculum reform?
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Chapter 5 Chinese Curriculum Reform, Dancing in Chains
There is no truly centralized or decentralized education system. In order to
govern a curriculum system, both centralization and decentralization are useful
technologies in coordinating within and between flows of work/tasks, responsibilities
and authorities. The core issue is always about how to establish a dynamic balance
between the center‘s control and the locality‘s autonomy. After over two decades of
reform, Chinese curriculum system is now at a crucial point. The structural
transformation both in the economic sector and public sectors has become an
increasing pressure on further reforming China‘s curriculum system. However, the
top-down curriculum reform is not moving smoothly as it was supposed. On
numerous occasions, the results of the reform actions in realistic local settings are not
close to the expected goals set by the central states.
This chapter focuses on the input and outcome of the strategy of centralized
decentralization in the current curriculum reform in China. The chapter demonstrates
the split between responsibility and authority in superficial decentralization and
relates the unbalanced central-local relations in curriculum governance to the
bottlenecks in achieving the goals of the curriculum reform. Meanwhile, this chapter
explores the inherent impediment to build a balanced central-local relation in Chinese
curriculum system and illustrates the enduring value dilemma regarding the purpose
of schooling in the unique socio-political context of China. The chapter also seeks
possible solutions.
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5.1 Bottleneck in Implementing Curriculum Reform
―Dancing in chains‖ (Zhu, 2008) is now an often seen metaphor in describing
local educators‘ daily work in the current curriculum reform in China. Chinese
education scholar, Zhu Yongxin (2008) directly points out that the ―chains‖ on local
education administrators and teachers are from the imposed national requirements at
the top as well as a social discourse that favors this centralized system. In the past 25
years, deconcentrating work and responsibilities to lower levels, the central state has
been tolerating more and more local innovations and incentives in reforming China‘s
curriculum system. There has come a demand from below for a redefined centrallocal relation in building a more inclusive curriculum system in China. However, the
decentralization reform in the form of deconcentration in China‘s curriculum system
barely solves deep problems, even though the reform has gone quite far in many
aspects, such as more leeway in textbook adoption, course structure and classroom
pedagogies.
In the current Chinese curriculum reform, the deconcentration process is merely
a readjustment about what work should be done by whom. In pre-reform era, China
adopted a highly centralized curriculum system. As the sole source of regulation and
enforcement, the central state itself was not only deeply involved in school curriculum
design, textbook compilation, quality assessment, but also directly managed the
implementation of the national policies in great detail. Its function relied on a strong
bureaucracy to exert a meticulous control over the curriculum applied to schools
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across the country. As the central agency of the state in the education sector, the
Ministry of Education (MOE) was in charge of the running of this centralized system
practically. Thus, in the pre-reform era, schooling in China was unified on a
nationwide basis.
Since the initiation of the curriculum reform in 1986, while the central state has
retreated from the overwhelming work of maintaining this centralized system alone;
local governments, education departments/bureaus, school administrators and teachers
have been encouraged to do the work previously done by the MOE. Local-based
curriculum design and textbook compilation are applied to enrich the diversity of
Chinese curriculum system. Meanwhile, reform in national college entrance
examinations has been launched. Starting from 2003, about 16 provinces are allowed
to adopt independent propositions of the matriculation test. However, decentralization
in China‘s curriculum system remains superficial. In shifting the work from the center
to localities, the central state concentrates on improving education policy and
legislation system, formulating national requirements and standards of schooling and
monitoring the reform process at all aspects. Basically, all of the work and changes in
China‘s curriculum system must be done in the strict framework set by the central
state, even though seemingly there is more flexibility in carrying out national
curriculum policies. Retaining the state‘s monopolistic authority over school
curriculum, the current reform has not touched on the real core of the authority
distribution in the Chinese curriculum system. In the superficial decentralization, the
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unbalanced central-local relation remains and results in a series of dilemmas in
evolving reform efforts.
The crux of these dilemmas arises from the division between responsibility and
authority in reform China‘s curriculum system through centralized decentralization. In
the current Chinese curriculum reform, the top-down approach deliberately blurs the
line differentiated between authority and responsibility. According to Max Weber
(1958), authority is the willing and unconditional compliance of people, resting upon
their belief that it is legitimate for the superior to impose his will on them and
illegitimate for them to refuse to obey. In other words, authority is normatively
exercised to exert obedience, to command and to enforce. Responsibility is however
different. It refers to the obligation to carry out assigned duties or achieve certain
objectives. In a formalized system, authority and responsibility are the two
fundamental factors that are inseparable from each other. Marshall Murphree (2000)
argues authority and responsibility should be linked; when they are de-linked both are
eroded. Authority without responsibility becomes meaningless and obstructive;
responsibility without authority lacks the necessary components for its effective
exercise.
In Chinese education system, the legitimacy of the authority of the MOE is
rooted in the established rules and laws of the state and is normally exercised through
the hierarchized structure of education governance. On the one hand, both the
Education Law (1995) and the Compulsory Education Law (1986) confirm the
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legitimate authority of the MOE in governing Chinese education. As the sole
representative of the central state in the education sector, the MOE retains the
monopolistic authority over the entire education system. The local education
departments/bureaus are assumed to do the assigned jobs in a settled framework and
toward unitary national goals under the leadership of the MOE. On the other hand,
education governance in China is organized and arranged in a strict vertical hierarchy
in which the MOE directs and supervises the work done at the local level. The current
curriculum reform is also formulated and implemented in this way.
In 2001, the Outline of Basic Education Curriculum Reform (Pilot) was issued
as the legitimate guideline for the reform in the Chinese curriculum system. It
explicitly claims that the MOE functions at the central level, formulating curriculum
development principles, imposing national standards and framing the evaluation
system. Local education departments/bureaus take operating responsibilities for
integrating the national policies into local realities. Schools are answerable for putting
the policies into practice. In deconcentrating work to localities, undoubtedly, the
central state accommodates flexibility of how to do the work in certain local
conditions and even encourages innovations by somewhat extension. However, what
remains ambiguous is to what extent the local actors are allowed to make decisions.
While stressing the obligation of local education departments/bureaus and schools, the
educational laws and reform guidelines don‘t clearly specify the role of these local
sectors in the decision-making process. In fact, in the top-down decentralization
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reform, the tolerance to curriculum diversities and flexibility in carrying out national
standards appears to be very limited. All work done at the local level must conform to
the national guidelines and challenges to the authority of education-related laws and
regulations are not allowed. Meanwhile, through the statewide supervision system
under the direct leadership of the MOE, the center takes a close watch on what is
happening in the curriculum system.
The ambiguous line between responsibility and authority creates a seeming
appearance of decentralization in the current curriculum reform. However, it is
responsibility rather than authority that is devolved from the center to the periphery in
this state-initiated and state-led decentralization reform. While burdening local
education departments/bureaus and schools with increased responsibilities, the center
has no attempt to grant matched authority to the localities in the process of centralized
decentralization. The unbalanced central-local relations manifest into a sharp split
between responsibility and authority. The de-linked responsibility and authority
inevitably leads to some contradictions and dilemmas in reconstructing China‘s
curriculum system.
5.2 Crux of Centralized Decentralization Strategy
The recent curriculum reform has been on-going for more than two decades.
However, with the strategy of centralized decentralization, both the visible
contradictions in curriculum management and invisible conflicts in curriculum
philosophy have not been resolved, and even become the bottlenecks in promoting the
reform efforts for meeting the needs of the rapidly changed Chinese society. In
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curriculum management, local curriculum innovation is deeply struggling in the
dilemma between top-down administrative control and the down-top implementation.
In curriculum philosophy, local-based curriculum development is directly dealing
with the contradiction of a holistic approach to essential-quality-oriented (EQO)
education and single-dimensional evaluation standard—testing results. In coping with
the division between responsibility and authority as well as contradictions and
dilemmas associated with the division, the reform progress has been slowed down.
5.2.1 Visible Contradiction in Curriculum Management
In the current reform, the most obvious effort in reforming China‘s curriculum
system reflects on changes in curriculum management. A three-level, hierarchical
curriculum management system of state, province and school was introduced in the
Outline of Basic Education Curriculum Reform (Pilot) issued by the MOE in 2001.
According to the 2001 Outline, academically, the MOE works at the central level,
setting up national curriculum; provincial education departments function at the lower
level, implementing national curriculum in local conditions as well as laying out
provincial curriculum; schools are allowed to develop school-based curriculum under
the consideration of addressing diverse needs and interest of local students. In general,
the school hours allocated to the national curriculum are suggested to be 80 to 84
percent of the total school hours (MOE, 2001a). Managerially, from the top to down,
the MOE regulates and supervises nationwide curriculum activities; local education
departments/bureaus direct curriculum-related work under their own jurisdictions;
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school administrators and teachers implement curricula formulated at national,
provincial and school levels. The superordinate exerts managerial control over the
subordinate. The subordinate assumes the operating responsibility and reports to the
superordinate.
Schools are the basic unit in Chinese education system and the most
fundamental site for reform practices. In the current curriculum reform, Chinese
schools are facing unprecedented challenges. In the policy climate of decentralizing
educational provision and distribution, schools are now undertaking the work
previously done at the higher level. It is the first time the central state allows input
from schools in curriculum management. Meanwhile, schools are put at the front line
to coordinate between education bureaucracy and real classrooms, as the institutions
directly organizing teaching and learning. However, school administrators and
teachers soon find they are positioned in a dilemmatic situation in this wave of
education reform.
In the pre-reform era, a centrally imposed unitary curriculum was applied to
every classroom across China. Curriculum management was through a top-down
bureaucratic approach. The MOE unitarily regulated all aspects of teaching and
learning in great detail, including teaching plans, textbooks, subject structure,
instruction hours and evaluation methods. Local education departments/bureaus
enforced the national curriculum and relevant policies to schools. School
administrators and teachers had no choice of their own but obeyed the superordinate.
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At that time, curriculum management at the local level was simplified into part of
administrative management and the majority duty placed on school staffs‘ shoulders
was merely following instructions from the education bureaucracy. In the current
reform, curriculum management is now a comprehensive procedure of organizing all
curriculum-related elements into an effective way and toward a specific goal,
involving planning, executing, staffing, directing and monitoring curriculum design,
instruction scheme, resource allocation and performance evaluation. In building the
tri-level curriculum management system, school administrators and teachers are
included and positioned at the bottom of the system. The expectation on the role of
schools in curriculum management is shifting away from a passive adherent to the
administrative bureaucracy of education to a relatively self-driven sector in
curriculum matters. Seemingly, in the tri-level curriculum system, school autonomy is
allowed and even encouraged. Flexibility in implementing national curriculum is
treated as the key to delivering effective, equal education services. Meanwhile,
innovations in local and school-based curricula are welcomed in classrooms to meet
realistic needs of local students and communities. However, in exercising school
autonomy, school administrators and educators soon find that the work on their
shoulders is not as it seems.
On the one hand, school administrators and teachers have very few experiences
in curriculum management, but they are plunged into the work of coordinating
between national, local and school-based curricula that is completely new in Chinese
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education. In the reform, school staff must take concrete steps to move from the idea
of reform to the practice of reform. Educators in the school site, from principals to
teachers as well as their support staff are bearing the most fundamental responsibility
for bringing the reform policies into effect. However, the accessible resources for
schools are quite limited, both financially and academically. The state has already
reduced budgetary allocation to education since the 1980s. The gap left by the central
state has to be filled by local money15. Under the requirement of the MOE, education
administrative units at local levels and schools are supposed to raise a special fund for
the curriculum reform (MOE, 2001b). Thus, the current situation is schools have to do
more work previously done at the higher level, but receive less funding from the state.
A national research conducted in 10 experimental areas of curriculum reform
observed that lack of funding had already impeded the reform process in schools
(Tang & Ma, 2002). At the same time, due to lacking expertise and experience of
curriculum design, the pressure on local teachers has rapidly increased. In fact, inservice and pre-service training for teachers and principals haven‘t sufficiently met
the immediate need of building a three-level curriculum system of national curriculum,
local curriculum and school-based curriculum (Zhong, 2006). The work duties of
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According to the Statistical Communiques of China on Education Finance from the fiscal year of

2007 to 2009, the central government allocation to education comprised 8.9%, 11%, 12.7% of the total
education expenditure, respectively. Local governments, education bureaucracy and school
administrators must be creative in looking for alternative financial sources. The main sources include
education surcharges levied on enterprises and individuals by local governments at each level, social
contribution to education, funds from school-run enterprises and school fees paid by students.
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school principals have expanded from maintaining routine administrative functions to
managing curriculum matters, such as facilitating teachers‘ work, organizing
curriculum resources, etc. The raised requirement and expectation on their work
performance are burdened, but the scarcity of assistance and resources are realistic
obstacles.
On the other hand, the national guideline for curriculum reform merely lays
down what should be done by whom, but not how to do. At the national level, the
Outline of Basic Education Curriculum Reform (Pilot) is the most detailed guideline
for curriculum reform, composed of nine sections: curriculum reform goals,
curriculum structure, curriculum standards, pedagogy process, textbook development
and management, curriculum evaluation, curriculum management and curriculum
reform organization and implementation. It is noteworthy that the guideline is broad
in scope, but general in implementation steps. The most specific content regarding
implementation is summarized to two concise principles: one is experimenting ideas
before setting down; the other is democratic participation and scientific decision.
Without further explanation, the two principles are seemingly open to a wide variety
of local interpretation. It gives an appearance that the current reform intends to
overcome the rigid conformity of the implementation of national policies. However,
the actual openness to school autonomy is very limited considering the authority is
still concentrated on the top.
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The Outline repeatedly stresses that the MOE not only provides an overall plan,
but controls over the entire process through the hierarchical education bureaucracy.
What can be taught in classrooms in which way must be approved and supervised by
the education administrative units. In this sense, the curriculum management at the
school site mainly goes through a top-down bureaucratic approach. The tri-level
curriculum management fails to make substantial changes in promoting flexibilities in
connecting national policies with local conditions. A recent field-based research
completed by Jocelyn Lai-ngok Wong (2006) proves this. Wong observed that both
the principals and teachers appeared not to derive substantial benefits from the recent
policy shift. In the interviews, the principals described their sense of powerlessness in
curriculum matters, because they must follow the laws and regulations set by the top.
Also, the teachers didn‘t become more engaged in curriculum matters, but
experienced more anxiety as a result of their increased workloads. They did just what
they had to do. Wong summarized that in most participant schools there was only
minor input, or no input from members of school communities.
The division between authority and responsibility in curriculum management
inevitably impedes the effectiveness of the reform process. Political scholar James
Scott (1998) points out that state officials are removed from the society they are
charged with governing. It is the case in China‘s curriculum management system. The
MOE made all substantial decisions based on the information abstracted from
statistics or other documents rather than the full reality. The provincial education
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department frames a localized plan to facilitate the implementation of national
policies. Even though both the MOE and its local agencies consult with curriculum
experts, teachers, school principals and launch experiments before popularizing the
policies, the officials in the education bureaucracy may be misled by their schematic
knowledge about Chinese schools. As a result, the decision made at the higher level
lags behind the realities in classrooms; simultaneously, the education bureaucracy
lacks sufficient, precise information to make timely adjustments according to what
actually happens in classrooms. The new curriculum management system is supposed
to improve the situation. In the curriculum reform, school principals and teachers are
coping with the existing and newly emerging issues that impact their daily work. Thus,
the meaningful input from the first line of the reform could be valuable and
imperative in improving the effectiveness. However, without necessary authority, in
verifying degrees, school incentives in curriculum management are suppressed and
local innovations in carrying out national policies are impeded. In this sense, the trilevel curriculum management system may become an empty idea rather than a
practicing reality.
5.2.2 Invisible Conflict in Curriculum Philosophy
Besides the visible contradictions in reforming curriculum management, the
split responsibility and authority causes deep problems in curriculum philosophy.
These philosophical problems are worth attention, but they are often ignored.
Curriculum philosophy refers to the most fundamental beliefs in curriculum
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development which define the purpose of curriculum design and focus of curriculum
practice. In the current curriculum reform, the most prominent transformation in
curriculum philosophy is a shifting from utilitarian education to holistic education.
Utilitarian philosophy morally justifies a right action based on its utility—the most
good (Bentham, 1907, Mill, 1861). Utilitarian education embraces a narrow approach
to the good of education—teaching and learning merely for a direct beneficial
consequence. In contemporary China, on the utilitarian ground, the determining
consideration of why and how education matters is on the usefulness of the outcome,
economically, socially and politically. Since the initiation of Chinese economic
reform, the economic function of education has been constantly highlighted. Testing
is viewed as the main method in measuring the outcome of education. Holistic
education rests on the philosophical assumption that there is an inseparable wholeness
of the diverse elements that compose the inner world of the self and the intimate
connection between the self and its external surroundings (Miller, 2007). Holistic
education aims at equipping students to explore the world around and inside of them
independently and thoughtfully. In contemporary China, holistic education is reified
as a quest for inspiring all-round development of students in a life time, morally,
intellectually and physically through cultivating a self-motivated love of learning and
competence of learning.
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5.2.2.1 Utilitarianism in Examination-oriented Education
The examination-oriented utilitarian education has long been deeply embedded
in China. For over 1000, the imperial examination (科举) had been adopted to recruit
bureaucrats for the empire under the direct supervision of the central authority.
Theoretically, any male adult in China, regardless of his family pedigree and wealth,
could be selected to be a state official by passing the imperial examination. There
were numerous examples in Chinese history of intellectuals who successfully moved
from low social status to political prominence through this channel. The impact of the
examination system has already extended from the imperial official selection to
Chinese culture and society in all aspects. Besides relative effectiveness and fairness
at the technical level, the emperor‘s‘ favor on the examination system was mainly
grounded on the social and political functions of the examination.
As early as in 206 BC, the Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty announced that
Confucianism was the official state orthodoxy. Deeply involved with the dynastic
regimes, Confucianism was propagandized as a very particular system of virtue ethics
in orienting individual behaviors and interpersonal relationships on a daily base in
Chinese society. In the imperial examination system initiated in 605 CE, Confucian
classics was the exclusive content of the national examination and sophistication of
Confucian philosophy was the critical criterion in selecting intellectual elites serving
the state. Chinese studies scholar Xinzhong Yao (2000) points out that ―Confucianism
extended the boundaries of moral codes from individual matters to social and political
areas, not only providing the state with an ideological format, but also equipping the
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authority with the standards to judge behavior and thoughts‖ (p. 34). The school of
Confucianism gained predominance over all other schools was never a historical
coincident.
Li (rite, 礼) is the core virtue of Confucian philosophy. The Confucian ―li‖
moves beyond the religious ceremonies in the Western conception of rites to an entire
system of settled social interrelations between individuals as well as between
individuals and their contexts. Socially, ―li‖ infused all Chinese people with an idea of
submitting to hierarchism and authority. As the universal moral principles for the
individual, ―li‖ was associated with self-restraint and self-discipline achieved through
his/her appropriate behaviors and obedience to social norms. As the basis of a stable
society, ―li‖ strictly defined social orders in a hierarchical way and stressed the proper
place of each individual in this structure. Politically, ―li‖ legitimated the absolute
authority of the state sovereign and maintained a unified, enduring state polity of
China for over two thousand years. The emperor ruled the nation through his huge
administrative bureaucracy composed of intellectual elites. The individual‘s
obedience to the authority in a family was politicalized into the subordination to his
supervisor in the state system and the loyalty to the emperor.
The uniformity of the content and format of the imperial examination served to
strengthen the ideological consensus on Confucian values and normalized the idea of
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hierarchism and conformity in imperial China16. In selecting local Confucian elites to
be state officials, the dynastic regimes overtly rewarded those who succeeded in the
examination system with high-ranked social status, wealth and glory. Besides the
examination

taker,

his

extended

family

both

intergenerationally

and

intragentrationally would greatly benefit from the state appointment. In this sense, the
examination system became the most practicable channel of upward social mobility in
the Imperial China since AD 605. Linking examination performance with access to
upward social mobility, the initiative of learning was encouraged. Consequently,
education was valued by the entire society and the dynastic regimes. In Imperial
China, following the tradition originating from Confucius, the vast majority of private
schools （sishu, 私塾）were financed by tuitions from students‘ families. These
schools served the needs of basic literacy and prepared youth for higher learning
(Deng, 1997). The public schools (guanxue, 官 学 ） were run by the central
government and its local agencies. In order to cultivate the most talented youth to be
officialdom, curriculum for public schools was unified and geared to the imperial
examination. With the best resources and direct connection with the central state,
being enrolled in the state schools was viewed as the key stepping-stone to further
success in the examination. In the climate of educating youth for state officialdom,
schooling in imperial China had a strong color of utilitarianism that associated the
16

Chinese historians often refer to the period from the beginning of Qin Dynasty in 221 BC to the fall

of Qing Dynasty in AD 1912 as imperial period of China. In the over two thousand years, the dynastic
regimes dedicated to build a unitary nation under the ruling of the emperors (Fan, 1995, Jian, 1979).
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purpose of schooling directly with the social and political benefits of education both
for individuals and the state. Education in contemporary China has never completely
shaken off its history.
The imperial examination was abolished in 1905 by the Qing Dynasty, but the
utilitarian idea of teaching and learning to test has never ended in China. The
utilitarian education in contemporary China takes the shape of examination-oriented
education. Reform attempts have been varied since the establishment of the People‘s
Republic of China in 1949. However, as Australia scholar Belinda Dello-lacovo (2009)
points out that China‘s intense focus on examination-oriented education ―has proven
remarkably resilient, bouncing back with renewed vigor after each assault in
contemporary China‖ (p. 242). After the death of Mao in 1976, the most influential
step in reconstructing Chinese education was the restoration of the national college
entrance examination in 1977 that had been discontinued by the Great Cultural
Revolution for ten years. The enrollment procedure was unified on a nationwide basis.
The MOE allotted total quotas of college seats to each province, and the numbers of
seats in an individual college to be assigned to each province throughout the country
were also fixed centrally in advance17. Then, the MOE gave the examination papers to
examinees throughout the country on the same days, at the same hours and in the
17

For example, Guangxi Province was allotted 7, 448 college seats in 1979. The total of 7, 448

seats consisted of 991 places in key-point universities throughout the country, 947 places in
ordinary institutions of higher education outside the province and 5,5 10 places in those within
the province (Pepper, 1980).
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same sequence. The admission decision was dependent on the result of this annual
examination. The admission to higher education was highly competitive (Table 5.1).

Table 5.1 National College Entrance Examination:

Candidates and Successful Entrants 18 (MOE, 1977-1984)
Year

Candidates

Successful Entrants

Enrollment Rate

1977

5,700,000

270,000

4.87%

1978

6,100,000

402,000

6.70%

1979

4,684,000

275,000

5.87%

1980

3,320,000

282,130

8.49%

1981

2,589,000

278,777

10.76%

1982

1,860,000

315,000

16.93%

1983

1,670,000

390,000

23.35%

1984

1,643,000

480,000

29.27%

The restoration of the nation-wide university entrance examination opened a
prelude to the establishment of the key-point school system at all levels. In 1978, the
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In the year 1977 and 1978, any Chinese youths who were under 30 and had a high school diploma or

the equivalent were eligible to take the college entrance examination. However, in the following years,
the eligibility requirements to the seats of the college entrance examination were narrowing prospective
examination takers to an increasingly uniform pool of fresh high school graduates without prior
employment experience (Pepper, 1980a). In 1977, only 20% to 30% of the examination takers were
fresh higher school graduates of that year. In 1978, the proportion increased to 50%. In 1979, the
preferred maximum age limits was reduced to 25 and employed staff were not encouraged to attend the
college entrance examination (Pepper, 1980b).
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State Council announced a list of 88 national key-point universities and colleges.
These key-point universities and colleges were heavily supported by the central state
in funds, personnel and other resources. In the same year, the MOE authorized and
ran around 20 schools across the country as national key point primary schools and
secondary schools. In the next few years, local education bureaus from the provincial
to county level ran key schools in their respective jurisdictions. The designation of
selected educational institutions as ―key points‖, without a doubt, had the effect of
resurrecting an educational pyramid in China (Epstein, 1987).
In the post-Mao era, the key-point school system was deliberately elitist in that
it channeled the best students into the best schools (Pepper, 1980). Meanwhile, the
key-point school system was featured by its urban-based focus. By 1981, there were
5,271 key-point primary schools, accounting for 0.6% of all Chinese primary schools
and 4,016 key-point secondary schools, accounting for 3.8% of all Chinese secondary
schools (Liu, 1993). A survey on the key-point secondary schools in 13 provinces,
municipalities and autonomous regions in 1982 showed an unbalanced proportion
between urban and rural education. Among a total of 348 key-point secondary schools
involved in the survey, nearly 70% were urban schools, 28% were township schools
and 2% were rural schools. Seven out of the thirteen administrative divisions at the
provincial level had no rural key-point schools (Yuan, 1999).
In general, at every level from elementary to higher education, those key-point
schools received the most funding from the state, recruited the best students and had

156

the highest quality teaching staffs. Thus, they constituted a direct conduit through
which students reached the pinnacle of elite education—colleges and universities.
Ultimately, the benefits of the elite education cumulated at an urban-based, stateassigned job (Rosen, 1985). In the middle 1970s, youth unemployment and
underemployment remained a serious social problem in urban China19. Only college
and university graduates were guaranteed permanently secured positions in the state
sector with a steady income. Most of those who were left behind by the elite
education stayed at home or entered the low-grade labor market associated with nonguaranteed payment and lack of welfare security.
In pre-reform China, being excluded from the state job allocation system, these
school leavers 20 had much fewer chances of upward social mobility than college
graduates. In this sense, the high expectation of gaining entrance to elite education
was primarily driven by the realistic benefits of elite education. For the student, elite
education was related to a secured job in the state sector and privileges associated

19

In the late 1970s, urban unemployment reached a crisis proportion. Unemployment at that time was

estimated to be about 9 percent of the urban labor force and underemployment had probably reached
between 10 percent and 30 percent of the total national population of working age (Harding, 1987). A
large number of rusticated youth who had been exiled to the countryside under the policy of ―sendyouth-to-countryside‖ from 1968 to 1978 returned to their home cities. These returnees and new school
leavers composed a massive influx of unemployed urban population. However, the available positions
were limited due to the shrinking of Chinese economy in the Great Cultural Revolution (MacFarquhar
& Fairbank, 1977). Thus, a secured job in the state sector became highly competitive.

20

School leavers in this chapter refer to school graduates and drop-outs.
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with the job. For schools, sending more students to key-point schools at a higher level
was linked with more funding and better personnel resources. For the state, the small
elite sector of Chinese education produced scientists and engineers to meet the
ambitious national goal of economic modernization. The utilitarian education became
a dominant discourse in China again.
The primary determination for the entrance to the key-point schools was
exclusively based on academic performance. The examination-bound assessment
method was used as the sole criterion in measuring students‘ academic performance
and ability. Meanwhile, the school quality was also evaluated on the basis of the
annual entrance examination. Those that produced a high percentage of students who
gained entrance to key point schools had the possibility of being authorized as keypoint schools. In the high-stakes environment, students, teachers and school
administrators were bearing increased pressure from the undue emphasis on testing.
For students, to climb up the education ladder for a secured job in the state sector, the
only channel was to be the best student in the best schools at each level. The critical
standard in evaluating ―what the best is‖ was based on examination results. Teachers‘
work performance was significantly measured and rewarded by students‘ test score
gains. School principals were expected to build school publicity through raising the
proportion of graduates who were admitted to key-point schools. The high-pressure
competition for privileged elite education resulted in an intense incentive of teaching
to the test.
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Education was revalued by Chinese society after the Great Cultural Revolution
decade (1966-1976) which brought Chinese education to a virtual halt. While teachers
and parents applied testing pressure to students to compete for the limited access to
elite education at young ages, they also boosted up a prevailing social trend toward
examination-oriented utilitarian education. An often-ignored fact is that this trend was
directly derived from the central state‘s advocacy and insistence on the meritocratic
education and economic function of education. After the death of Mao in 1976,
education for economic modernization was assigned special significance in China.
In restoring Chinese society from the chaos of the Great Cultural Revolution, the
central state was dedicated to reconstructing Chinese economy and closing the
scientific and technological gap between China and more developed countries. The
core figure in the Chinese Communist Party in the post-Mao era, Deng Xiaoping
(1983) repeatedly emphasizes that science and technology constitute a primary
productive force and education is the foundation to the achievement of socialist
modernization. Unprecedentedly, the focus has been placed on the role of education in
improving the economic power of China while downgrading the political function of
education since the late 1970s. Due to the contradiction between the limited
educational resources and increased need of highly-trained professionals for
economic development, the problem of quality versus quantity in Chinese
education emerged.
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In the Great Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Chinese education was featured
by its strong egalitarian color. Maoist China put particular emphasis on ―equality‖.
Concretely, it referred to closing the disparity between urban and rural development
and removing the hierarchy in status of mental and manual labors (Chen, 1980).
Motivated by the ideal of education equality, providing universal primary education
and expanding secondary enrollment became the goal of education in Maoist China.
Despite the large increase in the number of schools, the state fund for schooling
remained low and the length of schooling was shortened (Rosen, 1985). The massive
expansion of schooling was at the cost of cutting off the elite sector at the top of the
educational pyramid of China (Han, 2001). Meanwhile, in implementing Mao‘s idea
of combining manual labor with mental studies, local workers or peasants were
invited to teach classes about hands-on work. The enlarged role of these nonprofessionals in schooling diminished the status and influence of professional
educators in schools. The respect to educators and the value of education were
completely challenged. Anti-intellectualism pervaded in China. In 1968, all schools
across the country were suspended, while moving teachers to manual labor and
rusticating the urban youth to the countryside. The most serious negative consequence
of these efforts was a decline in the quality of education (Shirk, 1979).
At the same time, the Great Cultural Revolution drove the Chinese economy
into a depth of collapse from 1966 to 1976. In the late 1970s, China couldn‘t afford
enormous funds to reconstruct the Chinese education system at all levels and in all
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aspects equally. In 1977, Vice-premier Fang Yi announced that the state had decided
to increase budgetary allocation to science and education, ―because…we cannot do
everything all at once. We must give priority to building and improving major
research institutes and schools of higher education in accordance with what was
necessary and possible‖ (p. 15). To put it simply, in post-Mao era, China gave the
priority to higher education under the consideration of concentrating educational
investment on the training of high-level scientific and technical expertise 21 . This
explicitly sanctioned an essentially bifurcated school system, with a small elite sector
to train first-class scientists and engineers alongside a large mass sector that was to
provide basic educational skills, with the possibility of vocational training for the
majority (Rosen, 1985).
The national goal of Four Modernizations promoted intellectual meritocracy and
strengthened the economic function of Chinese education. In fact, it is the economic
imperative that rationalized the meritocratic education in China. As economist Clark
Kerr (1979) observes, the elite group of selected talents necessary for economic
modernization in China was the skilled personnel, including scientists, technicians,
teachers and the like:

21

Among the 88 national key-point universities and colleges authorized by the State Council, 53

had the tradition of particularly focusing on scientific, engineering and technological education
(MOE, 1978). Chinese scholar Yuan Zhenguo (1999) conducted research in 348 key point
secondary schools in 13 provinces and autonomous regions in 1982. He observed these key -point
schools put much more emphasis on science and engineering education.
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Their merit mainly lied in mastering the intellectual content of science
and technology. Only those most talented received the training that can
lead to technological mastery; only the most competent academically
were prepared to become the most productive economically‖. (p. 749)
The egregious highlight of the meritocratic myth in Chinese education further
strengthened economic utilitarianism in Chinese schools at the state level, especially
after the initiation of economic reform in 1979.
The decision to concentrate the state‘s educational resources to a few key
schools in 1978 was largely based on the consideration of producing maximum
economic returns in the shortest time (Pepper, 1980). In the logic of economic
utilitarianism, it was the most effective and rational strategy in promoting the nation‘s
mastery of science and technology for economic modernity. Economic modernization
relied on a group of intellectual elites who were educated in the meritocratic
education system; schooling should sort these elites out from the masses and train
them intensively. In stressing education development must be in line with economic
development, education for economic efficiency gained overwhelming advocacy in
China. Not surprisingly, the function of education was reduced to serving economic
growth and producing proper human resources.
In applying a strictly centralized national policy to Chinese schools, the central
state easily conceived a national consensus on what model of education was most
needed in China. Suzanne Pepper (1996) describes the Chinese school system in
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detail: schools were standardized, named and graded by national regulation and
resources concentrated in a few designated key schools to be promoted as models of
education quality (1996). Following the lead, the curriculum philosophy was oriented
toward meritocratic education for economic modernization. Under the name of
exerting centralized quality control, once again, there was national regulation about
what to teach and how to teach after the late 1970s. Susan Shirk (1979) observes that
the MOE prescribed a uniform national curriculum, including teaching plans, syllabi
for each subject and teaching materials. Local education departments/bureaus and
schools were stripped of flexibility in integrating the national curriculum into their
particular local circumstances. The training in the elite sector and mass sector was
differentiated but appropriate to students‘ future role in Chinese economy. Testing
became the most-often-used tool in placing students in the bifurcated school system
according to their intellectual ability.
―Right from the start however, the multiple flaws of this system were widely
criticized across society‖ (Dello-lacovo, 2009, p. 241). The accumulated criticism
concentrates on the over-intensive focus on the examination-centered curriculum
philosophy: the pedagogical style relied on rote memorization lectures; the teaching
content was based on the single set of textbooks assigned by the MOE; textbook
knowledge was disconnected with practical life; students were weighted down by
excessive pressure of high-stakes tests (Pepper, 1996, Thogerson, 1990). In short, as
teaching was geared by examinations, all around development of students was ignored
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in the undue emphasis on testing achievement and the significance of schooling was
narrowed to training human resources needed in economic development.
5.2.2.2 Examination-oriented education vs Quality-oriented Education
Since the 1990s, the essential-qualities-oriented (EQO) education (素质教育)
has been boosted up to be the dominant trend in the current curriculum reform. In
1994, at the National Conference of Education, the EQO education was introduced
introduced as a solution to solve problems in Chinese education in the turning of
century. In 1996, the MOE publicized the successful experience of the EQO education
in Hunan province to the country. At the end of 1998, the MOE issued the 2003-2007
Action Scheme for Invigorating Chinese Education Towards the 21st Century (《面向
21 世纪中国教育振兴计划》), initiating the Trans-century EQO Education Project
in China to improve the quality of Chinese people. In 1999, the State Council issued
Decision on Furthering Education Reform and Promoting EQO Education (《关于深
化教育改革全面推进素质教育的决定》) and claimed that the EQO education
should be implemented in all educational sectors.
The MOE (1997) defines the EQO education as oriented by the most
fundamental principle of improving the quality of the nation. It is a state policy of
education based on the Education Law, serving the long-term development of the
Chinese educatees and Chinese society. In order to enhance the basic quality of all
students at all aspects, the EQO education places the focus on the competences of the
educatees and the development of the educatees–morally, intellectually and physically.
The MOE stresses the imperative of transforming from the examination-centered
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education to EQO education. In implementing the EQO education, Chinese schools
are expected to train high-quality human resources for the demands newly emerging
in the transformation from the planning economy to market economy as well as the
competitions of comprehensive national power in the global world.
In 1999, the Trans-century EQO education Project (跨世纪素质教育工程) was
listed as the important component of the Action Scheme for Invigorating Education in
the 21st Century (《面向 21 世纪教育振兴行动计划》). The Action Scheme entails
the curriculum reform in the primary and secondary education:
by the year 2000 a framework and standards of basic education
curricula will have taken preliminary shape and progress will have
made in reforming the content and methods of teaching, promoting a
new evaluation system, in-service training for teachers, and launching
experiments on new school curricula. It is envisaged that on the basis
of experiments extending over ten years or so, we will be enabled to
implement a new system of basic education curricula and teaching
materials for the 21st century throughout the country.
To put the blueprint laid out in the Action Scheme into effect, in 2001, the
MOE issued the Outline of Basic Education Curriculum Reform (Pilot) after
consulting with educational experts and gaining experiences from pilot studies
in some regions. This Outline clearly points out that the purpose of the reform
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is to build a new curriculum system in accordance with the principle of EQO
education. The concrete objectives are:
1) To cultivate a learning-centered attitude for students, integrating
the process of acquiring textbook knowledge into the process of
building a positive value system and ability to learn;
2) To establish a balanced, integrative course structure, in setting
up a consistent subject and instruction hour arrangement from
primary to secondary education. In addition, comprehensive
courses22 are encouraged to meet the diverse needs of local areas
and students.
3) To enhance the connection between curriculum content and
practice. To stimulate students‘ interest of learning and prepare
them for lifelong learning.
4) To involve students in the learning process actively and foster
their ability to acquire new knowledge, collect information,
analyze and solve problems, communicate and cooperate with
others.

22

According to the Outline of Basic Education Curriculum Reform issued in 2001 by the MOE, the

comprehensive course refers to a course that combines two or more subjects and studies their
interrelationship. For example, Science is a comprehensive course that could include Physics,
Chemistry, Geology, ect. Comprehensive courses are given a central place in primary schools, but the
ratio of comprehensive courses in the total instruction hours gradually decreases in secondary
education.
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5) To use academic assessment as a tool in promoting the
development of students and enhancing the pedagogical
practices of teachers.
6) To build a three-level curriculum management system of the
state, localities and schools in order to improve the adaptability
of school curriculum in local areas and for local students.
The overarching philosophy guiding the current curriculum reform is explicitly
reflected in the six objectives. The reform intends to initiate a significant
transformation from the examination-oriented curriculum to a learning-centered
holistic one. As never before, the reform is much more concerned about students‘
interests and all-around development. Students are not treated as passive receivers of
book knowledge, but rather active explorers of facts and theories. According to the
2001 Outline, academic ability is not simply associated with the superficial
acquisition of theories and skills, but includes the abilities of lifelong learning and
independent thinking. Correspondingly, teaching is to stimulate students‘ motivation
to learn and cultivate their competences of real life problem solving. Teachers are
expected to encourage students to participate in exploring and experiencing realities
and interactively cooperate with others in the learning process. Text-based
instructional materials are the important content in the classroom, but a wide range of
resources in and out schools could be used. In addition, the new evaluation system no
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longer attempts to identify and select high-scored students, but to assess the progress
of learning and quality of teaching.
Embracing the philosophy of holistic development of students, the curriculum
reform is to rectify the narrowed utilitarian view of what school education is and what
school education is for. Teaching to testing and learning for testing are not the
ultimate goals of schooling. The learning-driven approach in the EQO education
requires the curriculum design take the learner‘s perspectives into account and
prepare the learner for living outside the classroom. As a result, the new curriculum
system as a whole should be more open to diversity and heterogeneity, covering
distinct learning environments and varied experiences of learners. Also, the trend of a
relaxed centralized control over the Chinese school curriculum is supposed to emerge
in the current reform with the establishment of the three-level curriculum
management system to tolerate more local inputs. However, after a decade, to what
extent the curriculum reform has changed the orientation of schooling in China is
uncertain.
Theoretically, in implementing the EQO education, a set of centrally unified
national standard is not suitable for every classroom and the standardized testing is
not appropriate in evaluating the development of individual learners. A shifting from
examination-oriented utilitarian education to quality-oriented holistic education is
supposed to be an irreversible trend in China. However, the way to achieve the goals
of the EQO education in China is long and inexplicit. Rote learning and examinations
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still dominate Chinese classrooms. A 2005 report on the EQO education in Jiangsu
province points out that the examination-oriented education was deeply rooted in the
school culture and the value of that type of education was twisting the goals of the
curriculum reform. According to the report, the majority of the curriculum resources
at all levels concentrated on the subjects required in the entrance examinations to
secondary schools and higher education. Schools even cut back non-examined
subjects or put on extra class hours for teaching to the test. If school would not
provide such courses, parents would send their children to after-school tutoring or
cram classes (Peng, 2005). According to Report on Development of Shanghai
Children and Adolescents (2011), over two thirds of Shanghai students were attending
cram classes or after-class tutoring programs. Both Jiangsu and Shanghai are two of
the most educationally advanced regions in China and the earliest pilot areas in
implementing the EQO education.
In response to criticism on the examination-oriented curriculum philosophy, the
central state does take real reform efforts. The amended Compulsory Law (2006)
annuls the key school system. In the same year, the MOE issued the Guidance on
Implementing Compulsory Law and Further Regulating the Operation of Compulsory
Education Schools (《关于贯彻《义务教育法》进一步规范义务教育办学行为的若干
意 见》 ) to release students and teachers from the workload and pressure of the

examination-oriented education. The 2006 Guidance abolishes the entrance
examination to secondary schools instead of the entering-school-nearby policy, bans
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tracking students into academic ability-based classes, and prohibits raking students
and schools based on test scores. However, the enforcement of the administrative
directive remains insufficient and erratic. The burden of homework and after school
tutoring increased on students in the past 10 years. Sun yunxiao (2010), Vice Director
of the China Youth and Children Research Center (中国青少年研究中心) points out
that latest research shows that from 1999 to 2010, the daily sleeping time of Chinese
primary and middle students was continually reduced due to the increased homework
burden. Sleeping deficiency became a nationwide common issue for Chinese students.
Among the 5000 student participants from 184 schools in 10 provinces, 80% showed
sleeping deficiencies on weekdays and 70% had the problem at weekends. The
homework burden was a direct result from the pressure of the high-stakes testing.
Suzanne Pepper (1996), an American scholar with a long-standing interest in
Chinese education, frankly expresses her concerns on the unresolved dilemmas of
Chinese education reform in the 20th century: ―There was a critical consensus of the
education system of the time but the attitude of Chinese educators was deeply
ambivalent. They paid lip service to ideals critical of the regular system while doing
completely the opposite in practice‖ (p. 104). It is still the case in the current
curriculum reform. After over two decades of reform, the few progresses toward EQO
education are slow and remain unclear. Chinese schooling is struggling between the
ideal of students‘ all around development and realistic pressure of teaching to the test.
Australian Scholar Dello-lacovo (2009) points out that ―one of the most perplexing
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aspects of the EQO education discourse is the apparent widespread support for the
ideal in theory coupled with widespread resistance in practice‖ (p.248). This
ambivalence does make the EQO education in the Chinese curriculum reform an
―empty talk‖. The curriculum reform centered on EQO education hasn‘t significantly
reduced or eliminated utilitarianism in Chinese curriculum system. However, more
importantly, what causes the ambivalence?
The external obstacles in implementing the EQO education are visible: the lack
of funding, the scarcity of curriculum resources and the shortage of experienced
teachers definitely hold back the reform progress (Feng, 2006; Dello-lacovo, 2009;
Zhong, 2006). However, in a top-down reform, the state‘s position in the reform and
its strategy in advancing the reform should never been ignored. The current
curriculum reform is led by the centrally imposed directives and moving toward the
goals set at the top. Even though there is somewhat loosened control over curriculum
development and management in order to promote the EQO education, the central
state still retains its absolute authority in deciding what and how to do, but leaves the
heavy workload on the shoulders of local education bureaucracy and educators. In this
sense, the split between authority and responsibility in centralized decentralization is
acutely hampering the reform process.
The EQO education has quickly become the spotlight in the current curriculum
reform. There is a consensus from the central state to local educators at the front-line
that it is imperative to shift Chinese schooling from the examination-oriented to the
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quality-oriented in the turning of the century. However, the central state‘s actual
attitude remains somewhat ambiguous and even ambivalent. In the 2008 National
Development Conference of Primary and Secondary School Principals, attending
principals described their situation: on the one hand, as educators, they advocated that
Chinese schooling should be oriented toward children‘s all-around competences and
life-long development; on the other hand, as school heads, their work had to be
centered on the rate of entering upgrade schools which was based on the high-stakes
testing. The pressure was from the parents and communities‘ high expectation of
preparing their children to win the competitions in the entrance examinations (Zhang,
2008). Director of Education Department of Yunnan Province, Luo Chongmin (2010)
replied in an interview that the EQO education was empty talk, unless the college
entrance examination system was reformed. In the top-down curriculum reform, the
central state hasn‘t demonstrated real commitment to significantly reform the entrance
examination system even though it has repeatedly announced that the priority is given
to the EQO education.
The assessment method is always at the heart of the current curriculum reform
but also the battleground of tensions. In fact, the entrance examination at each level of
Chinese education system is caught in the crossfire. The advocacy of the entrance
examination in China is usually based on the consideration that standardized testing
would be open, fair and impartial, highly comparable, as well as low cost and less
time-consuming (Liu, 1997&2000). However, public criticism is accumulating. Under
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the heavy pressure of excessive homework and high-stakes testing, teaching relies on
the pedagogy of rote memorization and learning is a passive process of acquiring
textbook knowledge. The EQO education was introduced by the central state as the
rectification to fix the problems of the examination-oriented education. Seemingly,
there is a strong urge at the state level to implement the EQO education in China.
Why does the central state‘s real effort to reform the examination-bounded
assessment still remain conservative?
As demonstrated in Chapter 4, a unified national curriculum could indoctrinate
whoever involved in the system with an idea of national standards and normalize a
centrally imposed conformity in social discourses. Meanwhile, the politically
screened curriculum knowledge creates a lived hegemony that redefines the meaning
of realities based on the dominant group‘s culture. In this sense, schooling could be
used as a socio-political device in maintaining the existing governing structure.
School curriculum is the last field that the central state is willing to decentralize.
Currently, in deconcentrating responsibility for education finance and administration
down to the local level, the central state does somewhat reduce constraints on how the
work is done by the local education bureaucracy and schools. Correspondingly, the
current curriculum system opens doors to local input and encourages innovations in
integrating the EQO education into a particular local circumstance. The EQO
education upholds child-centered approach to learning23 and the current curriculum
23

Child-centered education places the focus on children‘s need and interest in the learning process.

John Dewey is one of the theorists who build philosophical basis of child-centered approach to
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philosophy embraces diversity and heterogeneity. However, for the central state, the
most imperative issue is to avoid the loss of its control over school curriculum in the
reform process. In order to strengthen uniformity in socio-political discourses and
maintain conformity with national policies, the central state must find a way to
stabilize its absolute authority over the curriculum system. Retaining the examination
bounded assessment system, the central state actually applies an accountability-based
evaluation procedure to exert a centralized control over what kind of education is
needed and what kind of students is qualified. Maduas, Raczeck & Clarke (1997)
writes,
Both standardized testing and authentic assessments used as
instruments of public policy confer, on those who control them, real
power over the actions of teachers, students and administrators; real
power over the curriculum; real power over what is taught and learned,
and how materials is taught and learned. (p. 8)
The crucial point here is the assessment method in education is not simply about how
to measure academic achievement and quality of schooling, but also about who holds
the real authority over the entire curriculum system.

education. Dewey (1902) argues that ―we must take our stand with the child and our departure from
him. It is he and not the subject-matter which determines both quality and quantity of learning‖
(p. 108).
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The central state of China is unwilling to decentralize its authority over the
examination system. Apparently, the central state encourages quality-oriented holistic
education. However, relying on the high-stakes testing, the examination-bounded
assessment method functions as the most powerful hidden hand setting up limits of
local input in curriculum development and ensuring the overall homogeneity of
Chinese curriculum system. The situation becomes dilemmatic that whatever local
innovation could be done, the examination-bounded assessment has the final say.
Thus, on the one hand, students, parents, teachers and school principals overtly
criticize the abuse of the examinations; on the other hand they are completely
motivated by the curriculum philosophy of teaching to the test, even though they are
directly dealing with the problems of the examination-bounded assessment on the
daily basis.
5.3 Enduring Dilemma in Chinese Schooling
The current curriculum reform is an on-going attempt to cope with deep
problems in China‘s curriculum system. The goal set up in the reform is to adjust the
curriculum system to meet the needs of all-around development of Chinese students
and integrate the development of Chinese education with the developments of the
nation as a whole. However, the strategy of centralized decentralization deliberately
creates the split between authority and responsibility that is impeding the reform
progress toward these goals. Seemingly, the superficial decentralization in the form of
deconcentrating work/responsibility down to lower levels welcomes local inputs in
rebuilding a more inclusive curriculum system. However, holding the authority at the
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top of the state, local education bureaucracy and schools hardly contribute to the
three-level curriculum management system in a meaningful way. In a similar vein, the
transformation from examination-oriented utilitarian education to the quality-oriented
holistic education is also hampered by the central state‘s ambiguous stance in
reforming the evaluation and selection system based on high-stakes testing.
Apparently, the paradoxical mixture of centralization and decentralization
causes bottlenecks in the reform process. In fact, the crux of the unresolved problems
in the curriculum reform is not simply about how to govern a curriculum system at the
technological level. The inherent impediment to construct a balanced central-local
relation in China‘s curriculum system comes from an enduring value dilemma
regarding the purpose of schooling in socialist Chinese context. Since 1949, Chinese
curriculum system has already experienced waves of top-down reforms. The policies
shift from Mao‘s egalitarian education to Deng‘s elitist education and then to today‘s
EQO education. However, what has never changed is that the motives and objectives
of the oscillating curriculum policies are driven by the national goals in different
historical moments.
In Maoist China (1949-1976), the most urgent mission of this newly
established regime was to consolidate the ruling status of the Chinese Community
Party and restore the country from decades of ruins left by wars. Thus, Mao insists
that education must ―serve the politics of the proletariat and be combined with
productive laboring (Mao, 1957 & 1958). To substantially expand education access
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for children from peasant and working-class families, Mao‘s concept of egalitarian
education set into motion and led to a rapid quantitative expansion of schooling at all
levels until the Great Cultural Revolution brought a halt in Chinese education. In
order to indoctrinate unitary socialist beliefs to younger generations of China,
academic content in school curriculum was overwhelmed by political and ideological
content across the county (Tsang, 2001, Chen, 1980). In Deng‘s era, Deng emphasizes
that education must be in line with national economic development (Deng,
1978/1983). Following the lead of Deng, China concentrated the best resources on the
most talented students in the elitist sector. The purpose was to foster the most needed
professions for the transformation in Chinese economy and economic growth in the
shortest period. Scientific and technical knowledge was treated as the most prominent
in school curriculum. In the turning of the century, Jiang Zeming (1998), the core of
the third generation of Communist Party of China leaders, claims that knowledge
economy24 has been dramatically changing the economic and social life of the world.
The competitions between nations are the competitions between human resources in
nature. Thus, the future of China in international competitions all depends on

24

The concept of the knowledge economy refers to a knowledge-based economic system. It

emphasizes that knowledge has become the most important factor in economic development. The
concept can be traced to 1960s. Theodore Schultz (1961) points out that people are an important part of
the wealth of nations. Gary Becker (1964) asserts that economic growth now depends on the
knowledge, information, ideas, skills and health of the work force. Investments in education could
improve human capital which would contribute to economic growth. Peter Drucker (1993) argues that
knowledge rather than ownership of capital generates new wealth and that power is shifting from
owner and massagers of capital to knowledge workers.
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educational development and innovations in science and technology. Chinese schools
now become the front line in worldwide economic competitions. Curriculum reform
becomes imperative to cultivate students‘ practicing and creative skills for challenges
in the economic globalization process.
The oscillating curriculum policies in post-1949 China are evidence to a fact
that the state is playing a dominant role in Chinese education. It is the central state
that decides the strength, direction and content of the curriculum reforms. The topdown initiation of the education reforms are based on the demands of national
development at a particular historical moment rather than consideration of real needs
of education itself. In this sense, schooling as a social institution in China has not
been treated as an autonomous social agency in educating younger generations and
interacting with social changes, but as a manipulated social institution tied to state
apparatus. It is noteworthy that utilitarianism is deeply imbedded in Chinese
education philosophy. Linking education with national development, the value of
education in China is reduced to its functions in achieving either political stability or
economic growth. Currently, the emphasis is placed on the economic and social
benefits brought about by educational development in the global competitions of
national power.
Grounded in utilitarian conceptions of schooling, the current reform rhetoric,
particularly that of deconcentrated curriculum development but nationalized
curriculum standards creates a narrow problem/solution frame focusing almost
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exclusively on the efficiency and outcomes of schooling. The central state makes its
standpoint in the curriculum reform clear that what matters is not schooling itself, but
the result of schooling. In the state directives, the purpose of schooling in China is
interpreted as training students to be useful human resources in improving the
competitiveness of the nation in the global world. Zhou Ji (2004), former Minister of
Education, states in his speech to launch the 2003-2007 Action Plan for Invigorating
Education (《2003-2007》教育振兴计划) that education is playing a fundamental
role in changing the heave pressure of a population of over 1.3 billion into a rich pool
of human resource for a sustainable development of Chinese society and socialistic
market economy in the era of knowledge economy and economic globalization.
Relying on the never-loosened centralized control, the top-down approach ensures
that the all reform efforts at each level are on the right path and toward the consistent
direction. Thus, a utilitarian perspective of schooling is dominant over the ethos of
Chinese education.
Meanwhile, utilitarianism can be found in the majority of China‘s educational
officials, many of its school principals, teachers and its students. Local education
sectors are required to carry out the national policy without much dissension. While
doing the work assigned by the central state through the bureaucracy channel, local
education officials and school educators acknowledge that their role in the reform is
to share the workload burden previously on the shoulder of the central state, but not
the policy-making authority. There is no space for them to think about the issues in
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the curriculum reform critically or develop their own autonomy in making meaningful
changes to the system. In the reform process, these education officials and educators
just do what they are told to do. They know an unspoken truth quite well that
innovations are welcomed; however, innovations not only increase their workload, but
also distract their energy and time from teaching to the test. Their work performance
is still evaluated and rewarded on the rate of the graduates who are admitted to
reputable schools at higher levels. Thus, preparing students to survive and succeed in
the testing system is seen as the most important mission. Not surprising, local input in
the tri-level curriculum management system is limited and significant efforts to
promote the EQO education move slowly. Meanwhile, the utilitarian ethos in the
school system has already become a prevailing social discourse. A school diploma is
viewed as the stepping-stone for a desired job. Chinese parents push their children to
work hard for high-stakes testing. Students compete in entrance examinations at each
level for their future career. Focusing exclusively on the utility of schooling, learning
is not for its own sake, but a means to gain practical skills needed in the job market.
Undoubtedly, utilitarianism stifles schooling and prevents it from embracing
its true identity. More noticeably, utilitarianism could build a barrier to achieve
inclusivity within Chinese education. The motive based on the usefulness of education
justifies the pursuit for the maximized profit by investing in education that places the
emphasis on the efficiency and cost-benefit. Due to limited educational resources in
China, quality education is highly competitive. The urge for a prospering China in
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global, knowledge-based economy rationalizes the choice of concentrating education
resources for the most talented ones. However, as economist Clark Kerr (1978) points
out that class privilege can be minimized but education differentiation cannot be
avoided in China. Those who gain more access to better education could become a
privileged ―new class‖ in China. Such a trend would keep enlarging the gaps between
elite education and mass education, between urban students and rural students,
between students from rich families and students from low-income families. Andrew
Kipnis (2001) concluded from his research in Zouping County in Shandong Province
that there were increased rural/urban equality issues with the curriculum reform.
Passing the entrance examinations is the only channel for students to gain access to
quality education and decent urban jobs in the future.

Kipnis finds that in the

curriculum reform the rural schools in Zouping devoted extra school hours on the core
exam subjects (such as Maths and Chinese) and were less likely to have activity
courses such as computer technologies, speaking English or creativity classes during
their mandated instruction hours, as most rural schools simply had no resources to
hold such classes. Rural students were still intensively dedicated to rote learning as all
teachers were prepared in that way and little equipment was necessary. A rural teacher
expressed his concerned that the reform toward EQO education could eventually
reduce the opportunities of these rural students and even put them at a disadvantage.
Among Chinese students, parents, educators and scholars, there is a strong call
for rebuilding an open curriculum system to meet diverse needs of individual students
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and communities and significantly contribute to children‘s all-around development in
lifelong term. The state does officially announce that the current reform is a
movement toward this idealized goal through jointly working with local sectors in
curriculum management and development, but the strategy of a centralized
decentralization only scratches the surface of the problem-solving. Without a
completely rethinking of the utilitarian purpose of schooling, the reform will continue
to confront enduring dilemmas regarding educating for economic efficiency versus
educating for social equality, educating for consolidating ideological consensus versus
educating for cultivating independent, critical ways of thinking and educating for
realizing one‘s potential for the good of all versus education for present interest.
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Chapter 6 Conclusion
I started this study with the purpose to critically reflect on changes in Chinese
curriculum governance after 1986. Through a socio-philosophical approach, this study
not only investigates authority-sharing issues emerging in the reform process, but also
connects these issues with the most fundamental value orientation of Chinese
education with regard to the aim of education.
First of all, this study describes the historical and contemporary backgrounds of
current curriculum reform in China. Chinese education has undergone spectacular
development and substantial reforms since 1949. In Maoist China (1949-1976),
Chinese schools were centrally funded and administered by the state. Chinese
curriculum system featured a set of unified standards imposed by the central state.
However, the rigidly centralized governance over schooling in China resulted in
inefficiency and ineffectiveness in carrying out national education policies, due to
lack of plasticity and adaptability. Meanwhile, the cost to maintain such a highly
centralized education system became an unaffordable fiscal burden, especially after a
decade of the Great Cultural Revolution that caused severe social chaos and economic
collapse. The central state has to encourage local governments and education
institutions to search for alternative financial sources and transfer some administration
work down to the local level. The changed central-local relation in education finance
and administration inevitably leads to a series of substantial adjustments in China‘s
curriculum system. The criticism concentrates on the narrowness and rigidity of the
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unified national curriculum which excluded local diversities and individual needs. At
the same time, the accelerated globalization process not only nurtures interconnection
among states but also provides more opportunities for joint work between the local
and global. In this climate, decentralization has become a reform strategy widely
adopted by many countries. The current curriculum reform in China is not immune
from the global trend of education decentralization. To a great degree, the current
curriculum reform is not a proactive approach to enhance China‘s curriculum system,
but more like a reactive response to new issues arising from Chinese economic reform
and global trend of decentralizing education services.
Secondly, this study analyzes concrete content of current curriculum reform and
demonstrates the apparently loosened control over Chinese curriculum system. The
top-down Chinese curriculum reform initiated in 1986 is not a simple readjustment in
the content of schooling or replacement of textbooks, but an attempt to fundamentally
reconstruct China‘s curriculum system in a transitional period. Different from
previous practices in which the national curriculum was designed by the central state
alone and carried out by the localities. This time, the central state encourages local
innovation and participation, working with local education authorities, schools and
other social sectors. To accommodate local diversities, the new system is composed of
national curriculum, local curriculum and school-based curriculum. The emphasis on
the EQO education takes individual students‘ all-around development into account.
These reform efforts create an illusion that the central state is loosening its control
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over Chinese curriculum system. However, with a long history of highly centralized
control over major sectors in the state, the central-local relation in China‘s curriculum
system is much more complex that it seems.
Thirdly, this study clarifies the ambiguity in defining decentralization based on
Mark Hanson‘s theory and reexamines changes in Chinese curriculum governance
using this conceptual framework. In Mark Hanson‘s (1989a, 1989b, 2000 & 2006)
conceptual framework of education decentralization, it is important to investigate
whether changes in an education system have been accompanied with a shift of real
authority in the decision-making process. Even though the reform has been made for
over two decades, the authority of the central state still prevails across China‘s
curriculum system. In essence, the efforts to diversify China‘s curriculum system are
implemented in a uniform manner determined by the central state. While transferring
work to the local level, the central state has actually strengthened its authority over
school curriculum system. On the one hand, the central state concentrates on
education legislation, laying down national guidelines and overall plans to regulate all
aspects of schooling in China. On the other hand, a highly structured supervision
system is restored to ensure all efforts in reforming Chinese curriculum system are on
the right track. With little support for local autonomy in decision-making process,
local education bureaucracies and schools rely on the instructions from the hierarchy
above to do the work. Certainly, centrality is still heavily weighted by the state in
governing Chinese curriculum system. In this sense, the decentralization reform in
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China‘s curriculum system remains superficial, taking the shape of deconcentration.
More exactly, the top-down curriculum reform is a process toward centralized
decentralization.
Fourthly, to explain why the central state is unwilling to transfer its authority
over school curriculum to the local level, this study demonstrates the particular social
and political functions of school curriculum through the theoretical lens offered by
Michel Foucault and Raymond Williams. Foucault (1975) describes schools as
disciplinary institutions which not only train docile bodies but also produce
submissive minds. In contemporary context, a unified curriculum system implies
constant subjections and obedience to social norms, and thus it is part of the
disciplinary mechanism in exerting control over social members and social discourse.
In the case of Chinese curriculum reform, diversities in ―knowledge‖ are assumed to
be a threat to a consensus culture and ultimately destabilize a homogenous society.
There is always a strong need of a social filter to resolve diverse discourse into a set
of unified social meanings. Relying on the control over school curriculum, the central
state normalizes its authority in daily schooling and eventually builds a consensus on
social discourse through imposing national curriculum standards and requirement.
In contemporary education systems, national curriculum represents an
assembly of official knowledge that is legislated by the state power and considered
the most prestigious knowledge in a national context. However, the legislation
process is also a political screening process, involving power relations. In
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manipulating knowledge we exert power and in exerting power we manipulate
knowledge. Raymond Williams (1973) emphasizes that education is involved in a
continual making and remaking of an effective dominant culture and educational
institutions are the main agencies in distributing dominant culture. In reality, the
dominant group not only sets up limits on the selection process in formulating school
curriculum, but also exerts pressure on the organization and distribution of school
curriculum. The political purpose is to indoctrinate the dominant culture to young
generations and reinforce existing power relations. The Chinese curriculum is not an
exception.
Finally, the dissertation analyzes the apparent bottlenecks and deep value
dilemmas which impede current Chinese curriculum reform efforts to achieve its goal
of building a more inclusive curriculum system in China. To cope with problems in
Chinese schooling, the strategy of centralized decentralization is adopted to avoid the
loss of control over school curriculum in this transitional period. This superficial
decentralization merely involves a transferring of work/responsibility, but not the real
authority. In the process, the split between authority and responsibility becomes
inevitable and even causes bottlenecks in building a more inclusive curriculum system
in China. In fact, both centralization and decentralization may be useful governing
technologies in balancing central-local relations in the education sector and
coordinating between the national goals of education set by the state and the realities
in local classrooms. What is really at issue is how to construct an evolving
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relationship between the state and education. The crux of the problematic stateeducation relationship in Chinese curriculum reform is the utilitarian view of
schooling, which puts undue emphasis on economic or social benefits brought about
by education.
Since the 1949, the central state under the direct leadership of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCPCC) has played a dominant role in Chinese education. As Mun
Tsang (2000) summarizes,
the party leaders fought over alternative goals and approaches to
national development, and as the education system served as a reactive
vehicle for realizing the party‘s development objectives rather than an
autonomous institution for social changes, educators, parents, and
student have been unwilling caught in cycles of heart-wrenching
dislocations and adjustments…Policy shifts in education reflect shifts
in power and development perspective among party factions. (p. 23)
Viewing Chinese schooling as a manipulated social device under the control of the
central state, to what extent and to what direction the reform efforts in Chinese
curriculum highly depends on the extent of critically rethinking the utilitarianism
view of Chinese schooling at the cultural level.
At the institutional level, structural adjustment in central-local relations in
Chinese curriculum reform can‘t continue without political reform. In a nation as
large as China, how to achieve social stability with fast economic growth is the top
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issue for the Chinese Communist Party, the supreme political leader of China. Deng
(1989) points out that stability is an overwhelming issue in China: without a stable
environment, we cannot achieve any goals and we would even ruin what we have
achieved. Follow Deng‘s lead, the polity system in China consistently focuses on
building a disciplined society which is characterized by its uniformity and conformity.
However, the rapidly expanded economy brings more complicated social issues. To
build a harmonious society, the policy-makers at the state level have to cope with the
challenges from below and deal with the dilemmas originated from the unbalanced
central-local relations while seeking social stability. Without a structural adjustment
in authority-sharing arrangement at the state level, it is difficult to resolve the split
between responsibility and authority in the education sector in a meaningful way.
The relationship between state and education has never been single-dimensional.
Political reform can also benefit from changes in Chinese education. Since the late
1970s, the monopolistic domination of the state apparatus has been loosening
somewhat. Chinese society is experiencing dramatic changes in the reform era in
terms of transformations in Chinese economy and an accelerated process of
integrating into the global world. The reduced role of the central state in public
services has become a discernable trend in China. In the current curriculum reform,
the changed curriculum management system and the emphasis on the EQO education
certainly stimulate further demands of further reform Chinese schooling. In doing
more work based on local resources, educators not only face unprecedented
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challenges, but also gain opportunities to learn from their own experiences. Local
education autonomy may grow and spread in the process. More importantly, a
participative perspective can be cultivated in the process. Thus, it is likely that the
consensus on what kind of curriculum system is needed in China may not be solely
defined by the central state, but an inclusive reconciliation between diverse
standpoints and needs of the center, local communities, and individual students.
Through this, local input may contribute to the formulation of national policies in a
meaningful way and national policies may embrace more flexibility to deliver
maximum effectiveness and efficiency in promoting Chinese education.
This dissertation makes a critique on the current curriculum reform in China.
However, the study should not be read as a rejection to the efforts of reconstructing
China‘s curriculum system. Rather, it should be read as a rethinking of the reform and
a critique to the problematic strategy in the process. Any reform is a continuing cycle
of deconstruction and reconstruction. It is also a cycle of critique and improvement.
The ultimate outcome of a reform may be ambiguous, but the urge to consistently
question what we take for granted never goes away. This study is meant to open up
new discussion on possible solutions in further reforming Chinese curriculum reform.
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Appendices
Appendix 1
State Organs of People’s Republic of China


Chinese Communist Party: Ruling political party of the People‘s Republic of
China



Chinese Communist Party Central Committee: Highest leading body of the
Chinese Community Party



Central Financial and Economic Commission: Assumed responsibility for
restoring the state‘s financial and economic system, replaced by the Financial
and Economic Committee of the Government Administrative Council in Oct,
1949.



Government Administrative Council: Highest administrative organ of the
People‘s Republic of China, replaced by the State Council in 1954.



Ministry of Education: Central executive agency of education under the State
Council with broad control over the state‘s education system.



Ministry of Finance: Central executive agency of finance under the State
Council with broad control over the state‘s fiscal policy, economic regulations,
government budget, etc.



National Development and Reform Commission: Successor of the State
Planning Commission, a macroeconomic management agency under the State
Council with broad control over the state‘s economy.
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National People’s Congress: Supreme organ of state power body and the sole
legislative house in the People‘s Republic of China.



People’s Republic of China: Founded in Oct, 1949, under the leadership of the
Chinese Communist Party.



State Planning Commission: Predecessor of the National Development and
Reform Commission, the central macroeconomic management agency of
centrally planned economy in China from 1952 to 1998.



State Council: Synonym of the Central People‘s Government, formerly known
as the Government Administrative Council from 1949 to 1954, the executive
body of the highest state power and the supreme organ of state‘s
administration of the People‘s Republic of China.

217

Appendix 2
Chinese Education Reforms since 1949

Time

1949-1957

1958-1965

1966-1976

1977-1984

1985-1992

1993-2002

2002-the present

Main Reform Efforts
 Nationalized all schools in China
 Fixed the structure of China‘s school system
 Centralized the planning and financing of Chinese education
 Built education theory based on Marxism and Leninism
 Focused on quantitative expansion of education
 Claimed education must serve the proletariat class

 Emphasized political and ideological education in school
 Adopted an admission policy primarily based political
performance as well as family class-origins.
 Sent educated youth to the countryside
 Suspended schools to support the Great Cultural Revolution
 Reconstructed the Chinese school system
 Started to link education development with economic
development
 Gave prominence to science and technology in school
curriculum
 Initiated a structural reform in Chinese education
 Issued a series of laws and regulation regarding compulsory
education, teachers, special education, etc.
 Encouraged a diversified fiscal system for Chinese education
 Deepened the education reform and introduced the EssentialQuality-Oriented education
 Started to marketize and privatize Chinese education
 Outlined the direction and framework of Chinese education in
the 21ST Century.
 Further giving a priority to Essential-Quality-Oriented
education
 Popularizing compulsory education in undeveloped areas
 Improving education equality
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Appendix 3
Memorabilia of Chinese Curriculum Reforms
1950: The MOE issued the Curriculum Standards of All Subjects for Secondary
Schools (Draft)
1951: The People‘s Education Press (PEP) published the first set of national textbooks.
1952: The MOE issued the Temporary Provision of Primary Schools and
Secondary Schools and the Primary School Teaching Plan
1956: The MOE issued the Primary School Teaching Syllabus (All Subjects) and
the Secondary School Teaching Syllabus (All Subjects); published the
second set of national textbooks
1960: The PEP published the third set of national textbooks
1961: The PEP published the fourth set of national textbooks
(1966-1976 regular schooling halted)
1978: The MOE issued the new Teaching Scheme for Full-time Primary and
Secondary School (Draft). The PEP published the fifth set of national
textbooks
1981: The MOE issued the new Teaching Scheme for 6-Year Key-Point Secondary
School and Teaching Scheme for 5-year Primary School
1982: The PEP published the sixth set of national textbooks
1986: The MOE issued the new Teaching Syllabuses for Primary and Secondary
Schools (All Subjects)
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1986: The CCPCC and State Council issued the Compulsory Education Law of
People’s Republic of China. The MOE encouraged diversified preparation
and production of textbooks
1988: The MOE Issued the Teaching Scheme for Nine-year Compulsory
Education Full-time Primary and Middle Schools (Draft). The PEP
published the seventh set of national textbooks
1992: The MOE issued Curriculum Scheme for Nine-year Compulsory Education
Full-time Primary and Middle Schools (amended based on the 1988
Teaching Scheme) and the new Teaching Syllabuses for Nine-year
Compulsory Education Full-time Primary and Middle Schools (All Subjects)
1993: The CCPCC and State Council issued the Outline of Chinese Education
Reform and Development.
1999: The CCPCC and State Council issued the Decision on Deeping Educational
Reform and Promoting Essential-Qualities-Oriented Education. The MOE
issued the Action Scheme for Invigorating Education toward the 21st
Century.
2001: The MOE issued the Outline of Basic Education Curriculum Reform (Pilot).
2001: The MOE issued a set of Curriculum Standards for Compulsory Education
Full-time Primary and Middle Schools
2001: The MOE issued Temporary Provision of Compiling and Approving
Primary and Secondary School Textbooks
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2003: The MOE issued 2003-2007 Action Scheme for Invigorating Chinese
Education.
2010: The CCPCC and State Council issued the Outline of China’s National Plan
for Medium and Long-term Education Reform and Development.
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